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Professor Julia Driver, Chair 
 
 
In this dissertation I defend an unorthodox theory of practical reason called Rational 
Impartialism.  According to this view, one ought to have equal fundamental concern for the 
equal good of everyone.  Central to my argument for Rational Impartialism are two of Henry 
Sidgwick’s axioms of ethics. According to the axiom of Equal Good, one ought to have equal 
fundamental concern for equal portions of the good. According to the axiom of Personal 
Irrelevance, the equal good of any two individuals is exactly similar qua portions of universal 
good.  Sidgwick claims that from these two axioms we can deduce a principle of benevolence 
which is essentially the view I call Rational Impartialism.  However, there are three problems 
with this deduction: (1) an egoist can accept the axioms but resist impartialism by insisting that 
‘good’ is agent-relative, (2) if partiality towards loved ones is itself part of the good, then 
adherence to the axioms could be compatible with having ultimate reasons of partiality, (3) 
disagreement over the axiom of Equal Good seems to undermine its usefulness as a foundational 
ethical premise.  I attempt to revive Sidgwick’s derivation of Rational Impartialism by 
responding to all three challenges.     
1 
 
1  The Partiality Question 
 
1  Sidgwick’s Struggle        
In his “great, drab book,” The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick is in search of fundamental 
ethical principles possessing clarity and precision akin to the foundational principles of geometry 
and the physical sciences.
1
  After failing to find any such principles in the morality of common 
sense, Sidgwick offers a set of axioms which seem to him to possess the “highest certainty 
attainable” in philosophical ethics.  One such axiom states that no individual’s good is of more 
importance form “the point of view of the universe” than the good of any other.  A second states 
that rational beings are “bound to aim at good generally…not merely at a particular part of it.”  
From these two axioms Sidgwick deduces a principle of impartialism which holds that “each one 
is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own, except in so far 
as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by 
him” (ME 382).2   
 Unfortunately, Sidgwick is unable to stand by this deduction as he believes there is a rival 
principle that is equally well justified.  The rival principle is one of self-interest stating that 
“[one’s] own happiness is an end which it is irrational to sacrifice to any other” (ME 498).  
Because the principles of impartialism and self-interest regularly deliver conflicting verdicts 
about what an agent ought to do, Sidgwick somberly concludes that there is an irresolvable 
“Dualism of the Practical Reason,” meaning that in many circumstances, “practical reason, being 
                                                 
1
 The phrase “great, drab book” comes from Derek Parfit in the preface to On What Matters (2011: xxxiii).   
2
 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7
th
 ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981 (reprint of London: Macmillan, 1907).  
I will refer to the 7
th
 edition as ‘ME’.  For earlier editions I will add the edition number (ME1, ME2, etc.).  
References to Sidgwick’s other writings on ethics and epistemology are to his Essays on Ethics and Method, ed. 
Marcus Singer (Oxford, 2000), abbreviated EEM.   
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divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would have to be 
decided by the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups of non-rational 
impulses” (ME 508).    
 It should come as no surprise that Sidgwick’s careful, systematic, and ingenious study of 
the methods and principles of ethics culminates with the question of how to rationally adjudicate 
conflicts between self-interest and the general good.  This is, in my view, the most fundamental 
and important question of philosophical ethics.  It is also the most difficult.  Most everyone 
agrees that we have basic reasons to promote the interests of all human beings as such.  Yet, 
there are also strong intuitions suggesting that we have fundamental reasons to prioritize the 
needs of ourselves and our intimates.  Hence, the unavoidable question: To what extent (if any) 
does one’s own good and the good of one’s loved ones carry greater rational weight for one than 
the equal good of strangers?  I call this the Partiality Question.  Though Sidgwick failed to see 
how we could be justified in settling on an answer to this question, my aim in this dissertation is 
to argue that there is a well-justified answer.  I shall defend a controversial theory of practical 
reason called Rational Impartialism (RI).  According to this view, one ought to have equal 
fundamental concern for the equal good of all individuals.
3
   
 Rational Impartialism is not a popular view.
4
  Although many philosophers believe the 
welfare of complete strangers is a source of objective, non-derivative practical reasons, few such 
                                                 
3
 The ‘ought’ in this formulation is not the moral ‘ought’ but rather the ‘ought’ of ultimate (i.e. non-derivative) 
practical reasons).  RI is compatible with an agent having derivative reasons to prioritize the good of some over the 
equal good of others.  But this will only be the case if such partiality is ultimately justified from an impartial point of 
view.  Note also that RI is formulated in terms of the ‘equal good’ of all individuals.  This is partly to allow for the 
possibility that we are justified in having less fundamental concern for the well-being of agents with bad characters.  
If normatively significant desert exists (which is a question I shall not attempt to settle), then five minutes of 
happiness for Hitler and five minutes of happiness for Gandhi are not equally good, and so RI would not require 
equal fundamental concern for both.      
4
 It bears mentioning at the outset that Rational Impartialism is neutral with respect to consequentialist and 
deontological approaches to ethics. Consequentialists who believe there are prudential reasons that compete with 
impartial ‘moral’ reasons will reject RI. Deontologists who deny that there are duties and permissions of partiality 
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writers have defended impartialism, and several (perhaps most) have explicitly rejected it.
5
  
While these writers agree that personal and partial interests are not the only source of practical 
reasons, they find complete impartialism untenable.
6
  Russ Shafer-Landau (2010: 110) claims 
that the principle that one’s own interests carry extra weight “seems to be a basic, fundamental 
element in any plausible ethical view.”  
 Though it is unconventional, I believe Rational Impartialism constitutes the most 
plausible answer to the Partiality Question.  At the very least, the view merits more serious 
consideration than it has received to date.  My strategy for defending RI is to return the 
axiomatic deduction of impartialism provided by Sidgwick.  Sidgwick abandons his argument 
due to questions about the scope of ‘good’.  Had he been confident that each individual’s good is 
part of a ‘universal good’, meaning that all rational beings have reasons to promote it regardless 
of how they are related to it, then he would have been confident that one ought to give equal 
weight to the equal good everyone.  However, Sidgwick found it just as plausible that ‘good’ is 
always relative to the individual so that each agent has ultimate reason to pursue only her own 
good.  In light of this worry, I shall attempt to vindicate the universal conception of ‘good’ about 
which Sidgwick was uncertain.  I shall also argue that instantiations of partiality within loving 
relationships are only derivatively good.  If I succeed on these fronts, we can add two further 
premises to Sidgwick’s deduction: one stating that the good is universal, and another stating that 
partiality itself is not a part of universal good.   
                                                                                                                                                             
can accept RI.  As I hope to make clear in the discussion below, RI should not be viewed as a moral theory but 
rather as a theory of ultimate practical reasons.      
5
 Crisp (2006: 145); Shafer-Landau (2010: 110); Parfit (2011, 1:131); Enoch (2011: 19).  Enoch is more tentative in 
his denial of impartialism than the other authors cited.   
6
 Of course, philosophers such as Shelly Kagan (1989) and Peter Singer (1981) have famously defended impartialist 
views.  But their arguments have typically been about the impartiality of morality rather than practical reason itself.  
A notable exception is the recent work of Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (2014) which explicitly attempts to 
answer the question of what people ought to do in the ‘decisive-reason’ sense rather than the ‘moral’ sense. 
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 While the vindication of these additional premises likely would have convinced Sidgwick 
to embrace his initial impartialist conclusion, a compelling case for Rational Impartialism 
requires more.
7
  Unfortunately, one of Sidgwick’s key axioms is much more contentious than he 
realizes.  Sidgwick is aware that common-sense moralists will reject the axiom stating that 
rational beings are bound to aim at good generally rather than particular parts of it.  This is 
because common-sense holds that there are basic duties of partiality.  But Sidgwick is undaunted 
by this disagreement as he provides arguments that he takes to undermine belief in such duties, 
as well as debunking explanations for the intuitions that support them.  However, what Sidgwick 
could not have anticipated is that two of his greatest disciples—philosophers who share many of 
his methodological commitments as well as his ethical and metaethical views—deny that reason 
requires aiming at all of the good equally (despite their belief in universal good).  Roger Crisp 
(2006) and Derek Parfit (2011) hold that while everyone’s welfare is part of universal good, 
one’s own good does in fact carry greater rational weight for one than the equal good of others.  
The explanation given for the extra weight of self-interest is that value is not the only source of 
reasons—it also matters how one is related to the value in question.  In light of this dissent from 
two leading Sidgwickians, my argument for Rational Impartialism requires a defense of 
Sidgwick’s axiom against the challenge presented by Parfit and Crisp.    
 The rest of this dissertation comprises chapters that outline the Sidgwickian argument in 
more detail and defend the controversial premises.  The rest of the present chapter is devoted to 
laying the groundwork for investigation of the Partiality Question.  In the next section I argue 
that while pursuing answers to fundamental ethical questions it is best to avoid concepts and 
terms that are distinctively ‘moral’.   In section 3 I expound on the concepts that are most 
                                                 
7
 Sidgwick would not have needed the premise about the derivative value of partiality because he takes himself to 
have successfully defended a hedonistic value theory.  Since I do not wish to defend hedonism here, my argument 
does require showing that instantiations of partiality are not intrinsically valuable.   
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important for present purposes including the notion of a practical reason.  I also explain why the 
common tendency to focus on reasons that are relativized to different practical domains is both 
misguided and detrimental to philosophical progress.  Section 4 comprises a discussion of 
Sidgwickian metaethics and some of the assumptions about the nature of normativity that I shall 
be proceeding under throughout the dissertation.  A brief conclusion follows.   
 
2  Taking Morality Less Seriously 
Although philosophers have long thought that adjudicating the conflict between self-interest and 
the greater good is a matter of determining what morality requires of us, I believe focusing on 
distinctively moral concepts when investigating fundamental practical questions is a mistake.  I 
shall now provide three general considerations that explain why I set aside questions of moral 
obligations and permissions for purposes of this dissertation.    
 
2.1 Questionable Normative Significance 
The first reason why I have chosen not to utilize moral concepts is that the normative 
significance of purported moral facts is dubious at best.  While there is no universally accepted 
account of what it means to be under a moral obligation, there is a substantial amount of 
agreement that blameworthiness is central to the concept.
8
  When we fail to meet our moral 
obligations, we are said to have done something ‘morally wrong’.  To say that an action is 
‘morally wrong’, on one common conception, is to say that an agent who performs it is 
                                                 
8
 See Skorupski (1999 ch. 7) and Crisp (2006 ch. 1). 
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blameworthy, which amounts to her meriting emotional sanctions in the form of resentment from 
others and feelings of guilt within herself.
9
   
 It has been plausibly suggested that in order for morality to function effectively, the 
blamed agent must judge that the ‘wrongness’ of her action was itself an ultimate reason not to 
have done it.
10
  But when we stop to reflect on whether moral wrongness is itself a reason not to 
perform an action, doubts emerge.  Consider an act widely held to be morally wrong such as 
killing an innocent person for the sake of amusement.  What are our reasons for refraining from 
performing such an act?  One obvious candidate is the fact that killing a person deprives her of 
all the value of her future.
11
  A second is that the friends and family of the victim will experience 
tremendous emotional suffering as a result.  These considerations might explain why it would be 
wrong to perform the action, if we understand ‘wrong’ to mean that there are decisive reasons 
not to do it.  But if we use the moral sense of ‘wrong’ we imply that killing has an additional, 
distinctively moral property which provides a further reason not to do it.  But what are the 
grounds for believing that there is this further reason?  The answer to this question is far from 
obvious.
12
  
 Perhaps the further reason provided by an action’s being morally wrong is grounded in 
facts about blameworthiness.  Moral facts might have normative significance in that they tell us 
what agents are required to do in order to avoid being blameworthy.  But why should we think 
that our ultimate practical reasons include reasons to feel the emotions that are central to the 
                                                 
9
 Mill (1998); Strawson (1962); Gibbard (1990); Skorupski (1999); Prinz (2009).  For discussion of alternative 
senses of ‘morally wrong’ see Parfit (2011, 1: 164-74). 
10
 Mackie (1977); Joyce (2001). 
11
 Marquis (1989). 
12
 Of course, many people do take moral wrongness to be a reason-giving feature of an action.  But given the 
evolutionarily influenced structure of moral emotions and moral judgments, it is unsurprising that those of us who 
have been raised in societies that employ positive moralities would view moral wrongness in this way.  See Crisp 
(2006: 16). 
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concept of blameworthiness?  Take moral anger for example.  It is true that human beings 
typically do feel anger toward those who lie, cheat, and steal.  But what makes it the case that we 
have reasons to feel this way?  It is doubtful that feeling anger is valuable for its own sake.  
Perhaps we should feel anger because this emotion motivates us to perform actions, such as 
punishing those who harm us, that may be beneficial as a means of deterrence.  But notice that if 
this is right, our reason for feeling anger is merely derivative; we have a reason to feel anger only 
insofar as it will motivate us to perform blaming actions that we have reason to perform.  
Moreover, it is often the case that we do not have any reason to act as our moral emotions 
prompt us to, such as when expressing anger would do nothing but escalate a conflict.   
 Some theorists might be unmoved by these considerations because they believe moral 
facts tell us about which emotional responses would be ‘fitting’, and fittingness is thought by 
some to be a fundamental normative notion.
13
  One reason why fittingness has garnered attention 
recently is that this concept seems to track the so-called “right kind of reasons” to have certain 
beliefs and non-cognitive attitudes.  For instance, the fact that some evil despot threatens to 
torture an innocent child unless I desire for that child to be tortured does not mean that I ought to 
have this desire.  Whether I have a reason to desire some state of affairs seems to depend on the 
intrinsic features of that state of affairs rather than the consequences of having the desire.  Thus, 
while I would have reason to try to cause myself to have this desire, if I did come to possess it I 
would not be in a fitting motivational state.  Perhaps some might think that fittingness can also 
explain the normative relevance of moral emotions.  If someone causes harm to an innocent 
person, it is plausible that it would be fitting for others to feel anger towards the perpetrator and 
for the perpetrator to feel guilt.   
                                                 
13
 See D’Arms and Jacobson (2000); Chappell (2012); and McHugh and Way (forthcoming).   
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 The problem with the appeal to fittingness is that it is unclear how facts about the 
fittingness of feelings could have fundamental ethical significance.  As Sidgwick notes at the 
beginning of the Methods, ethics is an investigation into “what individual human beings 
‘ought’—or what is ‘right’ for them—to do, or to seek to realize by voluntary action” (ME 1, 
emphasis added).  Since our emotional responses are not under our direct voluntary control, the 
most we can do is try to preserve or change the feelings we have, and to try to cultivate the best 
possible psychologies.  And when deciding whether to preserve or change an emotional 
response, the question of whether the response is fitting is irrelevant.  To see this, suppose that 
you attend a professional basketball game, and your name is drawn for a chance to win a million 
dollars by making five consecutive free-throws during halftime.  Given these circumstances, it 
would certainly be fitting for you to feel extremely nervous as you step up to the free-throw line.  
But suppose that, surprisingly, you feel cool, calm, and collected.  Does this mean have reasons 
to try to make yourself nervous by focusing on the magnitude of the stakes, just so that you can 
have the fitting response to your circumstances?  Of course not.  On the other hand, if you do 
start to feel nervous it seems clear that you would have decisive reason to try to calm yourself 
down so that you can sink the free-throws.  This illustrates the point that when it comes to 
ultimate practical reasons, facts about which emotional responses would be fitting are 
unimportant.  Thus, even if it is true that it would be fitting to feel anger towards someone who 
violates a moral requirement, this tells us nothing about our ultimate practical reasons.     
 
 2.2 First-Order Judgments 
A second reason for shifting our focus away from moral concepts when engaging in 
philosophical ethics is that emphasizing moral concepts can have deleterious effects on our first-
9 
 
order judgments.  By now, most everyone working in ethics agrees that the mere fact that an 
ethical judgment is accepted by common-sense morality is not sufficient warrant for accepting it.  
This is because many of these judgements are predicated on distinctions that do not survive 
critical reflection.  For instance, because common-sense morality attaches substantial weight to 
the distinction between doing and allowing, many otherwise conscientious people believe it is 
better to let someone die a slow and painful death rather than painlessly killing him.  Another 
example is physical proximity.  Given that throughout most of human history there was nothing a 
person could do to promote the interests of distant strangers, it is unsurprising that moral 
intuitions tend to place at least some weight on physical distance.  When our normative 
capacities were developing, proximity mattered a great deal.  But when we think carefully about 
whether mere physical proximity has ultimate significance for determining whether or not we 
should provide aid, we realize that intuitions that push us towards prioritizing those who happen 
to be closer to us are unreliable.
14
   
 Even though few philosophers accept the verdicts of common-sense morality without 
subjecting them to critical scrutiny, it is plausible that our use of moral concepts while engaged 
in ethical theorizing increases the likelihood that arbitrary distinctions which are vestiges of our 
evolutionary past will have undue influence.  This is because describing an action as ‘morally 
wrong’ or ‘cruel’ is likely to elicit emotional responses that inhibit our ability to consider a wide 
range of factors.
15
  Even if philosophers are generally capable of overcoming these effects, it 
would still be wise to limit the risk.  Thus, rather than asking what a given agent is morally 
obligated to do, I think we can do better by asking what a given agent has most reason to do.  By 
                                                 
14
 For additional examples and further discussion see Crisp (2006: 20-27).   
15
 Crisp (2006: 20-24).   
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de-emphasizing ‘morality’ we stand a better chance of being guided by our powers of 
reasoning.
16
    
 It bears mentioning that the prioritizing of reason over feelings that I am advocating does 
not imply that feelings have no role to play in the life of a successful agent.  Given the facts 
about human nature, it is plausible that we have reasons to cultivate certain emotional 
dispositions in ourselves, such as the disposition to feel sympathy when others are suffering, and 
to feel anger towards those who wantonly cause harm.  Thus, my position is not that feelings do 
not or should not have a role to play in an ethical life.  The claim is rather that we should try to 
avoid being influenced by feelings when searching for fundamental ethical truths.  One way of 
doing this is to focus less on morality and more on practical reasons.
17
 
 
2.3 Metaethical Judgments 
A third problem generated by focusing on morality is that doing so can lead us astray in our 
metaethical theorizing.  The more one reflects on the origins of morality as well as the nature of 
purported moral properties, the more attractive moral anti-realism – the view that there are no 
response-independent
18
 moral truths – becomes.  There are several reasons for this.  First, as 
already mentioned, there seems to be little motivation for accepting the existence of moral 
properties with independent reason-giving force once we consider other possible sources of 
reasons not to perform “wrong” actions.   
                                                 
16
 Cf. Norcross (2008).  See also Crisp (2006: ch. 1).   
17
 I should also note that my reservations about using moral concepts while theorizing about ethics do not imply that 
moral concepts should be jettisoned from everyday thought and talk.  It may be that these concepts are so central to 
our current way of life that trying to eliminate them would do more harm than good.  See Crisp (2006: 27) and 
McElwee (2010) 
18
 I borrow the term ‘response-independence’ from David Enoch (2011: 3).  He provides the following 
characterization of response-independence: “Whether or not a given normative statement applies (for instance) to a 
given action does not depend on what attitudes regarding it – cognitive or otherwise – are entertained by those 
judging that it is (or is not) or by anyone in their environment, nor does it depend on the attitudes, desires, and the 
like of the agent whose action it is or of anyone in her environment.” 
11 
 
 Second, there is no denying that the moral concepts and the institution of morality they 
belong to have been heavily shaped by biological and social contingencies.  In the case of 
biology, it is widely accepted that evolutionary forces played a significant role in the 
development of the ‘reactive-attitudes’ that are essential to moral discourse and practice.19  These 
forces also plausibly played a role in shaping some of the intuitions and judgments that compose 
much of common-sense morality.
20
  Social and cultural evolution have also shaped our positive 
moralities.  Morality is a social institution, and the views and practices of societies and cultures 
that arise largely from accidental circumstances play a major role in determining which views are 
held and which concepts gain footing.  To take one notable example, Schopenhauer (1995) and 
Anscombe (1997) both argue that central moral concepts such as ‘forbidden’ and ‘permissible’ 
are vestiges of divine command ethics, and are only legitimate under the assumption that there is 
an external lawgiver.  These biological and historical contingences cast serious doubt on the 
likelihood that our moral judgements correspond to response-independent normative truths.  
Moreover, because the tendency to believe in objective moral truths can be easily explained 
without having to posit any genuine moral properties, considerations of parsimony tell in favor 
of anti-realist or nihilist views of morality.         
 Once we become skeptical about the existence of response-independent moral truths, it is 
easy to arrive at the conclusion that there are no response-independent truths about what we have 
reason to do.  This is partly due to the fact that so many of our metaethical inquiries have focused 
primarily on morality.
21
  But we must be careful not to let doubts about morality influence our 
views about normativity.  While there are compelling reasons for thinking that morality is merely 
                                                 
19
 Prinz (2009) 
20
 Street (2015)  
21
 Scanlon (2014: 1) points out that up until the late 1970s, metaethical debates focused almost entirely on morality.  
Though today there is more discussion of reasons in general, morality still seems to garner the most attention.   
12 
 
a human construction, I do not believe the same is true in the case of normativity.  Even if I am 
not genuinely under a “moral obligation” to promote the welfare of others, this would not 
preclude the possibility that the welfare of others can ground genuine response-independent 
reasons.   
 In addition to the reasons I have given for bracketing the use of moral concepts, there is 
also a basic point that pertains to the fundamentality of different practical questions we might 
ask.  It seems clear that the question of what I have most reason to do is more basic than the 
question of what I am morally obligated to do.  One way of seeing this is to note that even if 
there are moral obligations which are independent sources of reasons, we still must answer the 
question of how these reasons compare with other considerations such as self-interest.  An 
answer to the question of what I am morally obligated to do would not be sufficient for settling 
the question of I have most reason to do.
22
 
 Perhaps the belief in moral properties will ultimately be vindicated, and distinctively 
moral concepts will help us resolve our practical concerns.  But for the reasons I have given, it 
seems that the best strategy is to begin our investigation by thinking in terms of reasons rather 
than moral obligations, duties, and permissions. 
 
                                                 
22
 Although the Methods includes lengthy treatments of the morality of common sense, along with substantial 
discussions of distinctively moral concepts, Sidgwick does recognize that the most basic and fundamental questions 
in ethics concern reasons rather than moral obligations and duties.  Consider the following remarks from the opening 
of Book I, chapter VI: “The aim of Ethics is to systematize and free from error the apparent cognitions that most 
men have of the rightness or reasonableness of conduct, whether the conduct be considered as right in itself, or as 
the means to some end commonly conceived as ultimately reasonable” (ME 77).  Crisp (2015: 18) notes that the ‘or’ 
in this passage is epexegetic, and hence that the reference to ‘rightness’ can be eliminated.  Thus, Sidgwick’s point 
is that philosophical ethics is at bottom about our ultimate practical reasons.  Here Crisp follows the reading offered 
by Jerome Schneewind in his influential book on Sidgwick.  Schneewind claims that for Sidgwick, “[t]he point is to 
determine how we are to decide what is ultimately reasonable to do, regardless of whether the ultimately reasonable 
is called ‘moral’ or not” (1977: 228; reference from Crisp 2015: 18).    
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3  Reasons and Practical Domains 
3.1 Practical Reasons 
The Partiality Question is primarily about our practical reasons, which are a particular type of 
normative reason (the other type being epistemic).  Thus, before we can consider the various 
candidate answers to the Partiality Question it will be necessary to clarify the concept of a 
normative reason and highlight some of the important distinctions pertaining to this concept.  I 
share the common view that the notion of a normative reason cannot be helpfully explained via a 
definition.
23
  It is sometimes said that a normative reason is a consideration that counts, for the 
agent, in favor of performing some action or having some belief or attitude.
24
  But as Parfit 
(2011, 1: 1) notes, ‘counts in favor of’ is roughly synonymous with ‘gives a reason for’.  Parfit 
suggests that because the notion of a normative reason is fundamental, the way to explain it is to 
get people to think thoughts that employ the concept and to explain its relation to other notions.
25
  
He offers the example of the thought that we always have a reason to want to avoid being in 
agony (ibid.).  Another example is the thought that the fact that a neon ‘OPEN’ sign is glowing 
in the window is a reason to believe the store is open.   
 In addition to getting people to think the right thoughts, it is also useful to contrast the 
notion of a normative reason with other concepts involving the word ‘reason’.  In particular, it is 
important to contrast normative reasons with explanatory and motivating reasons.  An 
explanatory reason is, as the name implies, a fact that explains why some particular event 
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 Parfit (2011, 1:1); Raz (2011: 18).    
24
 In including the ‘for the agent’ clause I follow Crisp (2006: 38).  The purpose of this clause is to allow for 
properties that might count for some other agent in favor of performing an action or having some belief even though 
those properties are not reasons for the agent in question.  To borrow Crisp’s example, if egoism is true, then the fact 
that an action of yours would benefit me counts in favor for me of your performing it, though this would not give 
you an ultimate reason to perform it (ibid. n. 4).   
25
 Sidgwick makes a suggestion along these lines concerning the concepts of ‘ought’ and ‘right’ (ME 32-3).   
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occurs.
26
  For instance, if a car does not start due to battery failure we might say that the fact that 
the battery is dead is the reason why the car will not start.  In a certain sense, normative reasons 
are a type of explanatory reason.  This is true insofar as facts about what one has reasons to do or 
believe can always be part of an explanation of something.  However, normative reasons are 
distinct from explanatory reasons in that in addition to explaining, they also favor certain actions 
and attitudes.  Moreover, normative reasons do not merely explain why an action or attitude is 
favored—they occupy a favoring relation that is prior to and independent of explanation.  As 
Joesph Raz (2011: 19) puts the point: “Their explanatory use is secondary, and depends on the 
fact that they favor what they favor, a fact that sets them apart from other explanatory reasons.  
The existence of a normative relation: that one thing is a reason for another, is, on this 
suggestion, the object of the explanation.”  
 Motivating reasons are a type of explanatory reason.  They are facts that explain why an 
agent performs a particular action.  When I drive to the grocery store, my motivating reasons 
might be my desire for food, and my belief that I can obtain food at the grocery store.  
Importantly, an agent’s motivating and normative reasons often diverge.  For instance, though a 
sadist’s motivating reason for torturing his victim is his desire to witness suffering, we could 
plausibly say that he has no normative reason to torture.  And even if we think that the 
enjoyment he will derive from inflicting pain is a normative reason for him, we could still claim 
that he has decisive reason to refrain from doing so despite his motivational state.   
 Once we turn our focus specifically to normative reasons there are still several 
distinctions we can draw.  The philosophical literature on reasons is replete with dozens of 
distinctions and various terminological conventions.  For present purposes it is only necessary to 
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discuss a few such distinctions.  The first is that between epistemic and practical reasons.  
Whereas epistemic reasons are reasons for having a certain belief, practical reasons are reasons 
for performing a certain action.  Since ethics is primarily concerned with conduct rather than 
beliefs, we shall focus primarily on practical reasons.   
 One of the most useful distinctions pertaining to practical reasons is that between 
ultimate reasons and derivative reasons.  An ultimate reason is a reason to perform an action that 
cannot be explained by any further reason.  In contrast, a derivative reason is a reason to perform 
an action that is explained by some more fundamental reason.  To illustrate, consider an agent 
who purchases a ticket to a concert.  It is plausible that this agent had a reason to purchase the 
ticket because he will enjoy the concert, and he has a reason to seek enjoyment.  Thus, we can 
say that his reason to purchase the ticket derives from his reason to seek enjoyment.  But we 
might have trouble finding a reason why he should seek enjoyment.  Enjoyment is thus a 
plausible example of a source of ultimate (or non-derivative) reasons.  The reason to seek 
enjoyment is an ultimate reason if it does not inherit its normative force from any other 
reasons.
27
     
 
3.2 Practical Domains 
A final distinction that is important for present purposes is not between two different types of 
practical reason but rather between genuine practical reasons and what I shall call domain-
relative reasons.
28
  We often speak of reasons an agent has relative to a particular practical 
domain such as fashion, etiquette, law, football, chess, etc.  For instance, we might say that even 
if the interests of non-human animals give us strong reasons to refrain from consuming animal 
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products, we nonetheless have reasons of fashion to wear leather shoes and mink coats.  Reasons 
we are said to have relative to the standards of fashion are an example of domain-relative reasons 
(or d-reasons).   
 I believe it is a mistake to assume that our ability to think in terms of various practical 
domains and our corresponding tendency to refer to reasons that are relative to those domains is 
evidence that different domains are independently normative.
29
  Of course we can make 
intelligible claims about “moral reasons,” “fashion reasons,” and perhaps even “Blue Öyster Cult 
fandom reasons.”  We might say that I have reasons of fashion and reasons of BÖC fandom to 
wear my vintage “Black & Blue Tour” t-shirt.30  And suppose it is true that the t-shirt is 
fashionable and my wearing it would express support for the greatest sci-fi-gothic classic rock 
band of all-time.  These facts would not be enough to settle the question of whether there is 
anything counting in favor of my wearing the t-shirt.  We could not know whether compliance 
with fashion or BÖC fandom norms is a reason to Ф without answering the more fundamental 
question of whether we have any reason to care about these respective domains.  As Parfit notes, 
in order to make significant claims about the relative importance of the requirements of different 
domains, “we need some impartial, neutral criterion.  Reasons provide such a criterion” (2011, 1: 
148).   
 Do we have reasons to care about fashion and BÖC fandom?  Perhaps.  But if we do, it 
would seem that this is so only insofar as complying with these norms can make one’s life or the 
lives of others better, or if such compliance would instantiate a type of human excellence.
31
  If 
complying with these norms would not have these positive results, then it is hard to see what 
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 This point is raised by McLeod (2001: 274-5) and Dorsey (2013: 131-6).   
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 In 1980 Blue Öyster Cult and Black Sabbath co-headlined a highly successful nationwide tour.   
31
 Although I am tempted by welfarism about reasons, I shall not pursue this issue here.  For a compelling defense of 
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could count in favor of doing so.  Thus, any normativity inhering in these practical domains 
could only be derived from things that matter at the fundamental level.  Hence “reasons” of 
fashion and B.Ö.C. fandom are not genuine normative reasons.   
 Here one might object that we need justification for accepting the claim that reasons have 
fundamental normative importance such that they can undermine the verdicts of a given practical 
domain.  If fashion norms tell me to Ф, why must I ask the further question about whether I have 
reasons to care about fashion?  And if the norms of fashion cannot themselves vindicate the 
importance of fashion, how can reasons themselves vindicate the importance of reasons?  Parfit 
considers this objection and provides the following response: 
 
  As this objection rightly claims, we cannot show that reasons matter by appealing  
  to claims about reasons.  But justifications must end somewhere.  And if reasons  
  are fundamental, we should not expect that we could justify the reason-involving  
  criterion of importance, by appealing to some other, deeper criterion.  Reasons   
  are, I believe, fundamental.  Something matters only if we or others have some  
  reason to care about this thing.  (2011, 1: 148)       
 
 
Someone who thinks she has sufficient reason to wear fashionable clothes even though this will 
result in great suffering need not be conceptually confused.  I have not been arguing that the 
claim that fashion is more important than things like welfare is incoherent.  What I have been 
arguing is that an action or attitude being recommended by some practical domain or other does 
not by itself count in favor of performing that action or having that attitude.  Practical domains 
by themselves are normatively inert.  The verdicts of practical domains can only matter insofar 
as we have reasons to care about them.  Hence, rather than saying that reasons are the 
fundamental normative standpoint, it might be more helpful to say that reasons are the only 
normative standpoint.       
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 At this point one might wonder about two particular practical domains that seem most 
likely to have independent normative significance—prudence and morality.  Though it is initially 
very plausible that these domains are genuinely normative, I believe this as an illusion.  My 
primary aim in writing this dissertation is to make a convincing case that the fact that Ф-ing is in 
my self-interest is not an independent reason for me to Ф over and above the fact that Ф-ing 
promotes the interests of someone.  Of course, if Ф-ing would promote my welfare this does 
indeed count in favor of my Ф-ing.  But this reason is not grounded in my relationship to myself 
but rather the fact that my interests matter just as the interests of everyone else do.  Thus, on the 
view I am defending it is false to say that prudence is an independently normative domain.
32
            
 In section 2 I provided several reasons for turning our focus away from morality while 
investigating the Partiality Question.  Among the reasons I gave were (1) the fact that settling the 
question of what I morally ought to do does not settle the question of what I ought to do, (2) 
skepticism about the importance of the emotional responses that are closely tied to fundamental 
moral concepts, (3) the distorting influence of moral concepts on our first-order practical 
judgments, and (4) the fact that the plausibility of anti-realist views of morality erroneously leads 
many people to accept anti-realism about practical normativity.  As we saw, most of my 
skepticism about morality arises from concerns about the conceptual ties to emotional responses.  
However, there are conceptions of morality that are not in any way tied to emotions.  One such 
conception holds that moral reasons are simply other-regarding reasons.  Given my theoretical 
commitments it might seem as though I should accept the verdicts of morality thus understood as 
genuinely normative.  But in fact, I deny that morality is independently normative even when it 
is conceived as simply a matter of other-regarding reasons.  My reasons for denying normativity 
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here are analogous to my reasons for denying the normativity of prudence.  While I obviously 
think that the fact that Ф-ing would promote the interests of many people is a reason to Ф, the 
fact that the people affected are others is irrelevant.  On the view I am defending, I have equal 
reasons to promote equal interests regardless of how I am related to them.
33
   
 Suppose for instance that I am faced with two options for how to distribute benefits 
between myself and some other agent.  Option 1 would give me a benefit of 1, and the other 
person a benefit of 2.  Option 2 would give me a benefit of 2 and the other person a benefit of 1.  
To keep things simple we can suppose that nobody else will be affected by the distribution.   On 
the conception of morality we are considering I would have decisive moral reason to choose 
option 1.  This is because option 1 is best for others (in this case the single other agent affected 
by my choice).  But I believe the fact that option 1 would be best for agents other than me is 
irrelevant.  What ultimately matters is the interests at stake regardless of how I am related to 
them.  Thus, I would have equal reason to choose either option.  Hence, on the view I am 
defending, morality is not independently normative even when conceived of simply as a matter 
of other-regarding reasons.   
  
4  The Objectivity of Ethics 
It is sometimes thought that answers to first-order ethical questions such as the Partiality 
Question are completely independent from answers to metaethical questions about the nature of 
practical reasons.  One of the points that I hope to make clear in the chapters that follow is that it 
is a mistake to assume that ethics and metaethics are completely autonomous in this way.  On the 
                                                 
33
 Some might object to Rational Impartialism not because it fails to give enough weight to self-interest but rather 
because it gives too much.  The worry is that we tend to think an agent can have sufficient reason to sacrifice some 
of her interests for the sake of the lesser interests of others (e.g. sacrificing my life to save a stranger’s leg). I address 
this objection in chapter 5.   
20 
 
contrary, I shall argue that facts about the fundamental sources and nature of practical reasons 
bear strongly on the question of whether there are ultimate reasons of partiality.  More 
specifically, I will suggest that if practical reasons are grounded in objective facts about actions, 
objects, and outcomes, rather than in facts about our desires and evaluative attitudes, this tells in 
favor of an impartialist account of practical reason.  My aim in the rest of this section is to 
explain why I shall be proceeding under the assumption that practical reasons are indeed 
grounded in objective facts about acts, objects, and outcomes that make them worth performing, 
promoting, or producing for their own sake.   
 
4.1  Two Kinds of Theory 
Suppose a friend tells you that you have a reason to visit the science museum this weekend.  And 
suppose further that your initial response is rather skeptical: “What reason do I have to go to the 
science museum?  Aren’t there better things for me to do with my time?”  At this point, your 
friend will likely try to explain why it is true that you have a reason to visit the museum.  
Perhaps she will point out that they are opening a new exhibit on a topic that she believes you 
will greatly enjoy learning about.  Suppose your friend is right, and you would in fact enjoy the 
new exhibit.  If so, most of us would agree that your friend was also right about your having a 
reason to visit the science museum.  Perhaps the reason is not decisive because there may be 
even better things for you to do, but you seem to have at least some reason nonetheless.   
 While most philosophers would accept that you would have some reason to visit the 
science museum in the above example, there is great controversy about what would make this 
true.  According to some theorists, the ultimate explanation for the existence of a reason to 
perform an action such as visiting the museum could only be that doing so would satisfy one or 
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more of your desires.  These writers defend subjectivism about practical reasons.  Though 
subjectivism comes in many forms, what all versions share in common is the idea that whenever 
an agent A has a reason to Ф this fact is grounded or explained by the fact that Ф-ing would 
result in the satisfaction of one or more of A’s desires (or other subjective concerns such as 
valuings or preferences).  Most (if not all) proponents of subjectivism accept that it is not our 
actual subjective concerns that ground our reasons but rather the subjective concerns we would 
have if we were made aware of all the relevant facts.      
 According to an alternative family of views, your reason to visit the science museum is 
not grounded in the fact that doing so would accord with your valuings or satisfy your desires.  
Rather, your reason is grounded in the objective features of either the museum itself or the states 
of affairs that would result from your visit (e.g. the enjoyment you would experience).  
According to these views, our practical reasons are object-given, meaning that they are provided 
by facts about the features of objects, act, and outcomes that make them worth performing or 
promoting for their own sake.  These reason-giving facts usually make these acts, objects, and 
outcomes good or bad for particular individuals, or impersonally good or bad.  Hence, we can 
also refer to object-given theories as value-based (Parfit 2011, 1: 45).  According to these 
theories, an agent can have a reason to Ф even if Ф-ing would not satisfy any of her actual or 
idealized subjective concerns.      
There are several theoretical motivations for accepting a subjective rather than an 
objective account of practical reasons.  Among the chief motivations is a commitment to 
metaphysical naturalism.  One result of the impressive accomplishments of modern science is 
that philosophers have become increasingly wary of philosophical views that appear at odds with 
the modern scientific worldview.  Objective theories are a prime example of such views.  
22 
 
Objective value and reasons are not the sorts of things that can be discovered or verified by any 
of the natural or social sciences.  While science cannot conclusively rule out the existence of 
non-natural entities such as object-given reasons, scientists do not appeal to such entities in their 
explanations of how the universe works.  Because the natural and social sciences make no 
mention of objective reasons and value, many philosophers find belief in these things no less 
dubious than belief in ghosts and goblins.  It is believed that the only entities that have a place in 
a respectable ontology are the purely ‘natural’ entities that are part of the best scientific theories.  
Moreover, even if there is objective value in the universe, many theorists are puzzled about how 
we could have justified beliefs about this value.  If there are truths about objective value, they do 
not appear to be analytic, and it is unlikely that they are causally efficacious.  It is thus difficult 
to explain how we could possess knowledge of such truths.
34
   
Of course, even philosophers who reject objective theories recognize that ordinary human 
discourse is committed to the existence of reasons and value.  We regularly describe objects as 
good for people, actions as morally wrong, decisions as justifiable, choices as important, etc.  
Those who are committed to metaphysical naturalism can avoid the strikingly revisionary claim 
that all normative discourse is hopelessly defective by adopting a subjectivist account.  
Subjectivism holds that many of our claims about reasons and justification are true, and that this 
can be explained without running afoul of naturalism.  What makes normative claims true, 
according to subjectivists, is that some specified class of (perhaps idealized) agents adopts a 
particular attitude toward the relevant object, action, decision, or choice.  Value exists in the 
world because we value things.  Things matter in the sense that they matter to us.  Further, there 
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is no mystery about how we can come to have justified beliefs about our reasons if subjectivism 
is true.  All we need to do is figure out which available action is most consistent with our desires 
and/or evaluative commitments.           
A second motivation for subjectivism is the intuition that practical reasons are the sorts of 
things that should be capable of motivating agents.  According to the popular Humean theory of 
motivation, an agent can be motivated to Ф only if she believes Ф-ing would satisfy one or more 
of her desires.  Since motivation requires the presence of a desire, and reasons are presumably 
the sort of things that we can be motivated by, it would seem that we can only have a reason to 
perform some act if doing so would satisfy one or more of our desires.  While subjective views 
are able to accommodate this thought, objective theories cannot.  If practical reasons are object-
given and value-based, then an agent might have a reason to Ф even if Ф-ing is in no way 
connected to the things she cares about.  And if the Humean account of motivation is true, this 
would imply further that an agent might have a reason to Ф even if she could not possibly 
become motivated to Ф via rational means.   
  
4.2 Sidgwick and the Presuppositions of Ethical Inquiry 
There is a vast literature on the aforementioned attractions of subjectivism.  Proponents of 
objective theories argue that the purported attractions are much less compelling upon 
reflection.
35
 Subjectivists respond by sharpening their arguments and articulating further 
considerations in favor of their view.
36
  For present purposes, it will not be necessary to recount 
the details of the various moves that have been made in this debate.  This is because, as I shall 
now argue, regardless of the relative theoretical merits of the competing views and the arguments 
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meant to support them, the task I am undertaking in this dissertation requires that we proceed 
under the assumption that subjectivism is false, and that practical reasons are object-given and 
value-based.   
 In the first chapter of the first edition of the Methods, Sidgwick claims that the objectivity 
of ethics is a presupposition of the ethical investigations of philosophers and laypersons alike: 
 
  But if science of [ethics] be possible it must in another sense have objective  
  existence: it must be an object of knowledge and as such the same for all minds.   
  Even this however is not always admitted.  “What ought to be done” (it is said)  
  “is merely what we should like to be done, or, more precisely, what excites in us a 
  specific feeling called approbation, varying in its object from mind to mind…But  
  if it be maintained that two men may act in two different ways under   
  circumstances  precisely similar, and yet neither be wrong because he thinks  
  himself right: then the common notion of morality must be rejected as chimera.   
  That there is in any given circumstances some one thing that ought to be done and 
  that this can be known, is a fundamental assumption, made not by philosophers  
  only, but by all men who perform any process of moral reasoning. (ME1 5-6)
37
 
 
The final sentence of this passage is especially telling.  Sidgwick’s point is that the common 
practice of engaging in a process of reasoning to try to discover what we ought to do is 
predicated on the thought that the answer to this question exists independently of our subjective 
attitudes and feelings.  The Partiality Question is precisely the sort of question that requires the 
type of reasoning Sidgwick refers to, and hence, investigation of it can only be sensible on the 
assumption that there are objective facts about our practical reasons.
38
   
 To see this point more clearly, it will help to consider a vivid example of a practical 
conflict between self-interest and the general good.  Every fall I spend part of my Sunday 
afternoons in front of the television watching football.  In order to ensure that I can see my 
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favorite team play, I pay extra to subscribe to a satellite service that broadcasts all the games.  As 
someone who teaches and writes about ethics for a living, it is hard not to think about whether 
my football watching habit is justified.  Given the severe global poverty crisis that is taking 
place, wouldn’t my disposable income do a lot more good if I sent it to Oxfam rather than 
DirecTV?  This is a real-life case in which I must arrive at a decision about how to weigh my 
own interests against the interests of distant strangers.   
 Such first-person experiences are part of the motivation for a theoretical investigation of 
the Partiality Question.  Our hope is that if we think carefully enough, and consider all of the 
arguments, we shall ultimately arrive at the truth about the existence or non-existence of ultimate 
reasons of partiality.  We expect that this endeavor will require rigorous thinking and deep 
reflection.  And we are open to the possibility that by prioritizing our own welfare as much as we 
do, we are making a grave mistake.  Subjectivists believe they can accommodate the intuition 
that such normative mistakes are possible.  For instance, on Sharon Street’s (2012) version of 
subjectivism, such mistakes are possible insofar as some of our choices might do worse by the 
lights of our overall set of evaluative commitments (even if one or more of our desires is 
satisfied).  So when I subscribe to satellite television rather than donating to famine relief, I 
would be making a mistake if making the donation would be more consistent with my overall 
(contingently arrived at) set of evaluative commitments.  But surely this is not the kind of 
mistake the fear of which motivates our engaging in substantial ethical inquiry.  When I am 
attempting to determine whether I have most reason to write a check to Oxfam or DirecTV, I am 
not hoping to discover whether I happen to care more about following my favorite team or 
saving the life of a starving child on another continent.  I am trying to figure out which of these I 
should care more about.  But according to proponents of subjectivism, none of us have any 
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reason to care about the things we do because our reasons are determined by what we already 
happen to care about.   
 In an important sense then, subjectivism is close to nihilism (Parfit 2011, 107).  If things 
only matter insofar as they matter to us, we do not need to do philosophy in order to answer the 
Partiality Question.
39
  To figure out how much deliberative weight to give the interests of others 
we need only to think about how much we care about their interests compared to our own.  And 
even if we end up failing to act in accordance with our overall evaluative commitments, there 
could not be any reason to regret this fact because these commitments were not tracking any 
deep normative truths anyway.   
 The Partiality Question is worth pursuing only on the assumption that there are objective 
truths about our practical reasons.  The question presupposes that even if all of an agent’s 
deepest desires (whether actual or idealized) are satisfied throughout her life, there is a 
possibility that she has made grave normative mistakes nonetheless (perhaps by not giving 
sufficient weight to the interests of others).  Subjectivism precludes this possibility altogether.  In 
considering theories of rational weight, we endeavor to discover whether our tendency to favor 
ourselves is justified by the light of reason.  If there is no reason independent of our own 
subjective attitudes this endeavor would be futile.  As Parfit puts the point, “If Subjectivism is 
true, we would have to make our choices in the dark” (2011, 1: 46).   
 It is worth noting the further point that if subjectivism is true, even the most extreme 
degree of partiality towards oneself could be justified so long as the agent’s evaluative 
commitments are skewed towards her own welfare to a great enough degree.  And even worse, 
fundamental partiality towards members of one’s race and gender could be justified in the same 
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way.  This is deeply implausible.  Members of the Ku Klux Klan are not rationally justified in 
prioritizing the interests of White Americans, even if this favoring is entailed by their desires and 
evaluative commitments (as it surely is).  This is a further reason for setting aside the possibility 
that our reasons are ultimately grounded in facts about what we happen to care about.   
 I shall thus proceed under the assumption that our practical reasons are object-given and 
value-based, and that in order to answer to the Partiality Question we must look beyond our 
contingently given desires and evaluative commitments.  This is not to deny that objective 
theories of practical reason face serious challenges.  The metaphysical and epistemological 
objections canvassed above are far from trivial.  But it is beyond the scope of this project to 
address those worries.  The question I am investigating is how we are to rationally weigh the 
interests of others against our own.  It may turn out that normativity is an illusion, and that at 
bottom we have no reason to try to answer the Partiality Question because we have no object-
given reasons to do anything.  But if this turns out to be the case, it could not be true that we had 
reasons not to try to answer it.  On the other hand, if normativity is not an illusion, we most 
certainly have strong reasons to figure out how the interests of others are to be weighed against 
our own.         
 
5  Conclusion   
In this chapter I have introduced the question that this dissertation centers on, and I have 
provided a general outline of my strategy for answering it.  I have also explained why I shall not 
be focusing on distinctively moral concepts, and I have clarified the concepts that will play a 
vital role in the chapters that follow.  Lastly, I explained why I shall be proceeding under the 
assumption that practical reasons are object-given and value-based, as opposed to being 
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grounded in facts about our contingently given desires, preferences, and valuings, as subjectivists 
claim.   
 I began this chapter by recounting how Sidgwick’s attempt to arrive at foundational 
ethical principles ended with the somber conclusion that practical reason is divided against itself.  
In the next chapter I return to Sidgwick in order to lay the groundwork for my Sidgwickian 
argument for Rational Impartialism.  I shall delve into Sidgwick’s ethical epistemology and the 
self-evident axioms to which it leads him.  I shall also offer novel interpretations of the key 
axioms and explain how they will function as premises in my argument for RI.      
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2  Between Scylla and Charybdis: Sidgwick’s Axioms of Ethics 
 
1  Introduction 
Sidgwick’s approach to ethics is guided by the conviction that our inquiries will only lead to 
trustworthy conclusions if our reasoning begins with premises of the “highest certainty 
attainable.”  Such premises must have the appearance of self-evidence, meaning that they are 
free of arbitrariness, and at least some degree of justification is obtained merely by 
contemplating them (ME 293 f. 1; EEM 29).  But this prima facie justification is not sufficient 
for highest certainty; the foundational premises must also survive critical scrutiny.  We must 
make sure that the appearance of self-evidence is not an illusion arising from convention or 
familiarity.  And we must check to see that the proposition and its implications conflict neither 
with the beliefs of other equally competent judges, nor with other principles we take to be self-
evident (ME 338-42).  Only if a proposition meets these criteria can it serve as a genuine axiom 
of ethics.  Sidgwick’s hope is that such axioms, if they can be found, will provide a secure 
foundation for ethics analogous to the foundation provided by the basic axioms of geometry.   
 After investigating the core principles of common-sense morality, Sidgwick concludes 
that the appearance of self-evidence evaporates upon reflection.  Once the vagueness of these 
principles is removed, we see that many of them are beset by arbitrariness and inconsistencies, 
while others are merely concealed tautologies.  However, Sidgwick does believe that careful 
reflection on ethical concepts and the nature of rational agency gives rise to a set of foundational 
propositions that meet the criteria for highest certainty.  Among them are an axiom stating that 
one’s own welfare does not constitute a greater portion of the good than anyone else’s, and an 
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axiom stating that reason requires aiming at good generally, not just particular parts of it (ME 
382).   
 Sidgwick uses these axioms to deduce a principle of impartialism stating that “each one is 
morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as his own…” (ME 382).  
However, much to his dismay, Sidgwick ultimately concludes that the axioms cannot provide 
trustworthy ethical guidance after all.  This is due to the fact that one of the key axioms only has 
real significance on the assumption that ‘good’ is a universal end, meaning that it is something to 
be pursued by all rational beings as such—regardless of how they are related to it.  Proponents of 
egoism challenge this assumption by arguing that good is always relative to the individual.  
Because he sees no way to demonstrate that the Egoist is wrong about this, Sidgwick concludes 
that egoism is as well-justified as impartialism.  This leads to his belief that there is an 
irresolvable “Dualism of the Practical Reason” that reduces the “Cosmos of Duty” to a state of 
chaos (ME1 473).
 
 
 Given my aim of defending a purely impartial account of ultimate practical reasons, it 
should come as no surprise that I believe Sidgwick’s conclusion is mistaken.  Though he failed 
to realize it, much of the material necessary for arriving at a principled resolution of conflicts 
between self-interest and the greater good can be found within the Methods.  I shall argue that 
when the two axioms mentioned above are combined with a few additional premises, we obtain a 
powerful argument for Rational Impartialism—the view that there are no ultimate reasons of 
partiality. 
 The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts.  I begin in section 2 by explaining the 
motivations and advantages of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology.  Next, in section 3, I offer novel 
interpretations of Sidgwick’s axioms and defend my formulations against various objections.  
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Finally, in section 4, I delve deeper into Sidgwick’s infamous Dualism, and I explain how I shall 
try to avoid this bleak conclusion by supplementing the axioms with two additional premises.   
 
2  Philosophical Intuitionism 
Before he ever set out to write the Methods, Sidgwick was a devotee of the utilitarianism of Mill.  
What he found attractive about Mill’s position was that it appeared free from the arbitrariness 
and dogmatism that infected moral systems based on absolute duties ascertained by intuition.  In 
Sidgwick’s words: “I found in [Mill’s utilitarianism] relief from the apparently external and 
arbitrary pressure of moral rules which I had been educated to obey, and which presented 
themselves to me as to some extent doubtful and confused; and sometimes, even when clear, as 
merely dogmatic, unreasoned, incoherent” (ME xvii).  Sidgwick labels the use of intuition for the 
attainment of absolute duties the “Intuitional Method” (C.D. Broad (1930) would later provide 
the now widely used label “deontological”).  From the time he was an undergraduate at 
Cambridge, Sidgwick felt that the Intuitional method was beset by a lack of a unifying 
explanation for the various purported duties, as well as a lack of guidance for resolving conflicts 
of duty (ME xvii).     
 But it was not long before Sidgwick grew dissatisfied with Mill’s defense of 
utilitarianism.  Though both elements of the view—psychological hedonism and ethical 
hedonism—seemed plausible when viewed in isolation, Sidgwick soon recognized the deep 
discrepancy between the natural impulse to promote one’s own happiness and the ethical end of 
promoting the general happiness.  In Mill, Sidgwick was unable to find a satisfying explanation 
for why it would be rational to sacrifice one’s own happiness for the greater happiness of others.  
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He notes particular dissatisfaction with Mill’s suggestion that such sacrifice would be “heroic.”  
Sidgwick’s remarks on this point merit a full recounting:  
It was no use to say that if I was a moral hero I should have formed a habit of 
willing actions beneficial to others which would remain in force, even with my 
own pleasure in the other scale.  I knew that at any rate I was not the kind of 
moral hero who does this without reason; from blind habit.  Nor did I even wish 
to be that kind of hero: for it seemed to me that that kind of hero, however 
admirable, was certainly not a philosopher.  I must somehow see that it was right 
for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am part. 
(ME xviii)   
 
The recognition of a need to “see” that self-sacrifice was right marks a turning point for 
Sidgwick.  It is this need that prompts him to re-examine the intuitional method in hopes of 
finding a fundamental intuition that might provide a more secure philosophical foundation for 
ethics.   
 Though Sidgwick comes to accept that justification in ethics is not possible without 
relying on intuitions, one of his primary aims in the Methods is to draw crucial distinctions 
among different ways in which intuitions are utilized in ethical inquiry.  He distinguishes three 
different versions of intuitionism which he labels ‘Perceptional’, ‘Dogmatic’, and 
‘Philosophical’.  Perceptional Intuitionism (henceforth PI) is the method of determining whether 
a particular action is right through an immediate judgement of conscience.  For instance, when 
an individual has the opportunity to steal the wallet of an unsuspecting co-passenger onboard a 
train, she can immediately sense that the action would be wrong without the need for abstract 
ethical principles or rules.  On this approach, one’s conscience is a reliable guide to truths about 
the rightness or reasonableness of conduct in any given circumstance.     
 Sidgwick outlines several problems with PI.  First, the judgments of our conscience tend 
to be inconsistent across time: “The same conduct will wear a different moral aspect at one time 
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from that which it wore at another, although our knowledge of its circumstances and conditions 
is not materially changed” (ME 100).  Second, there is also wide variance in intuitions about 
specific cases between apparent epistemic peers.  These intra and inter-personal conflicts give 
rise to serious doubts about the reliability of immediate judgments of conscience.  Moreover, 
these discrepancies are well-explained by a third problematic feature of PI.  Intuitive judgements 
about particular acts are vulnerable to the influence of our motivational psychology, such as our 
instinctual drive for self-preservation, which we should not expect to track deep ethical truths.  
As a result of our socio-biological history we experience many impulses and immediate 
evaluative judgments that reveal themselves as unjustifiable upon further reflection.  A few 
ubiquitous examples are the tendency to give undue weight to physical proximity when 
considering reasons of beneficence, and the tendency to make different moral judgments about 
the same conduct depending on how similar the agent in question is to oneself.
1
  These ‘gut 
reactions’ are often experienced as accurate perceptions of ethical truths.  In some cases these 
feelings may lead us in the right direction, but whether they do is largely a matter of luck.  This 
is why it is dangerous to rely solely on immediate judgements about particular acts.   
 Dogmatic Intuitionism (henceforth DI) is a method of justification based on the 
assumption that the rules of common-sense morality provide generally reliable ethical guidance, 
and that the ethicist’s job is merely to refine and systematize them in order to make the rules 
clear and precise.  One of Sidgwick’s primary misgivings about DI is that there are 
circumstances in which different principles of common-sense morality recommend conflicting 
courses of action.  Sidgwick fails to see how there could be a non-arbitrary way of resolving such 
conflicts other than appealing to utilitarian considerations.  A further worry is that even if the 
                                                 
1
 See Crisp (2006: ch. 1), and Haidt (2001).   
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principles and duties of common-sense morality were consistent with each other, there does not 
seem to be a deep unifying explanation for them.  In Sidgwick’s words: 
 
  Even granting that these rules can be so defined as perfectly to fit together and  
  cover the whole field of human conduct, without coming into conflict and without 
  leaving any practical questions unanswered,--still the resulting code seems an  
  accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in need of some rational synthesis.  
  In short, without being disposed to deny that conduct commonly judged to be  
  right is so, we may yet require some deeper explanation why it is so. (ME 102)   
  
The lack of explanation should decrease our level of confidence in the verdicts of this method.  
Even if we tend to agree with the majority of common-sense moral rules, the absence of a 
unifying explanation and justification raises doubts about whether they have a truly rational 
basis.   
 As Crisp (2015: 104) points out, proponents of DI might object that common-sense 
morality contains deeper explanations than Sidgwick suggests: “Promise-breaking, for example, 
can be seen to be wrong in itself, or wrong because it is unjust; helping others is good in itself, or 
good because it is benevolent; and so on.”  But as Crisp notes, Sidgwick would still find such a 
theory too unsystematic to warrant strong confidence.  In Sidgwick’s view, what we need is “one 
or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which the current rules 
might be deduced, either just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and 
rectifications” (ME 102).2   
 The dissatisfaction with Perceptional and Dogmatic Intuitionism leads to Sidgwick’s 
preferred method of justification in ethics which he calls ‘Philosophical Intuitionism’ (henceforth 
PHI).  This method is characterized by the non-inferential grasping of abstract, self-evident 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Singer and De Lazari-Radek (2014: 67).  For further discussion of the different versions of intuitionism see 
Crisp (2002; 2015) and Phillips (2011: ch.5).   
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propositions that can provide a secure basis for ethical theories and principles.  There are thus 
three key features of PHI that distinguish it from its rivals: abstraction, foundationalism, and self-
evidence.   
 With regards to abstraction, the plausible suggestion is that by considering ethical 
propositions in the abstract rather than relying on our ‘gut reactions’ to particular sets of 
circumstances we are less likely to have our judgments distorted by the biases and motivational 
tendencies which are part of our animal nature.  Consideration of specific cases is certainly not 
useless, but there is always a danger that our verdicts will be unduly influenced by feelings 
aroused by the details of the situation.  Sidgwick expresses concern about the tendency to 
mistake subjective feelings for reasoned judgements.  He puts the point thus: “It cannot be 
denied that any strong sentiment, however purely subjective, is apt to transform itself into the 
semblance of an intuition; and it requires careful contemplation to detect the illusion” (ME 339).3   
 The second essential feature of PHI is its foundationalism.  Sidgwick believes that if an 
ethical principle is to be adequately justified, it must be supported by more fundamental 
propositions which are immediately cognizable in the abstract (ME 382).
4
  These fundamental 
propositions possess the attribute of self-evidence (the third feature of PHI) insofar as some 
degree of justification is obtained by reflecting on them alone.  The apparently self-evident 
propositions are those that do not present themselves to us as needing further rational 
justification (EEM 29; ME 383).
5
  However, it is important to note that ‘self-evident’ does not 
mean ‘obvious’.  Sometimes the self-evidence of a proposition can only be immediately 
                                                 
3
 Sidgwick notes that the importance of abstraction for eliminating personal bias is the driving thought behind 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative as a test for rightness (ME 339, n. 1).   
4
 As the term is being used here, to say that a proposition is ‘cognizable’ is not to say that it is knowable, where this 
would imply something close to certainty.  Rather, to cognize a proposition in the relevant sense is understand it and 
recognize a high likelihood of truth (ME 34).   
5
 One clear indicator that a principle is not self-evident is that it posits arbitrary definitions or boundaries (ME 293 n. 
1).   
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recognized by those with certain background knowledge and conceptual competence.  Although 
the suggestion that expertise is sometimes required for grasping self-evident truths might seem 
strange, Sidgwick points out that this is precisely how things work in the case of some of the 
axioms of mathematics and geometry.  He puts the point thus:  
 
  Just as some mathematical axioms are not and cannot be known to the multitude,  
  as their certainty cannot be seen except by minds carefully prepared,—but yet,  
  when their terms are properly understood, the perception of their absolute truth is  
  immediate and irresistible.  Similarly, if we are not able to claim for a proposed  
  moral axiom, in its precise form, an explicit and actual assent of “orbi terrarium,” 
  it may still be a truth which men before vaguely apprehended, and which they will 
  now unhesitatingly admit.  (ME 229)    
 
 
 Sidgwick is well aware of the potential pitfalls of appeals to self-evidence in ethics.  
First, some apparently self-evident propositions that seem to constitute substantive claims are 
really just concealed tautologies.  Sidgwick gives an example of a purported principle of justice 
which states that “we ought to give every man his own.”  This principle appears to have the 
abstractness, plausibility, and fundamentality of a self-evident axiom.  However, upon reflection 
we see that it is uninformative because “his own” just means “that which it is right [that] he 
should have” (ME 375).6  A second danger is that the apparent self-evidence of a principle is 
sometimes merely the product of convention or repetition.  A third is that many principles 
purported to be self-evident by a given theorist are inconsistent with the purportedly self-evident 
principles posited by other theorists.    
 In light of these concerns, Sidgwick posits four criteria that an apparently self-evident 
proposition must meet in order for it to possess the “highest certainty attainable.”  This level of 
                                                 
6
 An alternative reading of the principle implies that we must always return belongings to their owners.  In “Further 
on the Criteria of Truth and Error,” Sidgwick points out that this is the principle that Polemarchus initially accepts, 
but comes to reject once he is convinced that it is not just to return a weapon to a friend who has fallen mad (EEM 
166-7).  Cf. Plato’s Republic, Bk. I. 331c-e.    
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justification must be approximately realized by our foundational ethical propositions if our 
reasoning is to lead to trustworthy conclusions (ME 338).  The four criteria for highest certainty 
are as follows:  
  (1) The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise.  
  (2) The appearance of self-evidence must survive careful reflection. 
  (3) The proposition must not conflict with other self-evident propositions.  
  (4) The proposition must not be denied by an epistemic peer. (ME 338-41) 
 
Admittedly, it is possible for a proposition that meets all four criteria to be false nonetheless.  
But the lack of absolute certainty is an unavoidable feature of our epistemic situation.  Thus, 
Sidgwick insists that any proposition meeting these criteria possesses “as high a degree of 
certainty as [we] can hope to attain under the existing conditions of human thought” (EEM 109).    
 The primary motivation for the first criterion comes from the observation that the 
apparent certitude of a proposition can disappear once the key terms are rendered more precise.  
This point is illustrated in Sidgwick’s discussion of the common-sense precept that it is one’s 
duty to act wisely.  Though this principle might strike us as self-evident, problems arise from the 
lack of precision.  Read one way, the principle essentially tells us that we ought always to do 
what we have most reason to do.  Though this is certainly true, it is no more useful that the claim 
that it is always right to do what is right.  Read a second way, the principle tells us that we ought 
to cultivate a habit of always acting according to the verdicts of our reasoning, rather than 
allowing our actions to be determined by instincts or inclination.  The problem here is that it is 
far from certain that this principle is true.  Experience suggests that in some cases, rational ends 
are better attained by those who do not aim at them in a purely rational manner.  To take one of 
Sidgwick’s examples, marriages seem more likely to succeed if they result from falling in love 
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rather than ‘tranquil and deliberate design’ (ME 345).7  Of course, Sidgwick believes that careful 
reasoning is indispensible for discovering our ultimate ends and fundamental ethical principles.  
He is simply making the point that the best means of achieving these ends and living in 
accordance with true principles may sometimes require following the influence of feelings and 
instincts rather than rational deliberation.
8
    
 Regarding the second criterion, the key insight is that reflection can help us recognize 
when the apparent self-evidence of a proposition is illusory.  We sometimes judge principles to 
be self-evident simply because of their familiarity, or because they mesh with our inclinations or 
other non-rational impulses.  In such cases we may be able to detect the error by considering 
whether our confidence in it might have originated from a pernicious source (e.g. racist 
principles believed as a result of being raised in a racist society).  Crisp (2002: 71) helpfully 
summarizes this function of Sidgwick’s second test from a first-person perspective: “Ultimately I 
am seeking to vindicate my beliefs, to reassure myself that I believe that p because it is indeed 
the case that p.”     
 The third and fourth criteria explain why, despite the emphasis on foundational 
propositions, PHI is also partly coherentist.  The degree of justification for a given belief 
depends in part on consistency with the agent’s other beliefs, as well as the beliefs of other 
equally reliable epistemic agents.  Regarding the former, Sidgwick notes that ethicists have 
                                                 
7
 Crisp (2006: 89) notes that Sidgwick’s first criterion does not merely test for clarity and precision in the meaning 
of the terms, the subject assessing the proposition must also be clear about the practical implications of the 
proposition.  See Sidgwick (ME 215). 
8
 On this point Sidgwick adds the following: “Though the ‘dictates of Reason’ are always to be obeyed, it does not 
follow that ‘the dictation of Reason’—the predominance of consciously moral over non-moral motives—is to be 
promoted without limits…” (ME 395).  Here we should read ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’ as meaning ‘rational’ and 
‘non-rational’.  The suggestion that ultimate rational ends might be best promoted by allowing oneself to be 
influenced by non-rational impulses has been influential among contemporary consequentialists (see Driver: 2012).   
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frequently paid insufficient heed to the seriousness of internally inconsistent principles.
9
  He 
claims that such conflict is not a small problem to be put aside for future resolution, but is rather 
“absolute proof” that at least one of the principles must be qualified.  Of course, there is nothing 
inherently problematic about qualified principles in ethics.  But Sidgwick’s point is that adding 
qualifications requires reassessing the apparent self-evidence of the principle.  Though the 
proposition might have had an air of self-evidence in its original form, the need for qualification, 
“suggests a doubt whether the correctly qualified proposition will present itself with the same 
self-evidence as the simple but inadequate one; and whether we have not mistaken for an 
ultimate and independent axiom one that is really derivative and subordinate” (ME 341).10  Here 
again reflection plays an important role.  As Sidgwick notes in the first chapter of the Methods, 
many candidate first principles seem satisfactory to us when they have the field to themselves.  
But once we reflect and see potential conflicts with other plausible principles, the air of self-
evidence diminishes (ME 14).    
 The fourth criterion anticipates contemporary concerns over the epistemic implications of 
disagreement.  Sidgwick’s view is that a proposition cannot have the highest certainty attainable 
if an equally competent judge does not accept it.  Such conflict does not warrant complete 
abandonment of the proposition, but it does require at least a temporary reduction in confidence.  
Sidgwick puts the point as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Sidgwick does not clarify whether he is referring only to logical inconsistency, or also practical inconsistencies.  
Given his lengthy treatment of practical contradictions between egoism and utilitarianism, it is reasonable to 
suppose he has both types of inconsistency in mind.  On this point see Crisp (2006: 90).   
10
 For further discussion and defense of the foundationalist-coherentist hybrid reading of Sidgwick, see Phillips 
(2011: ch.5).    
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  For if I find any of my judgments, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict with  
  another mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to  
  suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between the 
  two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of neutrality.  And  
  though the total result in any mind is not exactly suspense of judgment, but an  
  alternation and conflict between positive affirmation by one act of thought and the 
  neutrality that is the result of another, it is obviously something very different  
  from scientific certitude. (ME 342)
11
 
 
It is important to note the qualifier in the above passage: “if I have no more reason to suspect 
error in the other mind than in my own.”  When there are strong grounds for believing that the 
other party is mistaken, the existence of disagreement need not undermine one’s confidence in 
the proposition in question. 
 Having provided and defended his four criteria for highest certainty, Sidgwick is in 
position to provide his own candidate axioms and attempt to utilize them for the derivation of 
properly justified ethical principles.    
 
3  Sidgwick’s Axioms of Ethics 
3.1  Between Scylla and Charybdis 
By the time we reach Sidgwick’s chapter on Philosophical Intuitionism in the Methods, he has 
already dedicated several chapters to the task of exposing the ways in which common-sense 
morality is epistemically suspect.  The Dogmatic Intuitional system is plagued by 
inconsistencies, arbitrariness, and a lack of unifying explanations.  And many of the common-
sense principles that initially seem most certain turn out to be mere tautologies.  Sidgwick 
memorably asks whether philosophical ethics might do better than this: “Can we then, between 
this Scylla and Charybdis of ethical inquiry, avoiding on the one hand doctrines that merely 
                                                 
11
 For contemporary discussion of the epistemology of disagreement see Kelly (2005), Audi (2010: ch. 14), and 
Christensen and Lackey (2013).   
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bring us back to common opinion with all its imperfections, and on the other hand doctrines that 
lead us round in a circle, find any way of obtaining self-evident moral principles of real 
significance?” (ME 379).  Sidgwick answers this question in the affirmative, although his 
optimism is qualified.  He believes there is a set of absolute, self-evident ethical principles, 
although they are too abstract to provide concrete guidance by themselves.  Still, these principles 
at least have the potential to provide the stable foundation necessary for justification in ethics.   
 There is substantial controversy over the precise number and content of Sidgwick’s 
axioms.  Part of the problem is that he is somewhat loose with terminology, occasionally 
oscillating between the labels ‘axiom’, ‘maxim’, ‘rational intuition’ and ‘principle’.  A further 
problem is that some of the principles outlined in his discussion are said to be derived from more 
basic propositions, which suggests that they may not be genuinely self-evident.
12
  As a result of 
these interpretive difficulties, a plausible case can be made for the number of genuine axioms 
being as small as three or as great as 11.
13
  As I interpret the relevant passages in the Methods, 
there are 5 distinct axioms from which three further principles are derived.   
 My preferred reading is motivated in part by Sidgwick’s remarks about what the various 
axioms and principles have in common.  Of particular interest is his observation that the axioms 
and derived principles can be obtained by considering the relationship between parts and wholes 
(ME 380, 382-83).  In some cases, the relevant relationship is the similarity of the individuals 
that make up a “Logical Whole or Genus.”  By this Sidgwick means the entire group of 
                                                 
12
 For one discussion of this issue see Schneewind (1977: 294-5).  The fact that Sidgwick derives some of his 
principles from other propositions does not rule out his viewing them as self-evident.  Given his frequent references 
to the axioms of mathematics and geometry, Sidgwick clearly believes that proofs can be provided for self-evident 
propositions.  It may be that Sidgwick thinks he can grasp the truth of his principles merely by reflecting on them, 
and the derivations are simply provided for those who might have greater difficulty cognizing them.  For helpful 
discussion of self-evidence in ethics, and the point that self-evidence is compatible with provability, see Audi 
(2015).     
13
 For historical treatments of this debate see the references in Schneewind (1977: 290 n).  For more recent 
treatments of, and contributions to, the debate over the axioms, see Skelton (2008), Irwin (2009 vol. 3, ch. 83); 
Phillips (2011: ch. 4), Shaver (2014), and Crisp (2015: 115-126).   
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individuals who possess the traits which make them such that certain normative concepts apply 
to them.  For instance, all individuals who are capable of understanding and responding to 
reasons make up the logical whole of rational beings.
14
  The other type of whole that is relevant 
for the axioms is the “Mathematical or Quantitative Whole.”  An example of a quantitative 
whole is a temporally instantiated and connected series of events such as the life of a particular 
person (Crisp 2015: 117, n. 37).  According to Sidgwick, this idea is said to be indicated in the 
common notion of ‘the Good’ or ‘good on the whole for any individual human being (ME 381, 
my italics).  Earlier in the Methods, Sidgwick characterizes ‘the good’ for a particular individual 
as that which she would have reason to desire on the assumption that only her own existence is to 
be considered (ME 112).
15
  This is contrasted with the notion of ‘good’ unqualified by reference 
to a particular subject.  This latter notion is taken to refer to that which any rational being as such 
would have reason to desire on the assumption that all existence it to be given equal 
consideration.  Sidgwick sometimes refers to this as ‘universal good’, and he suggests that this is 
the notion picked out when conduct is judged ‘good’ or ‘desirable’ in itself (ibid.).16   
 Sidgwick’s remarks about the relevance of parts and wholes for obtaining the axioms and 
derived principles allow us to see how they might be formulated and presented more 
                                                 
14
 See Irwin 2009 vol. 3, ch. 83).  Citing some of Sidgwick’s less well-known works, Crisp (2015: 117, n. 37) 
suggests that an example of a logical whole might be “the series of numbers, understood atemporally, each being a 
number as much as any other.”    
15
 In his discussion of an individual’s good in this passage, Sidgwick uses the phrase ‘ultimate good on the whole for 
me’ rather than simply ‘good for me’.  The extra verbiage is motivated by recognition that something might be good 
for me if only a particular temporal part of my life were to be considered, yet not be good for me if my entire life 
were considered.  This is an important point, but for ease of exposition I will use the phrase ‘the good for X’ to 
express the notion of X’s ultimate good on the whole.   
16
 Sidgwick occasionally uses the terms ‘absolute good’ and ‘objective good’ to express the idea of ‘universal’ or 
‘intrinsic’ good.  I have chosen to avoid using ‘absolute’ because this is sometimes taken to mean a type of good that 
is not good for anyone, such as unperceived beauty (see Kraut 2011).  If Sidgwick’s ‘universal good’ exists, it might 
still be the case that nothing is good unless it is good for someone.  I have chosen to avoid the term ‘objective good’ 
because this is sometimes taken to mean an end that a rational being ought to aim at independently of whether it 
would satisfy any of her desires.  It is possible that such ‘objective good’ exists even though Sidgwick’s ‘universal 
good’ does not.  This would be the case if, for instance, egoism is true.  I will sometimes use ‘agent-neutral good’ as 
a substitute for ‘universal good’, because the former nicely captures the idea Sidgwick has in mind (though this 
terminology did not appear until Parfit’s Reasons and Persons (1984)).     
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systematically than they are in the Methods.  My proposed formulations of the axioms and 
principles are as follows:
17
 
 
 
  Equal Right: The general requirements of ethics apply equally to all rational  
  beings as such. (379-80)
18
   
 
  Rational Being: Qua member of the logical whole of rational beings, I am  
  qualitatively identical to any other person. (379-80)
19
   
 
From these two axioms we deduce the following practical principle: 
  
  Universal Right: If an action is right (or wrong) for me, it must also be right (or  
  wrong) for any other rational being facing exactly similar circumstances. (379- 
  80)
20
  
  
The axioms above are obtained by consideration of the logical whole of rational beings.  
Sidgwick indicates that the other three are obtained by consideration of quantitative wholes 
rather than logical wholes: 
   
                                                 
17
 None of my formulations match Sidgwick’s wording exactly.  The page numbers refer to the passages where the 
relevant axiom or principle is discussed.  I defend my deviations from Sidgwick’s wording below.   
18
 Sidgwick does not assign labels to the axioms, though he does give labels to the derived principles.     
19
 This axiom appears to be trivially true.  This might seem problematic given Sidgwick’s stated aim of discovering 
substantive principles that are unlike the tautologous “sham axioms” of common-sense morality.  However, 
Sidgwick can achieve this aim as long as his derived principles are genuinely substantive and normative.  And this 
requires only that at least one of the axioms from which it is deduced is substantive and normative.  David Phillips 
(2011: 124) makes this point in defending his preferred reading of the axioms.     
20
 Sidgwick notes that there is a corresponding principle stating that “it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in 
which it is wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there 
being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for 
difference of treatment” (ME 380).  I do not consider this an independent principle because it is implied by the 
principle of Universal Right.  If there is no relevant difference between A and B, then if it is right for A to treat B in a 
certain manner, it follows from Universal Right that it would have to be right for B to treat A in that manner should 
their roles be reversed.     
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  Equal Good: One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of  
  the good. (382)
21
 
 
  Temporal Irrelevance: Equal temporal parts of one’s remaining life are exactly  
  similar qua portions of one’s own good. (381)22 
 
  Personal Irrelevance: The equal good of any two individuals is exactly similar qua 
  portions of universal good. (382)
23
 
 
From ‘Equal Good’ and ‘Temporal Irrelevance’ Sidgwick deduces a principle of prudence:  
 
  Prudence: One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal temporal parts 
  of one’s remaining life. (381)  
 
 
                                                 
21
 The ‘ought’ in the axioms should not be read as a moral ‘ought’ but rather as an ‘ought’ of ultimate practical 
reasons.  As Crisp notes, though Sidgwick often utilizes distinctively moral concepts, his primary concern is to 
discover principles telling us what is ultimately reasonable, or what one has overall reason to do (Crisp 2015: 17).  I 
have included the word ‘fundamental’ to express the point that the axioms are about ultimate reasons rather than 
derivative reasons.  One’s having equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good is compatible with one’s 
having derivative reasons to prioritize one portion over another.     
22
 Temporal Irrelevance does not appear to have the level of certainty Sidgwick thinks it does.  In recent debates 
about the value of the shape of a life, some have argued that the later parts of one’s life carry greater significance for 
one’s overall wellbeing (Velleman 1991; Slote 1983; Temkin 2012).  C.D. Broad (1930: 225) responds to this 
challenge for Sidgwick’s axiom by noting that intuitions supporting the idea that a life’s shape matters might be 
distorted by facts about the secondary pleasures and pains of memory and anticipation.  For present purposes we can 
avoid delving into this debate because the key axioms for answering the Partiality Question are Equal Good and 
Personal Irrelevance.     
23
 Sidgwick’s formulation of the claim that nobody’s good is more intrinsically valuable than anyone else’s includes 
the following qualifier: “unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized 
in the one case than in the other” (ME 382).  This qualifier is undoubtedly meant to capture the point that the quality 
and duration of the lives of two individuals would make a difference in the portion of universal good they constitute.  
But I believe the qualifier is also meant to accommodate the possibility that an individual’s good might constitute a 
smaller portion of universal good if she has a bad character.  Some evidence for this reading comes from Sidgwick’s 
initial presentation of the impartialist principle in the opening chapter of the Methods.  There he presents the 
impartialist as holding that “it cannot be reasonable to take as an ultimate and paramount end the happiness of any 
one individual rather than that of any other—at any rate if equally deserving and susceptible of it…” (ME 10, my 
italics).  In my formulation Personal Irrelevance, the word ‘equal’ before ‘good’ is meant to accommodate both the 
point about quality and duration as well as the point about desert.  The axiom leaves open the question of whether 
five minutes of Hitler’s pleasure is of equal intrinsic value as five minutes of Gandhi’s pleasure because their 
disparate characters might change the values.           
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From ‘Equal Good’ and ‘Personal Irrelevance’ Sidgwick deduces a principle of impartialism: 
 
  Rational Benevolence: One ought to have equal fundamental concern for the  
  equal good of all individuals. (382)
24
   
 
3.2 The Role of ‘Good’ in the Axioms 
An initial difficulty arises concerning the notion of ‘good’ and its place in the axioms.  As we 
have seen, Sidgwick believes this term can be used to express two different ideas, depending on 
whether reference is made to a particular subject.  If I say ‘the good for x’ where x represents a 
specific individual, I mean that which x ought to desire considering only x’s own existence.25  
We can call this the personal specification of ‘good’.  If, on the other hand, I use this phrase 
without making reference to anyone in particular, I mean to refer to that which ought to be 
desired and promoted by all rational beings as such, regardless of how they are related to it.
26
  
We can call this the universal specification of ‘good’.    
                                                 
24
 One might worry that the requirement of equal fundamental concern expressed in Prudence and Rational 
Benevolence can be met by not having any concern for the respective ends.  But since these principles are derived 
from axioms concerning ‘good’, and ‘good’ is understood as that which a rational being ought to aim at, Prudence 
and Rational Benevolence should be read as requiring positive concern for the respective ends.   
25
 Crisp (2015: 61) points out that Sidgwick’s account of ‘good for’ is vulnerable to ‘the wrong kind of reasons 
objection’ (Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2004: 393).  Crisp provides an example in which an evil demon 
threatens to torture you unless you desire something seemingly irrelevant to your good such as a saucer of mud.  
This threat would give you a strong reason to desire the saucer of mud, but it seems implausible that the mud is a 
constituent of your welfare.  This is taken as a reason to reject any account, such as Sidgwick’s, that explains ‘good 
for’ in terms of what an agent ought to desire.  Not much hangs on this for present purposes, as Crisp (2015: 61) 
suggests that Sidgwick could have avoided this difficulty by treating ‘good for’ as a primitive notion.  Nonetheless, 
one might defend Sidgwick’s analysis by drawing on the distinction between ultimate reasons and derivative 
reasons.  In the evil demon case, the reason to desire the saucer of mud is clearly derivative.  Sidgwick’s account of 
‘good for’ could seemingly avoid the objection if understood in terms of ultimate rather than derivative reasons.      
26
 Sidgwick’s gloss on the idea of universal good is that of an end that all rational beings should desire and seek to 
realize assuming equal concern for all existence (ME 112).  This way of expressing the idea is slightly misleading.  
It gives the impression that it is a conceptual truth that if universal good exists, everyone’s welfare constitutes an 
equal portion of it.  But this is not a conceptual truth.  To see why, recall that Sidgwick equates the idea of universal 
good with that of intrinsic value.  There is nothing incoherent about believing that one’s own welfare is more 
intrinsically valuable than that of someone else (though this is certainly implausible).  In order to avoid the 
implication that everyone’s welfare necessarily constitutes equal portions of universal good, I characterize universal 
good as that which ought to be desired by all rational beings as such, regardless of how they are related to it.  I take 
it that this captures what Sidgwick has in mind.  Some evidence for this reading is found in Methods IV: II where 
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 As I have presented them, the three relevant axioms differ regarding ‘good’.  Whereas the 
axioms of Temporal Irrelevance and Personal Irrelevance include personal and universal 
specifications respectively, the axiom of Equal Good includes an underspecified usage.  It may  
seem puzzling that ‘good’ could be used without full specification, given Sidgwick’s suggestion 
that a usage without reference to any particular subject means “what as a rational being I should 
desire and seek to realize, assuming myself to have equal concern for all existence” (ME 112).  
However, Sidgwick’s understanding of ‘good’ and the two different conceptions actually allows 
for a usage that maintains neutrality between the personal and universal specifications.  On this 
alternative usage, ‘good’ means ‘that which any rational being would have reason to desire and 
seek to realize’.  It is left open whether this end necessarily includes only one’s own welfare 
(because ‘good’ is agent-relative), or if it might extend beyond oneself (because ‘good’ is 
universal).
27
   
 I believe it is this neutral usage of ‘good’ which occurs in the axiom of Equal Good.  
Before considering the points in favor of this reading, note first that further specification is not 
needed for the axiom to have prima facie plausibility.  This can be seen by substituting the 
neutral gloss on ‘good’ in my suggested formulation: “One ought to have equal fundamental 
concern for equal portions of that end which, as a rational being, one ought to desire and seek to 
realize.”  This is a substantive proposition, and contemplation of it alone provides at least 
preliminary justification for its acceptance.      
 Further motivation for my underspecified reading of Equal Good comes from the 
following considerations.  First, notice that if the axiom were intended to be read with an agent-
                                                                                                                                                             
Sidgwick equates the idea of absolute, unqualified good with the idea of an end “to which the action of a reasonable 
agent as such ought to be directed” (ME 421).  The ‘as such’ in this statement is meant to encompass the idea that 
facts about how the agent happens to be related to the end in question are normatively inert.       
27
 One might worry that the neutral usage would render the axiom of Equal Good incapable of passing Sidgwick’s 
first test which requires clarity and precision.  I shall address this point presently.   
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relative specification of ‘good’, Sidgwick could not have derived the impartialist principle of 
Rational Benevolence from Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance.  Impartialism does not follow 
from (1) the fact that one ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the 
good, and (2) the fact that everyone’s good is of equal intrinsic value.  Hence, a reading of Equal 
Good with an agent-relative specification of ‘good’ is ruled out.  Thus, the only live alternative 
to the underspecified reading I favor is a reading according to which ‘good’ takes a universal 
specification.  One reason for favoring the underspecified reading over the universal reading is 
that the underspecification of ‘good’ allows for Equal Good to be accepted by egoists and non-
egoists alike.  This would not be the case if the axiom contained a universal specification of 
‘good’.  If the axiom contained such a specification, it would imply that the ultimate end of 
rational conduct is not relative to each individual.  The egoist adamantly denies this.  When 
considering candidate versions of genuinely self-evident axioms it is preferable to choose a 
version that is accepted by all parties to the debate because substantial disagreement diminishes 
the degree of certainty.
28
   
 This is related to a further point in favor of the underspecified reading which is that 
Sidgwick himself has substantial doubts about whether the ultimate end of rational conduct is 
universal rather than agent-relative.  These doubts about the existence of a non-relative end for 
all rational beings as such are precisely what lead to his dissatisfaction with Mill’s defense of 
utilitarianism.  And as I shall explain presently, these same doubts also lead to the famous 
conclusion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason.  Hence, it is doubtful that Sidgwick 
would find it self-evident that rational agents are bound to aim at universal good. 
                                                 
28
 Robert Shaver (2014) attempts to explain how egoists can accept Equal Good by interpreting it as having an 
unstated antecedent of ‘from the point of view of the universe’.  On this reading, the egoist can accept the axiom as a 
truth about what would follow were one to adopt a universal point of view.  The egoist can still avoid being driven 
to impartialism by simply refusing to adopt such a point of view.  One advantage of my reading is that it allows for 
the egoist’s assent without having to posit an unstated antecedent.          
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 An additional reason for reading Equal Good with an underspecified usage of ‘good’ is 
that this fits well with Sidgwick’s remarks about the usefulness of his axiom-based argument 
against proponents of egoism.  As will become clear in my discussion of the Dualism of Practical 
Reason, Sidgwick does not believe his derivation of Rational Benevolence has dialectical force 
against all proponents of egoism.  Specifically, he does not believe his argument is of any use 
against those egoists who believe all good is relative to the individual.  However, Sidgwick does 
believe his axioms are useful against an egoist who acknowledges the existence of universal 
good.  The suggestion is that if an egoist admits that his own welfare is part of universal good, it 
then becomes pertinent to note that his own good cannot be a greater part of universal good than 
anyone else’s.  From here Sidgwick claims that, “starting with his own principle,” the egoist may 
be brought to accept that the happiness of all is an end that the action of rational beings as such 
ought to be directed (ME 421).  One plausible way of understanding Sidgwick here is that all 
egoists agree that one ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  
They can resist impartialism as long as they deny that the good is universal.  But if an egoist 
acknowledges universal good, his acceptance of Equal Good combined with the truth of Personal 
Irrelevance will lead him directly to impartialism.   
 Though these considerations tell in favor of the underspecified usage of ‘good’, two 
further worries remain.  The first is that the lack of specification in Equal Good seems to tell 
against its status as an axiom of the highest certainty attainable.  As we have seen, Sidgwick’s 
first criterion for highest certainty requires clarity and precision.  The underspecification of 
‘good’ in my formulation seems to make it a prime example of imprecision.   
 In order to properly assess this worry it is necessary to recall the motivation for the ‘clear 
and precise’ criterion.  As we have seen, Sidgwick pays considerable heed to the fact that many 
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widely accepted ethical principles only appear self-evident as long as their terms remain vague.  
Recall the earlier example of a principle stating that it is one’s duty to act wisely.  We saw that 
this principle becomes highly dubious upon clarification.  Understood one way, the principle 
tells us only that it is our duty to do what we judge to be our duty.   Understood another way, the 
principle tells us that we ought to cultivate a habit of acting strictly from the deliverance of 
reason rather than allowing our actions to be determined by instincts and emotions.  While the 
first precisification renders the principle devoid of substance, the second substantially weakens 
its plausibility.  This type of problem illustrates the purpose of the first criterion.  Aiming for 
clarity and precision allows us to uncover serious problems afflicting principles that might 
appear self-evident at first blush.   
 The important point for present purposes is that the underspecification of Equal Good is 
not the sort of problematic imprecision that the first criterion tests for.  To see why, notice that 
neither of the candidate specifications of the principle renders it dubious.  Equal Good has the 
interesting feature of being equally plausible no matter which way of specifying it corresponds to 
the way the world is.  Whether the good is agent-relative or universal, it appears evident that I 
ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of it.  When I reflect on the notion of 
an end that I ought to desire and seek to promote, it seems clear that I ought to give equal weight 
to equal portions of it.  I can be confident about this even though I might be uncertain about 
whether this quantitative whole is agent-relative or agent-neutral.
29
    
 That being said, one might still worry that even if the lack of specification does not 
render Equal Good dubious, it does diminish its usefulness.  More specifically, one might have 
doubts about whether we can make valid inferences from the axioms to the principles of 
                                                 
29
 Unfortunately, the axiom of Equal Good does run afoul of Sidgwick’s fourth test.  As I shall discuss below, some 
of Sidgwick’s most loyal contemporary disciples implicitly reject the axiom.   
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Prudence and Rational Benevolence if the axioms differ in their specifications of the key term.  
Fortunately, the divergence in meaning that occurs in the axioms is not the type of ambiguity that 
leads to the fallacy of equivocation.  When a key term is underspecified in one premise and 
specified a particular way in another, a valid inference can still be made if the conclusion would 
follow on either specification of the term in the original premise.  This is exactly what happens in 
the case of the deduction of Prudence from Equal Good and Temporal Irrelevance.  We have 
seen that while Equal Good includes an underspecified usage of ‘good’, Temporal Irrelevance 
includes a personal specification.  The reason we can still deduce Prudence from these axioms is 
that the personal specification in Temporal Irrelevance will have the same significance no matter 
which account of ‘good’ turns out to be veridical.  The account that is veridical is the one that 
corresponds to the way the world actually is.  If the world is such that what is ultimately 
desirable for rational beings is always relative to the individual, then the personal account is 
veridical.  If the world is such that what is ultimately desirable for rational beings is universal 
rather than agent-relative, then the universal account is veridical.  Though Equal Good is given a 
neutral specification, the referent of this axiom is fixed by the facts about the world.  The axiom 
refers to whichever account of ‘good’ is veridical.      
 Suppose it turns out that good is always relative to the individual.  If so, then Equal Good 
would refer to personal good just as Temporal Irrelevance does.  Hence the deduction of 
Prudence would not be problematic at all.  But suppose instead that the world is such that the 
ultimate end for any rational being is universal rather than personal.  In that case, Equal Good 
would refer to universal good.  This might seem like a problem given that Temporal Irrelevance 
is about personal good.  However, on the reasonable assumption that the personal good of the 
individual would constitute at least a portion of universal good, it would still be the case that the 
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individual ought to promote her own good with equal regard for equal portions of it.  Hence, 
when this requirement is combined with the fact that the different temporal parts of a person’s 
life are the same qua portions of her good (i.e. the axiom of Temporal Irrelevance), we can 
conclude that the individual ought to be impartial with respect to the different temporal parts of 
her remaining life (i.e. the principle of Prudence).       
 Alas, things do not work quite so nicely for the deduction of Rational Benevolence from 
Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance.  Rational Benevolence only follows from these axioms if 
it turns out that the ultimate end for rational beings is universal rather than personal.  If ‘good’ is 
universal, then Equal Good refers to the same notion that Personal Irrelevance picks out.  Hence, 
there would be no trouble deriving the conclusion that reason requires impartiality at the 
fundamental level.  However, if ‘good’ is always relative to the individual, then Equal Good 
refers to a notion that is different from that picked out by Personal Irrelevance.  Thus, Rational 
Benevolence could not be derived from the axioms.  This may seem to undermine any potential 
usefulness of Personal Irrelevance for answering the Partiality Question.  However, the axiom is 
only useless if the idea of universal good cannot be vindicated.  If it can be vindicated (and I 
shall argue that it can), then we can use Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance to derive a 
principle of impartialism after all.  As we shall see presently, Sidgwick is well aware of the fact 
that the usefulness of his axioms hinges on the question of whether the good is universal or 
agent-relative.    
 
3.3 Sidgwick’s Words 
I take the foregoing considerations to constitute an adequate defense of my usage of ‘good’ in 
formulating the axioms.  But given the importance of Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance for 
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Sidgwick’s project, as well as for my argument for Rational Impartialism, it is necessary to 
examine Sidgwick’s own statements of these axioms in order to fully vindicate my formulations.  
Since I have opted to deviate from Sidgwick’s wording, I take on the burden of demonstrating 
that I have captured his intended meaning nonetheless.
30
 
 After explaining how the principle of Prudence is obtained by considering the similarity 
of the different temporal parts of the individual’s good on the whole, Sidgwick points out that 
similar reasoning can be applied in the case of universal good in order to derive the principle of 
Rational Benevolence.  The key passage reads as follows:  
 
  And here again, just as in the former case [i.e. the case of an individual’s good],  
  by considering the relation of the integrant parts to the whole and to each other, I  
  obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more  
  importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the  
  good of any other;  unless that is, there are special grounds for believing that more 
  good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other.  And it is evident to  
  me that as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,—so far as it is  
  attainable by my efforts,—not merely at a particular part of it.  (ME 382)   
  
 
Sidgwick adds that from these two axioms we can deduce the principle of Rational Benevolence, 
according to which “each one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as 
much as his own, except in so far as he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less 
certainly knowable or attainable by him” (ME 382).  
 The statement from which I draw the axiom of Personal Irrelevance is, “the good of any 
one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the 
Universe, than the good of any other…”  The obvious difference between this statement of the 
axiom and my preferred formulation is that whereas my formulation emphasizes similarity qua 
                                                 
30
 Of course, I am not alone in taking on this burden.  The need to deviate from Sidgwick’s wording in order to fully 
clarify his intended meaning is widely accepted among Sidgwick scholars.   
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portions of universal good, Sidgwick’s statement mentions equal importance from the point of 
view of the universe.  Despite this surface difference, I believe my formulation captures exactly 
what Sidgwick has in mind.  My primary reason for emphasizing similarity qua portions rather 
than equal importance is that this better accommodates Sidgwick’s claim that the same process 
of reasoning leads to the three derived principles—Prudence, Rational Benevolence, and 
Universal Right.
31
  The process of reasoning that leads to Universal Right and Prudence is 
clearly based on the similarity of different parts qua portions of the respective logical and 
quantitative wholes.  By formulating Personal Irrelevance as I have, the structural similarity 
between these deductions and the deduction of Rational Benevolence is rendered transparent.  
Moreover, the claim that the equal good of any two individuals is exactly similar qua portions of 
universal good is equivalent to the claim that neither person’s good is of greater importance from 
‘the point of view of the universe’.  The idea of something being important from the point of 
view of the universe is meant to capture the notion of an end that is desirable for all rational 
beings as such, regardless of how they are related to it.  This is the same notion picked out by 
‘good’ with a universal specification.32   
 My formulation of Equal Good is more controversial.  Sidgwick’s statement of this 
axiom is located in the part of the above passage that reads “as a rational being I am bound to 
                                                 
31
 Sidgwick refers to the principle I call ‘Universal Right’ as the principle of ‘Justice’ (ME 382).    
32
 Crisp suggests that the point of view of the universe is simply the perspective one takes when considering all 
sentient beings as a group (2015: 122, n. 51).   While it is true that the quantitative whole of universal good includes 
the welfare of all, textual evidence suggests that the notion of something being good from the point of view of the 
universe involves more than it merely being part of the sum total of welfare in the world.  In his essay, “Mr. Barratt 
on ‘The Suppression of Egoism,’” Sidgwick claims that when something is ‘desirable from a universal point of 
view’, this is equivalent to its being ‘absolutely’ good, or ‘what all rational beings, as such, ought to aim at 
realizing’” (EEM 27).  As I explain in footnote 17 above, for Sidgwick, ‘absolute good’ is equivalent to ‘universal 
good’ or ‘intrinsic good’.  Note that the axiom of Personal Irrelevance is a substantive claim.  It is conceptually 
possible that one person’s happiness is more intrinsically (or absolutely) valuable than another’s.  If this were the 
case, then all rational beings as such would have ultimate reason to give priority to that person’s happiness to the 
extent that it has greater intrinsic value.  The axiom of Personal Irrelevance is the substantive claim that this 
possibility does not obtain because nobody’s happiness (or deserved happiness) is of greater intrinsic value than the 
equal happiness (or deserved happiness) of anyone else.   
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aim at good generally… not merely at a particular part of it.”  It is not immediately obvious that 
this should be taken to mean “One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of 
the good.”  As is the case with Personal Irrelevance, one obvious difference between my 
formulation of Equal Good and Sidgwick’s statement of it is my emphasis on equal portions.  As 
before, the motivation for this emphasis is that it makes the similarity of structure among the 
deduction of all the intermediate principles more readily apparent.  All of the deductions are 
based on abstract maxims concerning quantitative or logical wholes, and the similarities among 
different parts of those wholes.       
 That being said, it is certainly tempting to read Sidgwick’s statement of Equal Good as an 
assertion that one ought to aim at the good of everyone rather than just one’s own good.33  This 
reading seems especially compelling if we take ‘bound to aim at good generally’ to be 
synonymous with ‘bound to aim at the general good’.  But we have already encountered two 
reasons for thinking think that this small difference in word order marks an important difference 
in meaning, and that it is no accident that Sidgwick says ‘good generally’ rather than ‘general 
good’.  First, given some of Sidgwick’s commitments, it would be strange for him to classify a 
principle stating that one ought to aim at general good (i.e. the good of everyone) among the self-
evident axioms.  He certainly considers egoism to be a viable option, and at least some 
proponents of egoism are thereby epistemic peers.  Hence, the egoist’s insistence on the falsity of 
                                                 
33
David Phillips (2011: 124) favors a reading of the above passage that renders Equal Good less significant.  On 
Phillips’ reading, the axiom is merely an expression of the idea that there is reason to aim at whatever is good.  
Phillips claims that this makes Equal Good tautologous, and that partly for this reason, the deduction of Rational 
Benevolence cannot succeed even on the assumption that ‘the good’ is universal.  The worry is that even if there is 
some reason to aim at whatever is universally good, reason might still permit prioritizing some parts of universal 
good over others.  I take it to be an advantage of my reading of Equal Good that this problem is avoided.  As I read 
Sidgwick, his claim is not just that there is some reason to aim at whatever is good but rather that one ought to have 
equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  Phillips would likely respond that on my reading the 
axiom is not genuinely self-evident because it is not obviously contrary to reason to prioritize one’s own good over 
the good of others, even if the good is universal rather than agent-relative.  I shall return to this issue in chapter 4 
where I consider a particularly incisive version of this challenge arising from the views of Roger Crisp (2006) and 
Derek Parfit (2011).        
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an axiom stating that one ought to aim at the good of all would diminish the appearance of self-
evidence.
34
  Second, if Sidgwick finds it genuinely self-evident that one ought to aim at the good 
of all he would not reach the troubling conclusion that egoism is as well justified as impartialism. 
 A further problem with the alternative reading of Equal Good mentioned above is that it 
cannot be combined with Personal Irrelevance to yield Rational Benevolence.  Personal 
Irrelevance essentially states that nobody’s welfare is more intrinsically valuable than anyone 
else’s.  It does not follow from this and the (ostensible) fact that one ought to aim at the good of 
everyone, that reason requires giving equal weight to the equal good of all.  One might 
consistently accept the two axioms (on the suggested readings) while also believing that one 
ought to prioritize the good of some over the equal good of others.  Proponents of the ‘aim at 
everyone’s good’ reading of Equal Good might respond by proposing that the axiom be read as 
stating a rational requirement to aim at everyone’s good equally.  But the problem here is that 
this is essentially the principle of Rational Benevolence, which is the conclusion that Sidgwick 
aims to derive from Personal Irrelevance and Equal Good.   
 Before moving on to discuss Sidgwick’s considered views about the epistemic status of 
egoism and Rational Benevolence, there is a final potential problem for my reading of the 
axioms that bears mentioning.  It might appear as though one of the primary objections I raise 
against alternative readings of Equal Good also cuts against my preferred formulation of 
Personal Irrelevance.  Just as the egoist would reject Equal Good if it implied that rational 
concern is not relative to oneself, so too should she reject Personal Irrelevance.  This is because 
                                                 
34
 One might object that the same could be said for Sidgwick’s principle of Rational Benevolence.  At times 
Sidgwick suggests that this principle is self-evident, yet clearly it is rejected by the egoist.  The solution to this 
puzzle is that Sidgwick only considers Rational Benevolence to possess apparent self-evidence.  Immediately 
following his deduction of the intermediate principles of Prudence and Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick claims only 
to have shown that they contain “at least a self-evident element” (ME 382).  The genuinely self-evident elements in 
Rational Benevolence are the axioms of Personal Irrelevance and Equal Good.  On the reading I am advocating 
neither of these axioms conflict with other apparently self-evident propositions.    
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proponents of egoism deny the existence of the non-relative, ‘universal’ good implied by 
Personal Irrelevance.  However, though the egoist claims that all good is agent-relative, she does 
not insist on the falsity of the claim that the good of any two individuals must be exactly similar 
qua portions of universal good.  The egoist can still accept the latter as a truth we can grasp by 
reflecting on the concept of universal good and the relation this notion might have to each 
individual’s good.35  For it seems difficult to imagine grounds for believing that one’s welfare 
could be any greater or lesser a part of universal good than the welfare of others would be, even 
if one has doubts about whether universal good exists at all.  And importantly, Personal 
Irrelevance does not have ethical implications such that the egoist is committed to their falsity.  
Things are different in the case of the alternative reading of Equal Good we have been 
considering.  On this alternative, the axiom implies that the ultimate aim of rational conduct is 
not relative to the individual.  The egoist rejects this implication as false, insisting that rational 
concern is exclusively self-regarding.  It is this sort of substantive ethical disagreement that 
precludes highest certainty.  Of course, the fact that Personal Irrelevance makes reference to a 
type of good for which there is controversy regarding its existence is cause for concern.  But we 
can at least be confident that if universal good exists, no individual’s good constitutes a greater 
or lesser portion of it.   
 These considerations also explain why Sidgwick himself finds Personal Irrelevance 
genuinely self-evident despite his being tempted by egoism.  He is certain that one ought to have 
equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good (no matter which specification of 
                                                 
35
 On this point I am generally in agreement with C.D. Broad (1930: 244) and Robert Shaver (2014: 176).   Note that 
on my reading, Personal Irrelevance is not tautologous.  The axiom essentially states that nobody’s welfare is more 
intrinsically valuable than anyone else’s.  Notice that if someone were to claim that her own welfare is more 
intrinsically valuable than that of others, she would not have said anything contradictory or incoherent.  Nor would 
she betray conceptual confusion.  We would reject her claim not because it is incoherent, but rather because it is 
deeply implausible and it wears its arbitrariness on its sleeve.   
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‘good’ corresponds to the way the world is).  And he is confident that nobody’s good could 
constitute a greater or lesser portion of universal good than anyone else’s.  What Sidgwick is 
uncertain about is whether ‘good’ really is universal, or if it is agent-relative as egoists maintain.  
It is this uncertainty which leads to the worrisome Dualism of Practical Reason.  Before turning 
to my axiom-based argument for Rational Impartialism, it will be instructive to take a closer look 
at Sidgwick’s most notorious thesis.        
 
4  Chaos in the Cosmos of Duty: The Dualism of Practical Reason   
4.1 ‘Foredoomed to Inevitable Failure’ 
Following his derivation of Rational Benevolence from two of his axioms, Sidgwick claims that 
this principle is “required as a rational basis for the Utilitarian system” (ME 387).  Rational 
Benevolence is only a basis for utilitarianism rather than a complete vindication of it because the 
principle does not tell us to maximize hedonic welfare in the aggregate by any means necessary.  
The principle tells us only that we have equal ultimate reasons to promote the equal good of all.  
This is in principle compatible with the existence of deontological constraints on the promotion 
if impartial good.
36
  However, the fact that a principle requiring impartiality between self and 
others is derived from self-evident axioms should presumably rule out egoism as a viable option.   
                                                 
36
 Thomas Hurka (2014) argues that Sidgwick was guilty of equivocation in his treatment of the principle of 
Rational Benevolence.  Hurka claims that Sidgwick must use the principle in a weaker ‘other-things-equal’ form in 
order to meet the consensus criterion, but that he must also use it in a stronger ‘all-things-considered’ form in order 
for it to support consequentialism and generate the Dualism of Practical Reason.  As I read him, Sidgwick’s 
principle of Rational Benevolence falls somewhere in between Hurka’s two alternatives.  It clearly is not the 
stronger version because it does not state that impartial welfare is the only source of one’s reasons.  But my reading 
is stronger than Hurka’s weaker version because the ‘other-things-equal’ qualifier is too permissive—it might allow 
one to appeal to relational facts as grounds for having different fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  
On my interpretation, the deduction of Rational Benevolence is intended to settle only the question of whether we 
have ultimate reasons of partiality.  What the principle leaves open is whether there might be other fundamental 
principles (e.g. deontological constraints) that place limits on the pursuit of impartial welfare.  My preferred 
‘intermediate’ reading of Rational Benevolence is sufficient for providing an intuitive basis for consequentialism 
because it informs us that we ought to promote the good impartially.  If, as Sidgwick initially believes, this principle 
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 But to his great disappointment, Sidgwick eventually concludes that the axioms cannot 
even do this much.  While there are no problems with Equal Good and Temporal Irrelevance, 
difficulty arises when we reach the axiom of Personal Irrelevance.  It is hard to see grounds for 
denying that if that which rational beings as such ought to desire is agent-neutral rather than 
agent-relative, then the equal good of any two individuals would constitute equal portions of this 
end.  Hence, if we could be confident about the universality of good, then Personal Irrelevance 
would be a useful principle.  However, it is far from clear that the good is agent-neutral.  And if 
the good is always relative to a particular individual, then Personal Irrelevance has no practical 
significance.  The fact that nobody’s good could constitute a greater portion of universal good 
becomes irrelevant if no such good exists.   
 Sidgwick is keenly aware of this problem, and this is why he claims that his argument for 
Rational Benevolence is of no use against an egoist who begins with the assumption that 
rationality requires pursuit of one’s own good exclusively.  He puts the point thus:  
 
  If the Egoist strictly confines himself to stating his conviction that he ought to  
  take his own happiness or pleasure as his ultimate end, there seems no opening for 
  any line of reasoning to lead him to Universalistic Hedonism as a first principle; it 
  cannot be proved that the difference between his own happiness and another’s  
  happiness is not for him all-important. (ME 420)   
 
In the final chapter of the Methods, Sidgwick further articulates his concern about the inability to 
undermine the egoist’s position:   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
is the only one to survive critical scrutiny, the result is consequentialism.  I disagree with Hurka’s claim that only an 
‘all-things-considered’ rendition of Rational Benevolence can give rise to the Dualism of Practical Reason. I explain 
how Sidgwick arrives at his dualism in the main text of this section.     
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  It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any  
  one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently “I”  
  am concerned with the quality of my existence as in individual in a sense,   
  fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the  
  existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved 
  that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate  
  end of rational action for an individual. (ME 498).
37
       
 
Because he finds egoism independently plausible, and because he sees no way of vindicating 
belief in the existence of universal good, Sidgwick concludes that egoism is as well justified as 
impartialism.   
 Though the equal standing of apparently contradictory principles suggests that a rational 
basis for ethics is unattainable, Sidgwick considers whether this conclusion might still be 
avoided.  This would be possible if it could be demonstrated on empirical grounds that, as many 
moralists and theologians have maintained, the ends of self-interest and the greater good 
harmonize such that they never conflict with one another.  Sidgwick explores this possibility and 
acknowledges that in many respects the two candidate ends are compatible.  Given the facts of 
human nature, having a high level of regard for the welfare of others tends to contribute greatly 
to one’s own happiness.  Those who are predominantly selfish miss out on the “sense of 
elevation and enlargement given by wide interests,” as well as the “more secure and serene 
satisfaction that attends continually on activities directed towards ends more stable in prospect 
than an individual’s happiness can be” (ME 501).   
                                                 
37
 David Phillips (2011: 127) suggests that, despite the wording of this passage, Sidgwick should be read as making 
a normative claim that one ought to have greater concern for the quality of one’s own existence, rather than the 
descriptive claim that the one is more concerned about the quality of one’s own existence.  Phillips believes this to 
be the case because if Sidgwick were merely making a descriptive claim, this would not lend any support to egoism.  
However, as I read him, Sidgwick’s point is not that common-sense suggests that one ought to have greater 
fundamental regard for oneself.  What common sense affirms is the real metaphysical distinction between persons, 
and the fact that most people do in fact have greater regard for themselves.  Sidgwick’s worry is that it seems 
reasonable for the egoist to insist that the real distinction between persons provides grounds for prioritizing one’s 
own good.          
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  Unfortunately, the overlap between the ends of one’s own happiness and universal 
happiness is far from perfect.  There are many circumstances in which promoting the general 
good requires a sacrifice of one’s own good.  Given these practical conflicts, and given the equal 
justification for principles of Egoism and Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick reaches the somber 
conclusion that there is an irresolvable “Dualism of the Practical Reason.”38  The upshot is that 
in a wide range of circumstances practical reason cannot serve as a useful guide.  Sidgwick 
laments that in cases of perceived conflict between self-interest and the greater good: “practical 
reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would 
have to be decided by one or other of two groups of non-rational impulses” (ME 508).  He puts 
the point even more dramatically at the conclusion of the first edition of The Methods: “The 
Cosmos of Duty is thus really reduced to a Chaos: and the prolonged effort of the human 
intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to have been foredoomed to 
inevitable failure” (ME1 473).      
 
4.2 Avoiding Cosmic Chaos 
Though I accepted Sidgwick’s bleak conclusion upon my first exposure to the underlying ideas, I 
have since regained hope.  My primary aim in this section is to explain how two of Sidgwick’s 
axioms will be used as part of my argument for Rational Impartialism.  If this argument 
succeeds, the failure of prolonged efforts in philosophical ethics will be prevented (or at least 
forestalled).   
                                                 
38
 In “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies,” Sidgwick expresses dissatisfaction with the term ‘Dualism of the 
Practical Reason’: “I am not particularly pleased with the phrase, which has a pretentious sound, and is perhaps 
liable to mislead by suggesting that I claim for my view a completeness of systematic construction which, on the 
contrary, I wish to avoid claiming; but it seemed the most convenient phrase to express the conclusion in which I 
was forced to acquiesce after a prolonged effort to effect a complete systematization of our common ethical thought” 
(EEM 43).   
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 The two key axioms are Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance.  We have seen that the 
Dualism arises from uncertainty about universal good.  If we lack justification for believing that 
such good exists, then we cannot deduce a principle of impartialism from Equal Good and 
Personal Irrelevance.  Hence, in order to vindicate Rational Impartialism, I shall argue that we 
are justified in believing that the good is not relative to individuals but rather comprises the good 
of all.  This claim will constitute one of the premises in my argument for RI.   
   But even if the idea of universal good is vindicated, this will still not be enough to 
deduce Rational Impartialism.  This is because it is prima facie plausible that partiality itself (e.g. 
loving relationships and the acts they give rise to) might be part of universal good.  If partiality is 
valuable for its own sake, then we can accept Personal Irrelevance and a universally specified 
axiom of Equal Good while still maintaining that we have fundamental reasons to prioritize our 
loved ones.  This would be the case, for instance, if the value instantiated in acts of partiality 
towards one’s intimates could outweigh the value realized by the promotion of a stranger’s well-
being.  Sidgwick does not worry about this because he takes himself to have provided sufficient 
justification for a purely hedonistic value theory (hence ruling out the intrinsic value of 
partiality).
39
  Since the truth of hedonism remains highly controversial, I shall attempt to 
vindicate impartialism via a (somewhat) less contentious route.  I shall argue that partiality is 
only derivatively good—that its value derives from the contributions it makes to welfare.  This 
will constitute the final premise in my argument for Rational Impartialism.  With the added 
premises, the argument for Rational Impartialism is as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Sidgwick’s case for hedonism in The Methods is located in Book III, ch. XIV.  See also his “Hedonism and 
Ultimate Good” (EEM 89-98).   
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 1.  One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good. 
     [Axiom of Equal Good] 
 
 2.  The good is not relative to individuals but rather is universal.   
 
 3.  One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of universal good.  
      (from 1-2)
40
 
 
 4.  The equal good of any two individuals is exactly similar qua portions of universal    
      good.  [Axiom of Personal Irrelevance]   
 
 5.  Partiality towards one’s intimates is only derivatively good.     
 
 6.  One ought to have equal fundamental concern for the equal good of all individuals.  
      (from 3-5)
41
    
 
If adequate support for premise 2 can be given, this will settle the question of how to specify ‘the 
good’ in the axiom of Equal Good.  Whereas its initial presentation requires an underspecified 
reading, if we are justified in believing that the good is universal, we can be justified in accepting 
a universally specified version of Equal Good (premise 3).  I shall provide arguments in support 
of premise 2 in the next chapter (chapter 3).  In that chapter I shall also provide a defense of 
premise 5—the claim that instantiations of partiality are only derivatively good.   
 Given what has been said so far, one might think that my case for Rational Impartialism 
depends solely the strength of the arguments I will present for universal good and the derivative 
value of partiality.  It certainly seems that this would have appeared sufficient to Sidgwick.  This 
                                                 
40
 One might worry that a universal specification renders Equal Good tautologous.  This worry seems especially 
compelling in light of Sidgwick’s gloss of ‘universal good’ as that which rational beings ought to desire and seek to 
realize assuming equal concern for all existence (ME 112).  However, one could coherently maintain that (1) there is 
an end such that all rational beings as such ought to desire and seek to realize it, (2) this end is that which a rational 
being ought to desire assuming equal concern for all existence, and (3) reason does not require equal concern for 
equal portions of this end.  That this is not an inconsistent triad can more readily be seen when we remember that 
‘universal good’ is synonymous with ‘intrinsic good’.  It is at least coherent to claim that one ought to prioritize a 
smaller portion of intrinsic value over a larger portion.  I shall return to this issue as part of my defense of the axiom 
of Equal Good in chapter 4.        
41
 Just as in the axiom of Equal Good, the ‘ought’ in the conclusion of this argument should not be read as a moral 
‘ought’ but rather as an ‘ought’ of ultimate practical reasons.      
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is because the other two premises are constituted by genuine axioms, and the difficulty 
concerning Equal Good would be eliminated with the vindication of premise 2.  However, one 
problem that Sidgwick could not have anticipated is that two of his most prominent disciples 
reject the axiom of Equal Good.  Derek Parfit (2011) and Roger Crisp (2006) independently 
champion a view which I call the Partial Dualism of Practical Reason.  On this view, although 
everyone’s welfare constitutes an equal portion of universal good, agents sometimes have 
ultimate reason to prefer their own lesser good to the greater good of others.
42
  The explanation 
for the extra weight of self-interest is that the intrinsic value of an individual’s welfare is not the 
only factor that determines our reasons to promote it—it also matters how we are related to that 
person.  Both Parfit and Crisp maintain that the relations we have to our own consciousness 
justify giving greater weight to our own welfare than the welfare of others, even though 
everyone’s welfare constitutes an equal portion of the good.  I shall thus dedicate chapter 4 to 
defending Equal Good against the challenges presented by Parfit and Crisp.   
 
5  Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the details of Sidgwick’s ‘Philosophical Intuitionism’, and 
explained why this is an attractive approach to ethical inquiry.  I have also provided novel 
formulations of Sidgwick’s axioms, and defended these formulations against various objections.  
Lastly, I explained how Sidgwick reaches the conclusion that there is an irresolvable Dualism of 
Practical Reason, and I outlined my strategy for avoiding this bleak view through a Sidgwick-
inspired argument for Rational Impartialism.  In the next chapter I provide arguments for two 
highly controversial claims about the good—that it is agent-neutral, and that partiality is only 
                                                 
42
 An early articulation of Partial Dualism is found in Broad’s chapter on Sidgwick in Five Types of Ethical Theory 
(1930: 243-6).     
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derivatively part of it.  These two claims respectively constitute the second and fourth premises 
of my argument for RI. 
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3  Universal Good 
 
1  Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Sidgwick’s Dualism arises from uncertainty about the scope 
of ‘good’.  The axiom of Equal Good states that one ought to have equal fundamental concern 
for equal portions of the good.  Sidgwick’s problem was that he could not see any way of settling 
the question of whether anything is good ‘from the point of view of the Universe’, or if instead 
there is only agent-relative good.  If the good is always relative to the individual, as egoists 
maintain, then Sidgwick’s axioms support egoism rather than impartialism.  One of my aims in 
this chapter is to make a compelling case for believing that universal good does in fact exist.  If 
we can be justified in believing that the good is universal rather than agent-relative, then the 
axiom of Equal Good can be read with a universal specification.  This would in turn allow for the 
possibility of deriving a principle of impartialism from Sidgwick’s axioms after all.  But as I 
mentioned previously, securing the impartialist conclusion requires arguing against the purported 
intrinsic value of partiality towards loved ones.  Hence, a second aim of this chapter is to argue 
that instantiations of partiality are not good in themselves, but are rather of mere derivative 
value. 
 The discussion proceeds as follows.  I begin in section 2 by further explicating the idea of 
universal good, and arguing that the best test for the existence of universal good involves 
consideration of cases in which promoting the interest of others requires no sacrifice on the part 
of the agent in question.  I present such a case, and I explain why it lends substantial support to 
the existence of universal good.  I also explain why the denial of universal good looks especially 
implausible on the assumption that practical reasons are object-given and value-based.  In section 
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3 I turn to the question of whether instantiations of partiality within the context of loving 
relationships are intrinsically valuable.  I argue that partiality’s value is merely derivative from 
the contributions it makes to welfare.  A brief conclusion follows.   
 
2  The Point of View of the Universe   
2.1 The Idea of Universal Good 
Recall that Sidgwick characterizes the ultimate good for the individual as “what I should 
practically desire if my desires were in harmony with reason, assuming my own existence alone 
to be considered” (ME 112).  This is contrasted with the notion of ultimate good unqualified by 
reference to a particular subject.  This unqualified usage of ‘good’ is said to mean “what as a 
rational being I should desire and seek to realize, assuming myself to have equal concern for all 
existence” (ibid.)   Sidgwick goes on to claim that this latter notion of ‘good’ is what we have in 
mind when we judge conduct to be intrinsically good (ibid.).  As I explained in chapter 2, 
Sidgwick treats the notions of ‘intrinsic good’, ‘absolute good’, ‘objective good’ and ‘universal 
good’ as equivalent.1  Recall also the point that Sidgwick’s use of the phrase ‘equal concern for 
all existence’ in the characterization of universal good is misleading in that it gives the 
impression that if universal good exists, each individual’s welfare necessarily constitutes an 
equal portion of it.  Because there is no contradiction in supposing that one person’s welfare is 
more intrinsically valuable than another’s, it might have been better for Sidgwick to describe 
universal good as that which all rational beings as such should desire and seek to realize, 
regardless of how they are related to it.  This characterization more clearly expresses the fact that 
the universal point of view involves an impartial starting point, even if it might end up requiring 
                                                 
1
 See p. 42 n. 16.   
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greater concern for some parts of existence over others should we discover that those parts 
contain more intrinsic value.  When I adopt the point of view of the universe I imagine that I 
have no connection or relation to anyone or anything in particular, including myself.  Anything 
that I ought to desire from this neutral starting point is part of universal good.  But it is not a 
conceptual truth that the good of each individual will constitute an equal portion of universal 
good--that is a substantive proposition expressed in the axiom of Personal Irrelevance. 
 The key question for present purposes is whether we have adequate grounds for believing 
that there is any such thing as universal good.  The egoist is able to resist Sidgwick’s deduction 
of impartialism because she refuses to acknowledge that universal good exists.  Proponents of 
egoism maintain that when the individual brackets her unique relation to herself and the special 
concern she has for her own welfare in order to take up the point of view of the universe, there is 
nothing that she ought to desire.  Egoists maintain that there is only agent-relative good, and 
practical reasons can only be sourced in facts about oneself such as the fact that a particular 
course of action will promote one’s own happiness.  
 Despite the egoist’s refusal to acknowledge universal good, Sidgwick claims that belief 
in the existence of universal good is part of the common moral consciousness of mankind.   In 
responding to a critique of his treatment of egoism in the Methods, Sidgwick draws our attention 
to the common belief that the universe was created by an intelligent designer for the purpose of 
realizing good.  He notes that in this context the notion of ‘good’ must be used ‘absolutely’, that 
is, universally (EEM 27-28).  The thought here is that the type of good that would serve as God’s 
purpose in creating the world would not be relative to each individual, but rather something that 
all rational beings as such would have reason to desire regardless of how they are related to it.  In 
his discussion of the ‘Proof of Utilitarianism’ in the Methods, Sidgwick even suggests that an 
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egoist can be moved to accept impartialism if he acknowledges that his own existence is the 
product of intelligent design, and therefore part of universal good (ME 421).
2
  Sidgwick notes, 
however, that the egoist can simply refuse to accept that his existence is part of a divine plan.  
And the widespread assent to the idea of universal good is insufficient to demonstrate that the 
egoist is mistaken in believing that the only reasonable ultimate end is the promotion of self-
interest.       
 
2.2 Non-conflict Cases 
Sidgwick admits that he finds egoism to be a somewhat unattractive and objectionable view.  He 
notes that when considered in the abstract, egoism gives offense to “our sympathetic and social 
nature” (ME 199).  He adds further that one’s own happiness is an end that is seemingly ill-
suited to be the ultimate end of rational conduct because it is “so narrow and limited, of such 
necessarily brief duration, and so shifting and insecure while it lasts” (ibid. 403).3  Nevertheless, 
Sidgwick does not see adequate grounds for rejecting egoism altogether.  Not only is it 
reasonable for the egoist to deny one of the main sources of belief in universal good—that the 
world is the product of divine decree—Sidgwick believes that the egoist’s position has 
independent intuitive support.  Note first the intuitive plausibility of the thought that the 
promotion of one’s own happiness is not an optional end contingent on one’s desires but is rather 
a ‘manifest obligation’ (ME 7).4  Sidgwick also finds it intuitive that it would be irrational to 
                                                 
2
 Sidgwick does not explicitly mention God or intelligent design in the relevant passage.  Rather, he uses the phrase 
‘designed by nature’. It is not entirely clear why Sidgwick does not mention God explicitly here, but given the 
context it is clear that this is the idea he has in mind.  If the egoist’s acknowledgement that he was ‘designed by 
nature’ meant only that he was the product of evolutionary forces, it is unclear how this could be seen as an 
admission that his own good is part of universal good.   
3
 See Crisp (2015: 195-99). 
4
 On this point Sidgwick references Butler’s Sermons on Human Nature.   
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sacrifice one’s own happiness for the sake of that of another (ME 404 n. 1; 498).5  Indeed, in 
recounting his dissatisfaction with Mill’s defense of utilitarianism, Sidgwick emphasizes the lack 
of explanation for why self-sacrifice is ultimately reasonable.  Mill’s suggestion that such 
sacrifice would be ‘heroic’ is not enough: “I must somehow see that it was right for me to 
sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am part” (ME xviii).  
 The fact that Sidgwick frequently appeals to the idea of self-sacrifice when describing the 
intuitive basis of egoism is significant.  If the dialectical situation were such that we had to 
decide between egoism and impartialism based solely on the prima facie plausibility of the views 
and their respective implications, intuitive judgements about those implications would be highly 
relevant.  However, Sidgwick’s attempted axiomatic deduction of impartialism makes the 
dialectical situation different in an important respect.  Given the apparent self-evidence of the 
axioms of Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance, all that is needed to undermine the egoist’s 
position is sufficient reason for believing that universal good exists.  And making a strong case 
for universal good does not require directly challenging the view that it is always irrational to 
sacrifice one’s own happiness.  It is only necessary to provide compelling evidence that there is 
at least one end such that all rational beings have at least some reason to promote it, regardless of 
how they are related to it.  I believe such evidence can be found by considering cases in which an 
individual can make substantial contributions to the welfare of others without having to sacrifice 
any part of her own welfare.  The following is one such case: 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Hastings Rashdall (1907: 57) suggests that Sidgwick found egoism more plausible than he should have as a result 
of the terminology he uses.  Sidgwick often uses the terms ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’, which can be taken to 
indicate internal inconsistency or means-ends coherence.  I shall return to this point in chapter 4.   
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  Faraway People:  In a faraway galaxy there exists a planet filled with persons  
  very similar to human beings.  One day, an individual named Mohatten is   
  presented with an opportunity to make a drastic difference in the lives of the  
  distant strangers.  Mohatten is presented with two buttons—one green, and one  
  red.  He is informed that if he presses the red button nothing will happen to the  
  faraway people, and if he presses the green button, each of the faraway people  
  will receive an extra ten years of happy life.  If he presses either button, Mohatten  
  will receive an extra ten years of happy life.  If he does not press either button,  
  nothing will happen to him.   Mohatten does not care at all about the faraway  
  people, and he knows he will never have any contact with them.  Mohatten is  
  informed that no matter which option he chooses, nobody will know his decision,  
  and he will immediately be made to forget about the entire scenario.                  
The egoist is committed to the claim that Mohatten would have just as much reason to press the 
red button as he would to press the green button.  This is because the egoist denies that the 
welfare of others is an independent source of reasons.
6
  Though the happiness of others is 
certainly good for them, the egoist maintains that each individual ought only to aim at his or her 
own good.  However, it seems quite clear that anyone faced with such circumstances would have 
decisive reason to press the green button.  Proponents of egoism and impartialism would agree 
that Mohatten should press at least one of the two buttons in order to obtain the extra ten years of 
happy life.  But the fact that pressing the green button will confer substantial benefits to many 
                                                 
6
 This is not true of every conceivable version of egoism.  A person who thinks that the good of others is a source of 
reasons but thinks that self-interest always trumps the good of others in cases of conflict qualifies as an egoist.  But 
that is not the sort of egoist we are concerned with for present purposes.  The chief threat to Sidgwick’s deduction of 
impartialism is the view that there is only agent-relative good.  Hence, we are concerned only with those egoists who 
deny that the interests of others are an independent source of reasons.  Thanks to Jason Gardener for urging me to 
clarify this point.   
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people makes it hard to see how there could be just as much counting in favor of pressing the red 
button.  And because Mohatten has no antecedent connection to the faraway people, and because 
he has no desires concerning them, the presence of a reason to press the green button rather than 
the red suggests that the welfare of those people is an end that one ought to desire and seek to 
promote regardless of how one is related to it.  In other words, the welfare of others is part of 
universal good.  One might object that pressing the green button is supported by prudence 
because of potential guilty feelings that might arise after pressing the red one, or because the 
harsh judgement one would receive from others.  However, this worry is precluded by the fact 
that immediately after pressing the button Mohatten will be made to forget that he was ever 
presented with this decision, and nobody else will know which choice he has made.
7
   
 There are possible lines of response one might make in order to defend the claim that 
there is equal reason to press either button.  A proponent of egoism would likely appeal to the 
metaphysical distinction between persons to explain her judgement about the case.  Recall from 
the previous chapter that Sidgwick utilizes this idea in order to explain why the egoist’s position 
is difficult to undermine:     
 
  It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any  
  one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently “I”  
  am concerned with the quality of my existence as in individual in a sense,   
  fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the  
  existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved 
  that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate  
  end of rational action for an individual. (ME 498). 
 
                                                 
7
 One might worry that appealing to intuitions about hypothetical cases is inconsistent with Sidgwick’s critique of 
perceptional intuitionism.  But Sidgwick is not principally opposed to the use of thought-experiments and imaginary 
cases as part of ethical inquiry.  What Sidgwick disparages is the notion that one’s own conscience is the ultimate 
arbiter of ethical truth, and that basic ethical principles are not necessary.  
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The suggestion that the separateness of persons is of high ethical importance is not unique to 
Sidgwick.  John Findlay calls it ‘the fundamental fact for ethics’, and Rawls’ primary criticism 
of utilitarianism is that it fails give adequate weight to the distinction between persons.
8
  Hence, 
it does not seem unreasonable for egoists to appeal to the separateness of persons in an attempt to 
justify their judgement about the ‘faraway people’ example.  The egoist could argue that the 
explanation for one’s having equal reason to press either button is that the faraway strangers are 
distinct persons, and that the separateness of persons plays a fundamental role in determining 
one’s practical reasons. 
 I readily grant the initial plausibility of the thought that the fact that I am connected to my 
own consciousness in a way in which I am not connected to others has non-derivative ethical 
significance.
9
  Perhaps the fact that I am me and you are you would give me a reason to save my 
own life rather than yours if forced to choose between the two.   However, in order for the 
separateness of persons to do the work that the egoist needs it to do, it is not enough for the 
distinction to have some degree of significance.  In order to avoid the conclusion that there is 
decisive reason to press the green button in ‘faraway people’ the egoist needs it to be the case 
that the significance of the distinction between individuals is absolute.  The significance must be 
so great that one could have decisive ultimate reason to promote one’s own happiness, but 
absolutely no ultimate reason to promote the qualitatively identical happiness of another person.  
While this suggestion is not incoherent, it is highly implausible.  C.D. Broad (1930: 245) puts the 
point forcefully in his assessment of Sidgwick’s discussion of egoism: “It does seem to me 
conceivable, though not self-evident, that I ought to desire more strongly the occurrence of a 
good state of mind in myself than the occurrence of an equally good state of mind in anyone else; 
                                                 
8
 Findlay (1961: 294); Rawls (1971: 27).  References from Parfit (2011, 1: 498).   
9
 That being said, I shall challenge this idea in chapter 4.   
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whilst it seems self-evident that I ought to desire to some degree its occurrence anywhere.”  In 
other words, while it might be true that the separateness of persons matters for ethics, if it does it 
is only a matter of degree.             
 An alternative way in which someone might try to defend the egoist’s judgement about 
‘faraway people’ is to appeal to facts about the individual’s desires.  One might try claiming that 
if pressing the green button rather than the red one would not satisfy any of the agent’s desires, 
this explains why there is equal reason to press either one.  One could also appeal to metaethical 
concerns about the very notion of something being good in itself such that all rational beings 
have reason to promote it regardless of whether they care about it or how they are related to it.  It 
might be said that universal good is metaphysically queer, or that we would have no reliable 
means of recognizing truths about such good.   
 These replies, however, cannot succeed.  Recall from chapter 1 that we are working 
under the assumption that subjectivism is false, and that practical reasons are object-given and 
value-based.  This assumption is shared by Sidgwick in the Methods, and the brand of egoism he 
is troubled by holds that the promotion of self-interest is an unconditional requirement of reason.  
Sidgwick’s egoist believes that one ought to promote one’s own good regardless of whether 
doing so would satisfy one’s desires.  Moreover, since this brand of egoism implies that practical 
reasons are objective rather than subjective, any metaphysical and epistemological worries one 
might have about universal good apply equally to the reasons sourced in one’s own good.               
 Not only does the commitment to objective normativity preclude egoists from appealing 
to facts about desires in order to defend their judgement about ‘faraway people’, it also 
highlights the oddity of the egoist’s overall position.  It is easy to see why proponents of 
subjectivism would deny the existence of universal good.  As we saw in chapter 1, subjective 
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theories hold that practical rationality is ultimately a matter of getting what one wants.  Even in 
their most sophisticated forms such as Bernard Williams’ idealized theory (1981) and Sharon 
Street’s Formal Humean Constructivism (2012), these views imply that an agent has reason to Ф 
only if she genuinely cares about Ф-ing.  If practical reasons were grounded in facts about the 
agent’s desires, it would be clear that the locus of normativity is the individual herself, and it 
would be clear that there could not be an end that all rational beings as such have reason to 
promote.  Indeed, Parfit suggests that one possible explanation for someone’s having a 
completely egoistic outlook is that she has been taught to accept some desire-based subjective 
theory of practical reason (2011, 1: 137). 
 But given the assumption that practical reasons are object-given and value-based, the 
thought that there is only agent-relative good looks strange.  To appreciate the strangeness of this 
view, consider the example of Anita.  Anita is suffering from an illness that is potentially life-
threatening.  Fortunately, a new medicine has become available that is highly effective in treating 
this illness.  If she takes the medicine, Anita will be cured and go on to enjoy many years of 
happy life.  According to egoists, Anita has decisive reason to take the medicine regardless of 
whether doing so will satisfy any of her desires (whether actual or idealized).  This point by itself 
is not difficult to accept.  But what is strange is the further implication of the view which is that 
nobody else could have any reason to try to help Anita obtain the medicine unless doing so 
would promote their own interests.  If Anita has reason to take the medicine regardless of 
whether her doing so would satisfy any of her desires, why wouldn’t it be the case that other 
people have at least some reason to help her acquire the medicine regardless of how this would 
affect them?  It would be one thing if the grounds for Anita’s reason to take the medicine were 
the fact that she wants to live, and that taking the medicine would save her life.  We could then 
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say that the reason others do not have reasons to help her is that they do not care whether she 
lives or dies.  But we are working under the assumption that practical reasons are grounded in 
objective features of objects and outcomes rather than desires or preferences.  If the objective 
features of Anita’s future happy life are part of the ground of her reasons to take the medicine, it 
is hard to see why these features could not give others at least some reason to help her.  And if 
other agents would have at least some reason to help Anita regardless of whether doing so would 
promote their own welfare, this means that Anita’s welfare is part of universal good.    
 
3  The Value of Partiality 
I take it that the foregoing discussion provides adequate grounds for accepting the existence of 
universal good.  But even if we could remove all doubt about the existence of universal good, 
this would not be sufficient for a successful deduction of impartialism from Sidgwick’s axioms.  
The acceptance of the axioms of Personal Irrelevance and Equal Good is consistent with the 
rejection of Sidgwick’s principle of Benevolence (which is equivalent to the view I call Rational 
Impartialism).  A proponent of partiality might agree that everyone’s welfare constitutes an equal 
portion of the good and that practical reason precludes giving unequal weight to equal portions 
of the good, while also maintaining that there are ultimate reasons of partiality nonetheless.  
These ideas would be consistent with one another if partiality (instantiated in relationships 
themselves, acts of love, displays of loyalty, etc.) is valuable in and of itself.  If love-based 
partiality is valuable for its own sake, then there could be circumstances in which promoting the 
lesser needs of a friend or family member rather than the greater needs of a stranger could be 
justified by the light of reason.  This would be the case whenever the value realized through the 
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display of partiality is greater in quantity than the value inhering in the welfare that was forsaken 
by prioritizing the lesser needs of a loved one over the greater needs of a stranger.   
 Suppose, for example, that you face a choice between volunteering at an under-staffed 
homeless shelter, and spending the same amount of time relaxing at home with your significant 
other.  Spending the extra time with your partner will certainly promote the welfare of both of 
you, but we can suppose that you will make a more substantial contribution to general welfare by 
volunteering instead.  Even if this is right, it could still be the case that more overall good would 
be realized by choosing your partner over the shelter.   This could be true if displays of love or 
relationships themselves have their own inherent value—a value above and beyond the value 
inhering in their contribution to welfare.   
 In light of these considerations, it is clear that Sidgwick’s axioms cannot rule out ultimate 
reasons of partiality as long as we are justified in believing that partiality is itself a source of 
intrinsic value.  This is why my Sidgwickian argument for Rational Impartialism includes a 
premise stating that partiality towards one’s intimates is only derivatively good (premise 5).  The 
rest of this chapter is dedicated to defending this premise.
10
 
 
3.1 Personal Relationships 
I suspect many would agree that the value of acting for the sake of loved ones can be greater than 
the value realized by benefitting a stranger, even if the benefit to the stranger would be more 
substantial.  For instance, if I must choose between buying a gift for a close friend or lover and 
                                                 
10
 Sidgwick does not directly address this issue in the Methods.  In the chapter in which he argues for hedonism, the 
alternative candidate sources of intrinsic value he considers are virtue, truth, beauty, and freedom (ME 391-407).  
The most thorough discussion of personal relationships occurs in the context of an examination of common sense 
morality.  Sidgwick argues that, as with the majority of common sense morality, the purported duties of partiality 
towards intimates lack the clarity, precision, and unification necessary for practical as well as theoretical purposes 
(ME 244-263).     
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donating that money to famine relief, many of us would judge that I ought to buy the gift.  We 
make this judgment despite the fact that the donation could save a stranger’s life, and my friend 
or lover already has a wealth of material possessions.  Gift giving is just one of many ways in 
which we exhibit partiality towards intimates.  Another example is our tendency to devote time 
to meeting their needs even if we could do more overall good by using that time helping 
strangers (perhaps by volunteering or campaigning).   Ostensibly, the reason for choosing to buy 
the gifts and spend time helping our loved ones even when our time and money can do more 
good for strangers is that prioritizing the good of our loved ones is an essential component of 
intimate relationships, and such relationships are highly valuable for their own sake.     
 Though the idea that close personal relationships are intrinsically valuable is initially 
plausible, it does not withstand critical scrutiny.  The primary reason for doubting that personal 
relationships are valuable for their own sake is that they fail isolation tests for intrinsic value.
11
  
If relationships really are valuable for their own sake, we should find that there is at least some 
reason to preserve or promote them that is independent of their contribution to other sources of 
value such as hedonic welfare.  But, as I shall now try to show, this is not what we find.   
 Imagine, for example, that we discover an isolated culture in a heretofore unexplored 
territory.
12
  We observe that the people in this society are completely impartial in their dealings 
with others, and that they do not have anything approximating the close personal relationships 
that we are accustomed to.  They do not have monogamous romantic relationships or close 
friendships, and their children are raised communally.  Suppose that the social structure of this 
                                                 
11
 Sidgwick applies an isolation test of sorts in considering whether ‘ideal goods’ such as virtue, truth, beauty, and 
freedom are intrinsically valuable.  He claims that when we isolate these goods from the positive consciousness 
accompanying them, they do not appear to be desirable (ME 400-1).  G.E. Moore’s (1903: 83-5) ‘two worlds’ 
thought experiment is perhaps the most influential example of an isolation test for intrinsic value. 
12
 The following example (as well as the example in the next paragraph) is a modified version of an example found 
in Simon Keller’s Partiality (2013).   
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society works very well insofar as the individuals living there enjoy high levels of happiness, as 
well as intellectual, artistic, and athletic achievement.  If close personal relationships were 
valuable for their own sake, there would be reason to lament the fact that the people living in the 
society are completely impartial.  We would have reasons to hope that they would rearrange their 
social structure, and perhaps we might even have reasons to try to help them make the change.  
But given that the people in this society are every bit as creative, productive, and content as we 
could hope to be, it is hardly plausible that we would have any such reasons.      
 Another way to see the same point is to consider the example of a romantic relationship 
between two individuals who, after being together for several years, have slowly grown apart.  
Because of an increasing divergence in their goals and desires they often quarrel, and they no 
longer enjoy each other’s company.  Once it becomes clear that preserving the relationship will 
not contribute to the flourishing of either party there is no reason for them to try to maintain it.  It 
would be strange to suggest that they should stay together to their own detriment for the sake of 
the relationship itself.
13
 Similar remarks apply to the case of friendships.   
 Not only does the apparent value of friendships and romantic partnerships seem to 
disappear when we isolate them from their contributions to welfare, it is also the case that we 
tend to assign value to such relationships roughly in proportion to the amount of welfare that 
they bring to the individuals involved.
14
  When two individuals are able to reach great levels of 
flourishing within a relationship, we judge the relationship to be of especially high value.  When 
the benefit to the individuals is not as great, we assign less value to the relationship.   
 Here one might object that it is not just any close relationship that has intrinsic value, but 
only healthy ones.  Of course a relationship that is abusive or otherwise dysfunctional is of no 
                                                 
13
 See Keller (2013: 56-58).   
14
 Sidgwick makes a similar point regarding common judgements about the value of knowledge, beauty, truth, 
freedom, and virtue (ME 401).   
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value, but this is compatible with healthy relationships having value in and of themselves.  
Perhaps this intrinsic value can only arise under conditions in which the relationship contributes 
to the flourishing of both parties.  Those who claim that relationships have intrinsic value might 
even insist that their use of the term ‘relationship’ is meant only to refer to healthy associations 
between individuals.   
 To see why this objection fails, it will help to consider the following analogy provided by 
Simon Keller: 
 
  I claim that winter coats are intrinsically valuable, meaning that they have value  
  in addition to the good they do in keeping people warm.  You say that it seems  
  implausible to think that a winter coat could be valuable even when it does  
  nothing to keep anyone warm.  I reply that it wouldn’t be; I say that the intrinsic  
  value of a winter coat is conditional upon the coat’s also having the value of  
  keeping someone warm, or perhaps that a winter coat that does not keep anyone  
  warm is not really a “winter coat” in the sense in which I use the term.  You  
  would be within your rights to think that I am just trying to make trouble.  Given  
  my concessions, what more could I possibly need to see that the value of a winter  
  coat is purely extrinsic? (2013: 58).     
 
The point of this analogy is that acknowledging that contribution to welfare is a precondition for 
a relationship’s being valuable leaves us without any philosophical motivation for claiming that 
relationships are valuable for their own sake.
15
   
 None of this is to deny that loving relationships are highly valuable, and that in practice 
we often have reasons to show partiality towards friends, family, and romantic partners.  But the 
above considerations suggest that the true value of loving relationships is found in their 
                                                 
15
 A similar point can also be used to defend Sidgwick against a criticism offered by Crisp (2015: 82-3).  In 
discussing the purported intrinsic value of ‘ideal goods’ such as truth and beauty, Sidgwick argues that when we 
isolate these goods from the consciousness accompanying and resulting from them they do not appear to be of any 
value (ME 400-1).  Crisp objects that even though an individual’s knowledge may appear valueless in isolation, this 
does not imply that such knowledge combined with the conscious states is of no greater value than the conscious 
states themselves.  Crisp is certainly right about this.  However, if the ‘ideal goods’ appear valueless in isolation 
from the positive experiences they give rise to, there is little motivation for believing that they have independent 
value of their own over and above those experiences.     
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contribution to the welfare of the individuals who participate in them.  Importantly, if our 
reasons to preserve and promote relationships depend on matters of welfare, this suggests that 
our reasons within relationships are dependent in the same way.  Whatever reason we have to 
pay special attention to the needs of those near and dear to us derives from the fact that our 
relationship puts us in a unique position to promote their interests.  A shared history and 
common values allow me to provide emotional support to my friend that I could not provide to 
just anyone.
16
  I have reason to cancel my weekend plans to volunteer at the homeless shelter in 
order to support my grief-stricken friend at his wife’s funeral not because friendships are 
valuable for their own sake, but rather because my friend’s welfare matters, and I am in a unique 
position to make a substantial contribution to it.  But of course, my friend’s welfare is no more 
important than a stranger’s.  So while our relationship gives me reasons to treat my friend in 
many ways differently from the way I treat strangers, it does not give me reasons to act so as to 
bring about a state of affairs that is worse overall but better for my friend.   
 Since much of the preceding discussion has drawn on the arguments Keller presents in 
Partiality (2013), it is worth considering his suggested rationale for fundamental partiality 
towards loved ones.  Though he denies that loving relationships are valuable for their own sake, 
Keller maintains that we have ultimate reasons of partiality nonetheless.  While he acknowledges 
the difficulty in finding a philosophical rationale for the existence of ultimate reasons of 
partiality, he suggests that the phenomenology of our ethical experiences might be sufficient.  
Keller claims that finding another person to matter for her own sake “is one of our deepest and 
most familiar ethical experiences” (2013: 56).  He adds further that, “It is that experience, not 
                                                 
16
 Robert Goodin (1985: 33) helpfully characterizes reasons of partiality as reasons to protect and advance another 
person’s interests in contexts in which that person’s interests are especially vulnerable to our actions.  This is 
typically the case with one’s friends and family.   
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just a brute intuition, that the belief in reasons of partiality is grounded, and it would take quite 
some argument to show that the experience rests on an illusion” (ibid.).  
 Denying that there are ultimate reasons of partiality does not require showing that the 
ethical experience Keller refers to is an illusion.  Impartialist theories of practical reason do not 
deny that individuals are valuable for their own sake.  What the impartialist denies is that 
recognizing a person’s intrinsic value justifies rationally discounting the value of relevantly 
similar strangers.  When I see my best friend, I have the deep and familiar ethical experience 
Keller alludes to—I see someone who matters in her own right.  But the reason she matters is 
that she has capacities for things like enjoyment, suffering, and achievement.  People whom I 
have never met (and may never meet) matter just as much because they have these same 
capacities.  Admittedly, I am motivated to care for my friend more than I am to care for distant 
strangers—she matters more to me.  What I take to be illusory is the common thought that this 
fact about my motivations and evaluative attitudes reveals something deep about my ultimate 
practical reasons. 
 It also bears mentioning that Rational Impartialism is compatible with the intrinsic value 
of things such as compassion and kindness.  If it turns out that acts of compassion or kindness 
towards other beings have value over and above the promotion of welfare, this does not 
undermine the claim that our ultimate practical reasons are impartial.  This is because 
compassion and kindness can be instantiated towards strangers just as well as it can towards 
one’s intimates.  
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3.2 Love 
The preceding discussion focused primarily on the question of whether relationships themselves 
are a source of intrinsic value.  Some may be unmoved by these considerations because they 
believe that it is not relationships that are the source of value but rather love itself.  It is thus 
worth considering whether love is a source of value over and above the contributions it makes to 
welfare.  Though love is certainly not easy to define, for present purposes we can consider a 
plausible characterization offered by Sidgwick in the Methods.  According to Sidgwick, love is 
primarily a pleasant emotion comprising three essential components: (1) a sense of union with 
another person, (2) a desire to do good to the beloved, and (3) a desire for the society of the 
beloved (ME 244).  Sidgwick considers whether love so understood should qualify as a moral 
excellence.  Though he thinks it is natural and desirable that we be moved by affection for 
particular individuals, this is only so to the extent that such affection can help us fulfill particular 
duties we might have, and he denies that we should cultivate love beyond this point (ME 245).   
 Our question about love is different from Sidgwick’s question.  We are not asking 
whether love is a moral excellence but rather whether it is a source of intrinsic value capable of 
generating reasons that can override reasons grounded in welfare.  To answer this question we 
can examine the three components of love listed above.  Consider first the sense of union with 
another person that is characteristic of love.  It is highly plausible that this sense of union is 
valuable.  But as with the case of relationships themselves, the value seems to be located in the 
contribution to a person’s wellbeing.  Given the sorts of creatures we are, a sense of union with 
another person is typically a great source of contentment, enjoyment, and security.  And these 
three products of a loving union undoubtedly make a person’s life go better.  But if we consider a 
person who is able to attain the same levels of happiness and gratification without being in love, 
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it does not seem like she would still have reason to try to fall in love.  And when we imagine two 
people who share a sense of union with each other, but do not gain any of the prudential goods 
that typically arise from this, it does not seem that there is anything of value there.  In other 
words, a sense of union with another person does not appear to have value independent of the 
contributions it typically makes to welfare.       
 The second element of love as characterized by Sidgwick is a desire to do good to the 
beloved.  It is fairly clear that a benevolent impulse towards others is valuable insofar as we can 
often promote the good of others in ways that they themselves are unable to, such as when we 
express sympathetic concern for a friend experiencing grief.  But setting this instrumental value 
aside, it tempting to think that there is a special value inhering in the benevolent desire itself.  
But even if this were the case, it is doubtful that the value of the benevolent impulse is limited to 
benevolence towards specific individuals.  Consider an agent who has a strong desire to promote 
general welfare, and so she sets out to help those who are worst off, regardless of where they are 
located or how she is related to them.  Compare this with the example of an agent who feels an 
equally strong impulse to promote the welfare of her lover.  Perhaps both of these impulses are 
valuable in their own right, but it is hard to believe that the later agent’s desire is more valuable.  
And if the impulse to aim at good generally is just as valuable as the impulse to aim at a 
particular part of it, this undermines the suggestion that the value of love is a source of ultimate 
reasons of partiality.   
 The third element of love is the least plausible source of intrinsic value.  Viewed in 
isolation, the desire for the society of the beloved does not seem valuable even instrumentally.  
The bare desire for companionship with another is no more plausible a candidate for intrinsic 
value than other biological desires such as the desire for food, shelter, and rest.  Moreover, the 
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desire for companionship is often a source of disvalue.  As Sidgwick observes: “this element 
may predominate over [the desire to do good to the beloved], and even conflict with it, so that 
the true interests of the beloved may be sacrificed.  In this case we call the affection selfish, and 
do not praise it at all, but rather blame” (ME 244-45).  That being said, when two individuals are 
in a loving relationship their knowledge of each other’s desire for communion can contribute to 
their welfare.  But this awareness is essentially the sense of union already discussed above.   
 
3.3 Parental Partiality 
Intuitions supporting the intrinsic value of partiality are perhaps strongest in the case of parents 
and their children.  While common sense acknowledges a basic obligation to nurture and protect 
one’s children, it also supports the idea that the special care and attention most parents provide 
for their children has value in and of itself.  But as is the case with friendships and romantic 
relationships, the purported intrinsic value parental partiality does not survive critical scrutiny.   
 One need not conduct a survey of psychological literature to know that human children 
benefit from experiencing a close bond with their parents.  The love and support of one’s parents 
provides a sense of security for a child, and helps them to develop intellectually and emotionally.  
Further, for many (if not most) parents, the experience of intense love for their children provides 
more happiness and contentment than anything else they experience during their lives.  In light 
of these points, it is clear that parental partiality is highly important.  But imagine a scenario in 
which partiality towards one’s children would not result in an improvement of the welfare of the 
child or the parent.  The earlier example of a society in which children are raised communally 
will suffice for this purpose.  Suppose once again that the people that constitute this society 
experience just as much happiness and prosperity as those living in societies in which children 
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are raised by parents who prioritize their needs over the needs of others.  It does not seem to be 
the case that the absence of parental partiality in this society is something to lament.  Of course, 
the individuals living there miss out on the wonderful enjoyment and sense of purpose that many 
of us experience through the special bonds we have with our parents and children.  But if they 
find just as much meaning and enjoyment in their lives without parent-child bonds, then this is 
not a genuine loss.   
 Though Sidgwick does not consider whether partiality towards one’s child is valuable for 
its own sake, he does discuss the purported duties of parents to their children, and his comments 
are instructive for both issues.  On the question of whether parents have basic duties to provide 
for their children Sidgwick writes: 
 
  We have no doubt about this duty as a part of the present order of society, by  
  which the due growth and training of the rising generation is distributed among  
  adults… If, however, we consider the duty of parents by itself, out of connexion  
  with this social order, it is certainly not self-evident that we owe more to our own  
  children than to others whose happiness equally depends on our exertions.  To get 
  the question clear, let us suppose that I am thrown with my family upon a desert  
  island, where I find an abandoned orphan.  Is it evident that I am less bound to  
  provide this child, as far as lies in my power, with the means of subsistence, than I 
  am to provide for my own children? (ME 346-7)  
 
Although we tend to judge that a parent’s love and dedication to her own child has value in and 
of itself, Sidgwick’s thought experiment helps us to see that this is largely due to a failure to 
consider contexts in which just as much good would be realized by giving equal weight to the 
good of someone else.   Although I certainly have reasons to try to ensure that my child does not 
suffer and has a minimally decent life, this is best explained by facts about the badness of 
suffering and the positive value of enjoyment, achievement, autonomy, etc., combined with the 
fact that I am in a unique practical position with respect to the interests of my child.  I am in this 
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unique position primarily due to contingent facts about the social structure of the society in 
which I live.  If I happen to be in a unique position to care for an unrelated child, I would have 
equal reason to do so. 
 Given our strong biological disposition to care for our young, it should not be surprising 
that we tend to view parental partiality as a manifest obligation.  These facts about our 
motivational psychology and the social structure of society also explain why we are prone to 
judge partiality towards children to be valuable for its own sake.   But on “Sidgwick’s Island” I 
would have just as much reason to care for the orphaned child as I would for my biological 
children.  This is because the orphaned child has all the same ethically relevant capacities as my 
own child, and she is equally lacking in ability to care for herself.   The fact that I am not her 
biological parent is irrelevant.     
 It is highly plausible that it is better for the world as a whole if parents are disposed to 
favor their own children because the absence of such partiality would result in an entire 
generation of people who develop emotional and psychological deficits of varying degrees.  But 
this suggests only that partiality towards one’s children is derivatively good.   I ought to pay 
special attention to the needs of my child because this is what is best from an impartial 
perspective.  It is ultimately a good thing that my motivational psychology is such that it would 
be extraordinarily difficult for me to save the lives of several unrelated children at the cost of 
letting my own child die.  But it does not follow that I would have an ultimate reason to save my 
child.
17
  If the grounds for partiality toward one’s children is the impact on the general welfare of 
everyone, we cannot have ultimate reason to bring about a state of affairs with less total welfare 
merely to protect that of our own children.   
                                                 
17
 The lack of an ultimate reason to save my child rather than several unrelated children is compatible with my 
having ultimate reasons to deliberately maintain and cultivate the sentiments and inclinations that would likely move 
me to save my child’s life under such circumstances.   
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3.4 Partiality and Self-Sacrifice   
One explanation for the intuition that partiality towards loved ones is intrinsically valuable is the 
fact that such partiality often involves some degree of self-sacrifice by the agent in question.  Of 
course, devoting time and other resources to our loved ones is an excellent way to promote our 
own happiness.  But loving relationships also require us to set aside our own plans and projects 
in order to promote the welfare of the beloved.  The willingness to sacrifice one’s own interests 
for the benefit of one’s intimates certainly commends itself to common moral consciousness.  
But while this might be taken as evidence that there is intrinsic value in acts of sacrifice for the 
sake of loved ones, there are a few important points that undermine this thought.   
 First, just as we feel admiration for those who sacrifice themselves for the sake of friends 
and family, we also feel admiration for those who sacrifice themselves for the sake of strangers.  
Even if stories of Good Samaritans do not have the same emotional impact as stories of sacrifices 
made for loved ones, we are certainly moved when we hear of individuals willing to set aside 
their own good for the sake of another human being whom they have never met.  This suggests 
that what we are responding to when we feel great admiration for those who sacrifice themselves 
is not the fact that they are showing partiality to the person they are helping, but rather the fact 
that they are capable of overcoming their self-interested instincts for the sake of others.  The 
special feeling of approval in either case can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that we are 
predisposed to self-regard, and a willingness to suppress this is good from an impartial 
perspective.
18
     
 Admittedly, there are cases in which our responses to acts of sacrifice for the sake of 
others differ depending on whether the recipient is a loved one or a stranger.  For instance, while 
                                                 
18
 Of course, if Rational Impartialism is true, one could not have reasons to sacrifice one’s greater interests for the 
sake of the lesser interests of others.  I discuss this point in further detail in chapter 5.   
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kidney donations made for the benefit of a friend or family member are typically the subject of 
universal admiration, not everyone responds favorably to cases of individuals who donate 
kidneys to strangers.  Not only do some people respond more favorably to the former sort of 
case, there are some who actually have negative reactions to the latter.
19
  But once again, we 
need not assume that these divergent reactions are tracking any deep ethical truths.  The 
divergence is well explained by the fact that we are biologically predisposed to feel strong 
inclinations to protect our loved ones, combined with the fact that voluntary organ removal runs 
counter to our typical notions about health and the role of medicine.  While our disposition to 
protect and provide for our intimates is strong enough to overcome our aversion to organ 
removal such that we approve in the case of donations for family and friends, our inclinations to 
help whoever happens to be in need are not always strong enough to overcome the aversion.  
Further, it is plausible that the negative reaction to those who donate kidneys to strangers arises 
from feelings of guilt for not being willing to make the same sacrifice (ibid.)
20
          
 
 
4  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the case for accepting the existence of universal good.  I have 
argued that the existence of universal good is most readily seen when we consider cases in which 
promoting the welfare of strangers does not require any sacrifice on the part of the individual.  I 
have also argued that the denial of universal good sits uncomfortably with the egoist’s 
commitment to an object-given account of practical reasons.  The vindication of universal good 
                                                 
19
 Andrew Anthony, “Would You Give Your Kidney to a Complete Stranger,” The Guardian (July 2014): 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/13/kidney-donation-altruism-andrew-anthony  
20
 Ibid.     
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means that the axiom of Equal Good should be read with a universal specification, and that 
premise 2 of my Sidgwickian argument for Rational Impartialism is secured.   
 The second task of this chapter was to defend premise 5, which states that partiality 
towards one’s intimates is only derivatively good.  I applied isolation tests of intrinsic value to 
undermine the common thought that loving relationships and the acts of partiality they give rise 
to are valuable for their own sake.  Though we clearly have reasons to pay special attention to 
those near and dear to us, these reasons are explained by the unique practical and epistemic 
position we are in relative to their needs.   
 Had Sidgwick been confident in the existence of universal good, his masterpiece would 
not have ended on the somber note that there is “an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in 
our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct” (ME 508).  He would have concluded 
that the axioms of Equal Good and Personal Irrelevance are sufficient for vindicating an 
impartialist account of practical reasons.   However, even if the arguments presented thus far are 
successful, this is not in fact enough to secure Rational Impartialism.  This is because the self-
evidence of the axiom of Equal Good is called into question by proponents of the view I call 
Partial Dualism.  It is the task of the next chapter to examine the motivations for rejecting Equal 
Good, and to present reasons for believing that such rejection is a mistake.      
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4  ‘Equal Good’ and the Partial Dualism of Practical Reason 
 
1  Introduction 
Recall that my argument for Rational Impartialism takes the following form: 
 1.  One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good. 
     [Axiom of Equal Good] 
 
 2.  The good is not relative to individuals but rather is universal.   
 
 3.  One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of universal good.  
      (from 1-2) 
 
 4.  The equal good of any two individuals is exactly similar qua portions of universal    
      good.  [Axiom of Personal Irrelevance]   
 
 5.  Partiality towards one’s intimates is only derivatively good.     
 
 6.  One ought to have equal fundamental concern for the equal good of all individuals.  
      (from 3-5) 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that we have strong grounds for believing that the good is 
universal rather than agent-relative.  I also provided reasons for thinking that the value of 
partiality is merely derivative.  If these arguments are successful, then premises 2, and 5 of my 
argument are secured.  Given that the premises 1 and 4 are two of Sidgwick’s axioms, it might 
appear that the Sidgwickian case for Rational Impartialism is complete.  However, as I noted 
previously, the axiom of Equal Good is more contentious than Sidgwick realizes.   
 Sidgwick is aware of the fact that some common-sense moralists will reject his axiom 
due to their belief in special duties of partiality that are a source of ultimate reasons (e.g. parental 
duties, duties of friendship, duties of gratitude, etc.).  Sidgwick does not find this disagreement 
over Equal Good worrisome because he sees several reasons for believing that common-sense is 
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mistaken on this score.
21
  What Sidgwick does not anticipate, however, is that some of his most 
capable successors—philosophers who share many of his methodological and ethical views—
implicitly reject the axiom of Equal Good.  Roger Crisp (2006) and Derek Parfit (2011) each 
champion the view I call Partial Dualism.  On this view, the welfare of all is a source of reasons 
for all, but one’s own good (and for Parfit, the good of one’s intimates) is a source of reasons 
with independent weight over and above the weight they would have in an impartial calculus.
22
  
Partial Dualists thus deny that one ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of 
the good because they believe individuals are justified in prioritizing their own good over the 
equal good of strangers.  The explanation for this purported rational disparity between self and 
others is that value is not the only source of an agent’s reasons—it also matters how the agent is 
related to that value.  The connections I have to my future self is claimed to be a non-evaluative 
source of reasons that can compete with reasons sourced in the universal value of everyone’s 
welfare.   
 In light of the Partial Dualist’s challenge, my argument for Rational Impartialism cannot 
succeed without a compelling defense of Equal Good.  To provide such a defense is the primary 
aim of this chapter.  I begin in section 2 with a brief overview of the motivations and 
commitments of Partial Dualism.  In section 3 I articulate the attractions of Equal Good, and I 
argue that the best strategy for proponents of Partial Dualism is to advocate a qualified version of 
                                                 
21
 See ME 238-263.       
22
 Crisp calls his account a “dual-source view”, while Parfit labels his account a “wide value-based objective view.”  
I have chosen to use the label “Partial Dualism” because it helps to distinguish the views of Crisp and Parfit from 
other accounts of rational weight such as Sidgwick’s Dualism, Rational Egoism, and Rational Impartialism.  
Although the views of Crisp and Parfit are similar, it is worth noting two points on which they diverge.  First, while 
Parfit thinks the interests of an agent’s friends and family can also outweigh impartial considerations, Crisp does 
not.  Second, while Crisp’s view implies that personal sacrifice for the greater good can be irrational, Parfit suggests 
that such sacrifice might always be rationally permissible.  The significance of these differences will become clear 
as the discussion proceeds.   
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the axiom.  In sections 4 and 5 I apply Sidgwick’s first two tests for highest certainty to show 
that we lack adequate justification for abandoning Equal Good in favor of the qualified version.       
 
2  Partial Dualism 
Parfit and Crisp are both unabashedly enamored with Sidgwick’s arguments and methodology.  
In the preface to On What Matters Parfit calls Sidgwick one of his two masters (the other being 
Kant), and claims that the Methods is “the book that it would be best for everyone interested in 
ethics to read, remember, and be able to assume that others have read” (2011, 1: xl).  Crisp 
describes the Methods as a “philosophical goldmine,” and he endorses an earlier philosopher’s 
opinion that Sidgwick’s work is a source of “pure white light” (2015: x; 2002: 56).23  
 Despite being so greatly influenced by Sidgwick, Parfit and Crisp diverge from their 
master on a few key issues.  The major disagreement concerns Sidgwick’s infamous Dualism of 
Practical Reason.  Whereas Sidgwick views self-interest and universal benevolence as equally 
plausible candidates for the ultimate practical end, Parfit and Crisp aim to show that neither 
egoism nor impartialism is tenable.  While both writers accept that the good of all is a source of 
reasons for all, they also maintain that one’s own good carries greater rational weight for one 
than the equal good of strangers.  Hence, in attempting to avoid Sidgwick’s somber view, these 
contemporary Sidgwickians reject the axiom of Equal Good.  My aim in this section is to outline 
some of the initial attractions and theoretical commitments of Partial Dualism, and to explain 
how this view constitutes a forceful challenge for Equal Good and my overall case for Rational 
Impartialism.        
                                                 
23
 The “pure white light” comment was originally made by a British philosopher overheard by Brand Blanshard as 
recounted in his Four Reasonable Men: Marcus Aurelius, John Stuart Mill, Ernest Renan, Henry Sidgwick (1984).    
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 In the Methods, Sidgwick writes: “[It] is hardly going too far to say that common sense 
assumes that ‘interested’ actions, tending to promote the agent’s happiness, are prima facie 
reasonable: and that the onus probandi lies with those who maintain that disinterested conduct, 
as such, is reasonable” (ME 120).  Crisp and Parfit each take up the challenge of showing that 
the interests of strangers can rationally override self-interested reasons.  In arguing against 
egoism, Crisp and Parfit primarily appeal to intuitive judgments about hypothetical scenarios.  
Consider the following case offered by Crisp: 
 
  Two Doors 2: You are confronted by two doors.  If you do not pass through one  
  or other of them, you will suffer an extremely painful electric shock.  If you pass  
  through door A, you will experience a minor twinge in your leg, but nothing  
  further  will happen.  If you pass through door B, you will not experience the  
  twinge, but some other person, a stranger and out of sight, will suffer an   
  extremely painful electric shock. (2006: 132)   
 
Crisp suggests that to claim that you have stronger reason to pass through door B rather than 
door A is almost as implausible as claiming that none of us have any reason to avoid 
excruciating pain.  When we can prevent a stranger’s suffering by making a minuscule self-
sacrifice, we have decisive reasons to do so: “The well-being of others, in other words, can 
ground reasons to act which override the reason we have to promote our own well-being” (ibid.)  
 In the context of his discussion of the egoism that is implied by Sidgwick’s Dualism, 
Parfit points out that on this view we could rationally do what we knew would only be slightly 
better for ourselves but substantially worse for many people: “For example, we could rationally 
save ourselves from one minute of discomfort rather than saving a million people from death or 
agony” (2011, 1: 135).  After acknowledging that many people might judge such an act rational 
in the instrumental sense, Parfit asserts that such an act would not be rational in the more 
important objective reason-based sense: “Would we have sufficient reasons to save ourselves 
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from mild discomfort, rather than saving a million people from death or agony?  The answer, I 
believe, is No.  This horrendous act would not be rational” (ibid.).24  
 Given their belief that the interests of beings unrelated to oneself are a source of 
objective, non-derivative practical reasons, one might have expected Parfit and Crisp to endorse 
an impartialist theory of rational weight.  However, both authors find impartialist views 
implausible.  Parfit believes that when the stakes are high enough, such as when one’s life is in 
danger, giving priority to one’s own interests is rationally justified.  He puts the point as follows:  
 
  According to Rational Impartialists, we could not have sufficient reasons to do  
  what would be impartially worse than some other possible act.  That is not true.   
  We might have such reasons, for example, when and because our act would be  
  much better for ourselves.  I would have sufficient reasons to save my own life  
  rather than the lives of several strangers.  (2011, 1:131) 
 
Crisp also appeals to intuitions about cases of conflict between self-interest and the interests of 
others to motivate the rejection of Rational Impartialism.  The following is one such case: 
 
  Two Doors 3:  You are confronted by two doors.  If you do not pass through one  
  or the other of them, you will suffer an extremely painful electric shock.  If you  
  pass through door A, you will experience a less painful but significant shock.  If  
  you pass through door B, you will not experience this shock, but some other  
  person, a stranger and out of sight, will suffer a shock of the same intensity.  
  (2006: 133)   
 
Crisp finds it obvious that you have decisive reason to pass through door B rather than door A 
because in addition to the reasons provided by the well-being of everyone, you have separate 
reasons provided by the fact that your own well-being is yours.  
                                                 
24
 Though he does not provide much by way of explanation for this judgment, Parfit suggest that one reason such 
acts would not be rational is that they would be morally wrong (2011, 1: 136).   
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 Neither Parfit nor Crisp suggests that there is any precise truth about the relative weight 
of self-interested and impartial reasons.
25
  However they do believe that these reasons can be 
balanced against each other, and that in the majority of cases there is a fact of the matter about 
what an agent has most reason to do.
26
    
  The Partial Dualist’s suggestion that reasons sourced in the interests of others can be 
outweighed by considerations of self-interest is supported by common sense.  And examples in 
which a minuscule self-sacrifice leads to an enormous increase in impartial welfare tell against 
Sidgwick’s claim that rational adjudication in all cases of conflict between self-interest and the 
greater good is impossible.  But the truth of Partial Dualism would imply that the axiom of Equal 
Good is false.  If Parfit and Crisp are right, reason does not require giving equal fundamental 
weight to equal portions of the good, and my Sidgwickian argument for Rational Impartialism 
fails.  Given the initial plausibility of Sidgwick’s axiom, and given what’s at stake for the 
Partiality Question, it will be necessary to further examine the merits of Equal Good, and also to 
delve deeper into the commitments and implications of Partial Dualism.  This will allow us to 
determine whether Sidgwick’s axiom and my argument for Rational Impartialism can withstand 
the Partial Dualist’s challenge.          
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Parfit believes the idea of ‘normative imprecision’ has been underappreciated by philosophers.  He places 
substantial weight on this notion in his paper ‘How We Can Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion’ (unpublished).    
26
 The view put forth by Samuel Scheffler in The Rejection of Consequentialism (1982) can be understood as a 
version of Partial Dualism.  However, there is an important respect in which his view differs from the views of Parfit 
and Crisp.  While Scheffler’s ‘agent-centered prerogative’ is based on the fact that human beings typically care more 
about their own interests, Parfit and Crisp deny that reasons are grounded in facts about favoring attitudes.  See 
Crisp (2006: 139 n. 38).      
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3  Explanatory Power and Criterial Arguments    
One of the chief merits of the axiom of Equal Good is that it provides a compelling unifying 
explanation for the truth of a variety of normative judgments accepted by partialists and 
impartialists alike.  Consider the following: 
 (1)  If forced to choose between a more painful experience tomorrow and a less painful  
       experience today, you have decisive reason to choose the less painful experience  
       today.      
   
 (2)  You have just as much reason to save the life of a person of a different race as you do 
        to save a member of your own race.   
 
  (3)  If forced to choose between a nuclear bomb being dropped on either a large city or a     
        small isolated village, you have decisive reason to choose the village.     
 
 
In each of these examples, the choice deemed contrary to reason involves having unequal 
fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  For instance, in (1), the fact that one’s 
hedonic welfare is no more or less valuable tomorrow than it is today, combined with the fact 
that one ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good, explains why it 
is true that you would have decisive reason to choose the less painful experience today.  The 
structure of this explanation is the same for claims (2) and (3).   
 In rejecting the axiom of Equal Good, Partial Dualists dispense with what appears to be a 
powerful unifying explanation for the truth of such judgments.  This looks like a significant 
theoretical cost.  The best way for Partial Dualists to overcome this worry is to offer an 
alternative principle that can also explain the judgments while remaining consistent with the 
central commitments of their view.  In light of these considerations, and in light of the core 
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tenets of Partial Dualism, I suggest that Partial Dualists should advocate the following alternative 
principle: 
  Equal Good Relational: One ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal  
  portions of the good, but only insofar as one is equally related to the different  
  portions; different relations can justify different levels of fundamental concern.   
   
The suggestion that different relations can justify having unequal fundamental concern for equal 
portions of the good is central to Partial Dualism.  Recall that Parfit and Crisp’s chief 
disagreement with Sidgwick concerns whether the existence of universal good must lead to an 
impartial account of practical reason.  Though Partial Dualists accept that everyone’s welfare is 
an equal part of universal good, they reject impartialism because they believe that the relations 
we have to ourselves are non-evaluative sources of reasons that compete with reasons sourced in 
universal good.  In other words, although reason often requires that we give equal fundamental 
weight to equal portions of the good, differing relations can justify different assignments of 
weight.   
 Notice that Equal Good Relational is equally capable of explaining why the mere 
difference of a day is not reason to choose more pain rather than less (judgement 1 above).  Since 
unequal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good can only be justified if one is 
differently related to those portions, and since there is no such difference in this instance, it 
would be contrary to reason to choose the more painful experience tomorrow rather than the less 
painful one today.  Equal Good Relational is also capable of explaining the other judgments that 
seemed well explained by the unqualified version of Equal Good.   
 We now have two candidate principles for which we can make a pairwise comparison.  If 
a stronger case can be made for Equal Good Relational, then my argument for Rational 
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Impartialism cannot succeed.  But if it turns out that the original version of the axiom has greater 
justification, then the challenge from Partial Dualism is overcome. 
 A difficulty arises at this point, however.  Given that Equal Good is a purported self-
evident axiom of ethics, we cannot attempt to vindicate it by appealing to more basic principles 
in support of it.  As Sidgwick points out in “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles,” it is 
not immediately obvious how philosophical progress can be made when there is disagreement 
over purported fundamental principles.  He articulates the puzzle as follows: 
 
  On the one hand, it seems undeniable that first principles cannot stand in need of  
  what is strictly to be called proof: they would obviously cease to be first   
  principles if they were exhibited as dependent for their certainty on the acceptance 
  by the mind of certain other truths.  Yet, on the other hand, when we are dealing  
  with any subject where there is a conflict of opinion as to first principles, we can  
  hardly refuse to give reasons for taking our side in the conflict: as rational beings  
  conversing with other  rationals it seems absurd that we should not be able to  
  explain to each other why we accept one first principle rather than another.  
  (EEM 29) 
 
Sidgwick goes on to outline two ways in which philosophical progress can be made when we 
encounter disagreement over first principles.  The first involves addressing the principle of one’s 
interlocutor and trying to show that while there is some kernel of truth in it, there is some 
accidental or arbitrary feature that precludes it from being the true first principle (EEM 30).  For 
example, if my interlocutor accepts that all pain of human beings is to be avoided, I can point out 
that the limitation to human beings is arbitrary, and so the real first principle is that all pain is to 
be avoided regardless of species membership (ibid.).  David Phillips (2011: 63) labels these 
“bipartite ad hominem arguments” because they are addressed to particular interlocutors and they 
involve both a negative and a positive verdict on the interlocutor’s initial belief.       
99 
 
 A second way of making progress regarding disagreement over first principles involves 
appealing to general criteria for assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the candidate 
principles.  As Sidgwick explains: “We may be able to establish some general criteria for 
distinguishing true first principles (whether ethical or non-ethical) from false ones; and may then 
construct a strictly logical deduction by which, applying the general criteria to the special case of 
ethics, we establish the true first principles of this latter subject” (EEM 30).  Following Phillips 
(2011: 64) I shall refer to arguments of this sort as “criterial arguments.”   
 The criteria that Sidgwick outlines in “The Establishment of Ethical First Principles” are 
essentially the same criteria he gives as part of his discussion of Philosophical Intuitionism in the 
Methods.  As we saw in chapter 2, these criteria are as follows:  
 
  (1) The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise.  
  (2) The appearance of self-evidence must survive careful reflection. 
  (3) The proposition must not conflict with other self-evident propositions.  
  (4) The proposition must not be denied by an epistemic peer. (ME 338-41) 
 
If Equal Good Relational appears no less evident than Equal Good, then neither passes 
Sidgwick’s third test.  And neither principle appears to meet the fourth criterion, as evidenced by 
Parfit and Crisp’s rejection of Equal Good.  Given Sidgwick’s belief that encountering such 
disagreement should reduce one to a state of neutrality, one might expect that no further progress 
can be made regarding the axioms.  Recall, however, that Sidgwick qualifies his remarks about 
disagreement with the statement “if I have no more reason to suspect error in the other mind than 
in my own” (ME 342).  Encountering disagreement over first principles does not mark the end of 
inquiry.  If there are considerations one can raise which might explain why one’s interlocutor 
100 
 
rejects the candidate principle, it is worth articulating those considerations in hopes that the 
disagreement might be resolved.  In the next two sections I shall argue that Equal Good fares 
much better than Equal Good Relational when exposed to Sidgwick’s first two tests for highest 
certainty.  If these arguments succeed, then our confidence in Equal Good need not be threatened 
by the disagreement.       
 
4  Sidgwick’s First Test   
Sidgwick’s first criterion for highest certainty requires that the terms of the proposition be clear 
and precise.  As we saw in chapter 2, the axiom of Equal Good requires an initial reading of 
‘good’ that is neutral between the universal and agent-relative conceptions.  This seemed to 
indicate that Equal Good runs afoul of Sidgwick’s first test because it lacks the requisite 
precision.  But as I explained, the lack of specification in the axiom is not the type of problematic 
vagueness or ambiguity that the first criterion tests for.  This is because neither specification 
threatens to undermine the plausibility or usefulness of the axiom by introducing arbitrariness or 
rendering it tautologous.
27
  Moreover, the work done in chapter 3 (if successful) eliminates 
worries about ambiguity.  Vindication of universal good means the axiom of Equal Good should 
be read with a universal specification of ‘good’. 
  In order for Equal Good Relational to fair equally well by Sidgwick’s first test it needs to 
be rendered more precise.  Specifically, it needs to be made clear just what type of relations are 
such that they justify having unequal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  
Clearly, not just any relation will do.  The fact I was born in the same hospital as another person 
does not justify having greater fundamental concern for that person than I do for people born in 
                                                 
27
 See pp. 49-50; 62 n. 40.     
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different hospitals.  Nor does the fact another person and I share the same ethnicity provide 
reason to prioritize that person’s interests over the interests of others.  These sorts of relations are 
obviously normatively inert.     
 But just what relations do justify unequal fundamental concern for equal portions of the 
good?  The answer is not immediately obvious.  Hence, the application of Sidgwick’s first test 
poses a challenge for the qualified version of Equal Good and for Partial Dualism itself.  The 
challenge is to provide a specific answer to the question of what relations justify unequal 
fundamental concern, and to present a case for the ethical significance of these relations that is 
compelling enough to warrant deviating from the original version of the axiom.      
 
4.1 Crisp on the Separateness of Persons  
Crisp attempts to meet this challenge by appealing to the separateness of persons.  The relation 
that Crisp believes justifies different levels of regard for equal portions of the good is the relation 
one has to oneself.  In his chapter on practical reason, Crisp writes: “What grounds self-
interested reasons is the value to the agent in terms of her own well-being (a value which could 
be understood as assessed from ‘the objective point of view’) and the fact that this value is 
instantiated in the life of the agent.  That non-evaluative fact is part of the ground of the self-
interested reason” (2006: 139).   
   In positing the separateness of persons as a non-evaluative source of reasons, Crisp does 
not appeal to the notion of rights or facts about how people ought to regard one another.  Rather, 
he appeals to the descriptive fact that each individual possesses a distinct capacity for 
consciousness.  The fact that we all have a separate capacity for conscious experience is what 
gives each of us “a special reason for promoting the enjoyment and minimizing the suffering 
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arising through that capacity’s being exercised” (2006: 141).  In an effort explain why an agent’s 
separate consciousness matters in this way, Crisp quotes one of the passages from the Methods 
that we considered in previous chapters:  
 
  It would be contrary to common sense to deny that the distinction between any  
  one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently ‘I’ am 
  concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense,   
  fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the existence of other  
  individuals. (ME 498)   
 
Following this quotation, Crisp adds that “the difference between one person and another is, as 
Sidgwick says, real.  However close I am to some other person, she will still be another person.  
And it is this difference which provides a source of self-interested reasons” (2006: 143).   
 While I do not wish to deny that there is a metaphysical difference between one person’s 
capacity for consciousness and that of another, the problem is that it is unclear why this 
difference has any greater ethical significance than other differences between individuals such as 
differences of race, gender, nationality, etc.  We can imagine a nationalist attempting to justify 
prioritizing the interests of his compatriots by saying “However close I am to a foreigner, she 
will still be a foreigner.”  Obviously the claim that we have ultimate reasons to favor ourselves 
has much greater prima facie plausibility than the claim that we have ultimate reasons to favor 
members of our own nation.  But this is well explained by the fact that virtually all of us care 
more about ourselves than we do about strangers, and few of us experience the same disparity in 
caring between fellow countrymen and citizens of other nations.  The passage from Sidgwick 
that Crisp offers for support is especially telling here.  Given that I am more concerned about my 
own existence than about the interests of others, it is unsurprising that it seems as though I have 
“special reason” for promoting my own welfare.  But for those with nationalist commitments it 
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will seem equally plausible that they have special reason for promoting the interests of their 
compatriots.  Thus, it would appear that much more needs to be said about why my relation to 
myself has special significance that does not inhere in the various relations I have to other 
people.
28
     
 These points are related to an objection Crisp himself raises against the appeal to social 
relations (e.g. friendships, familial relations, etc.) as a source of ultimate reasons. Crisp is 
skeptical that these relations are a source of ultimate reasons partly because they have a 
biological basis which conferred an obvious evolutionary advantage (2006: 143).  The 
suggestion is that our natural inclination to favor our intimates makes intuitions about the 
rationality of such favoring less reliable.
29
  But note that this worry applies equally well to self-
favoring.  Just as favoring the near and dear was adaptive for our ancestors, so was favoring 
oneself.  Thus, if Crisp is right to be skeptical about social relations as a source of ultimate 
reasons, we should also be skeptical about one’s relation to oneself as a source of ultimate 
reasons.
30
      
 In addition to these epistemological concerns, Crisp’s appeal to the separateness of 
persons also leads to worries about the general stability of his brand of Partial Dualism.  Because 
he rejects the idea that kin relations and social relations are an independent source of reasons for 
an agent, Crisp must hold that there is something uniquely significant about one’s relation to 
one’s own consciousness.  But the more significance we attribute to the separateness of persons, 
the more difficult it becomes to explain why pursuing one’s own interests can be contrary to 
                                                 
28
 As we saw earlier, Crisp also appeals to intuitions about particular cases to support his view.  I raise worries about 
this strategy in section 5 below.   
29
 Crisp remarks that the evolutionary benefit of favoring kin is insufficient for debunking intuitions supporting 
ultimate reasons of partiality, but he claims (rightly, in my view) that it is enough to throw these intuitions into 
doubt (2006: 143).   
30
 I return to this point in section 5 below.    
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reason (as it is when doing so comes at a great cost to others).  Indeed, if my relation to myself is 
as radically different from my relations to others as Crisp suggests, it becomes difficult to see 
how any particular weighing of personal and impartial reasons could have greater justification 
than any other.   
  
4.2 Parfit on Psychological Connections 
Let us turn then to the specification of Equal Good Relational that is suggested by Parfit’s 
discussion of partiality.  Parfit’s defense of Partial Dualism does not focus on each individual’s 
metaphysically distinct capacity for consciousness, but rather the various psychological 
connections between one’s present and future selves, as well the similar connections between 
oneself and one’s loved ones (2011, 1: 136).  Parfit believes these connections justify having 
greater regard for one’s own good and the good of one’s intimates than one has for the equal 
good of strangers.   The relevant psychological connections are things like shared memories, 
desires, goals, intentions, etc.
31
   
 In order to understand why Parfit believes these connections justify unequal fundamental 
concern for equal portions of the good, we must consider a line of argument he presents in 
Reasons and Persons (1984).  Parfit provides powerful arguments for the claim that when it 
comes to an individual’s survival, it is not mere psychological continuity that matters but also the 
                                                 
31
 David Brink (1997) also appeals to psychological connections in order to resolve Sidgwick’s Dualism.  According 
to Brink’s ‘metaphysical egoism’, the psychological connections we have to others give us self-interested reasons to 
promote their interests.  Since our own flourishing is dependent upon our relations to others as well as their 
flourishing, this shows that the ends of self-interest and the greater good are aligned after all.  Though I don’t have 
space to adequately address Brink’s proposal, I can note here one major concern.  The problem is that Brink’s view 
does not explain how we can have reasons to promote the interests of strangers on the other side of the globe.  As I 
argued in chapter 3, it’s deeply implausible that the happiness of faraway people whom I shall never meet cannot 
provide any ultimate reasons for me.  For further discussion of Brink’s proposal see Singer and De Lazari-Radek 
(2014: 164-7).     
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persistence of the aforementioned psychological connections.  He illustrates this point with the 
example of memory: 
 
  If our lives have been worth living, most of us value highly our ability to   
  remember many of our past experiences.  The loss of all these memories need not  
  destroy continuity of memory, which only requires overlapping chains of   
  memories.  Suppose I know that, two days from now, my only experience-  
  memories will be of experiences that I shall have tomorrow.  On the view just  
  stated, since there will be continuity of memory, this is all that matters.  It should  
  not matter to me that I shall soon have lost all of my memories of my past life.   
  Most of us would strongly disagree.  Losing all such memories would be   
  something that we would deeply regret. (1984: 301)  
 
Similar remarks apply for other psychological connections.  Not only would I regret losing all of 
the memories of my past life, I would also regret the disappearance of my values, commitments, 
ambitions, etc.   
 Parfit makes a compelling case.  It would indeed be very bad for an agent to lose all 
memories of her past even if she could maintain continuity through overlapping chains going 
forward.  So it is plausible that these connections are crucial for meaningful survival and perhaps 
also for flourishing.  But notice that this tells us nothing about why the individual should assign 
greater weight to her own survival and flourishing when deciding what to do than she does for 
the survival and flourishing of relevantly similar strangers.  In On What Matters, Parfit seems to 
assume that because shared memories are necessary for meaningful survival they must also have 
significance for the question of partiality towards oneself.  But this does not follow.  The fact 
that my welfare partly depends on the persistence of my psychological connections does not 
imply that these connections provide reasons to prioritize my own welfare over the welfare of 
others.       
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 Consider some of the other candidate psychological connections that might justify 
unequal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  Could the fact that my future self 
shares some of the same desires and intentions as my current self ground reasons to prioritize my 
welfare over that of a relevantly similar stranger?
32
  The best reasons for skepticism about this 
possibility come from Parfit himself.  In Part 1 of On What Matters, Parfit provides a forceful 
critique of desire-based theories of practical reason.  He highlights the implausible implications 
of these views, and he explains why the standard strategies for mitigating the damage resulting 
from those implications are unsuccessful.
33
  Parfit concludes that the mere fact that Ф-ing would 
satisfy an agent’s desire (whether actual or idealized) is not a reason for that agent to Ф.  But if 
desires themselves are normatively inert in this respect, why would the fact that I share desires 
with my future self have ultimate reason-giving force?  If the fact that I desire to visit Paris is not 
by itself a reason to visit Paris, why is the fact that my future self will also have this desire a 
reason to prioritize my own welfare?
34
        
 Similar remarks apply for shared intentions.  Parfit denies that the mere fact that an agent 
intends to Ф is a reason for that agent to Ф.  Whether an agent has reason to Ф, on Parfit’s view, 
depends on the objective features of Ф-ing.  It is only if Ф-ing is valuable for its own sake, or 
will lead to something of value, that an agent can have any reason to Ф.  If this is right, why 
should the fact that an agent shares the intention to Ф with her future self be a reason for her to 
prioritize her own interests?  If intentions themselves are normatively inert for an agent at a 
                                                 
32
 By ‘relevantly similar’ I mean a stranger who is no more or less likely to benefit or harm others, and is likely to 
experience the same number of years of happy life as I am.   
33
 Parfit (2011, 1: 58-110) 
34In his unpublished manuscript ‘Why Not Subjectivism?’ David Sobel suggests that Subjectivism fits well with 
non-impartialist accounts of practical reason.  The suggestion is that Subjectivism, combined with the fact that most 
of us care more about our own lives than the lives of strangers explains the widely shared intuition that we have at 
least as much reason to focus on our personal projects as we do to help needy strangers (p. 52).  I think Sobel is right 
about the fit between Subjectivism and partiality, and I believe there is a parallel fit between Objective accounts of 
practical reason and impartialism.     
107 
 
particular time, it would be surprising if shared intentions have ultimate normative significance.  
Of course, there are cases in which it would seem that shared intentions do provide reasons.  For 
instance, if my intention is to continue a promising line of medical research that might lead to a 
cure for cancer, then the fact that my future self will share this intention would be a reason to 
save my own life rather than the life of a stranger who intends to spend the rest of his life 
vacationing.  But here the source of my reason is the valuable state of affairs I could bring about 
if my intentions are carried out successfully—it is not the mere fact that I am connected to my 
future self through the shared intention.   
 Recall from chapter 1 that philosophical investigation of the Partiality Question 
presupposes that our practical reasons are object-given and value-based.
35
  It was Parfit’s 
powerful critique of desire-based accounts that first helped me appreciate this point.  The point 
of the previous two paragraphs has been to show that Parfit’s commitment to object-given, 
value-based accounts of practical reasons is difficult to reconcile with his belief that 
psychological connections are a source of ultimate reasons.  If psychological states such as 
desiring or intending are not sources of reasons for a particular individual, we should not expect 
that sharing these states with others (including our future selves) is a source of reasons.
36
   
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 See pp. 19-27.   
36
 In The Point of View of the Universe (Singer and De Lazari-Radek: 2014, 163) the authors cite an example Parfit 
provided to them in personal correspondence.  The case involves stealing a stranger’s raft in order to save one’s own 
child, and thereby preventing the stranger from saving her own two children.  Singer and De Lazari-Radek note that 
though Parfit initially claimed that such an act would not be contrary to reason, he has since indicated that he is 
reconsidering his view on this issue.  This suggests that Parfit might be growing less confident about the extra 
rational weight provided my connections to oneself and one’s intimates.   
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4.3 Summary    
The Partial Dualist’s qualified version of Equal Good does poorly when we apply Sidgwick’s 
first criterion for highest certainty.  When we attempt to give the principle the requisite precision 
by specifying the relations that justify unequal fundamental concern for equal good, serious 
problems emerge.  First, it is not clear why a shared capacity for consciousness with oneself has 
greater ethical significance than any of the numerous other features we share with others.  
Second, the same reasons that warrant skepticism about intuitions supporting partiality towards 
kin also apply to intuitions supporting self-favoring (more on this point in the next section).  
Third, the idea that shared memories support ultimate reasons of partiality gains illicit support 
from the fact that connections to one’s memories are important for personal identity.  Finally, the 
purported significance of shared desires and intentions sits uncomfortably with Parfit’s well 
motivated rejection of Subjectivism.   
 
5  Sidgwick’s Second Test 
Recall that Sidgwick’s second criterion for highest certainty requires that the intuitive 
plausibility of the principle survive careful reflection.  Specifically, we need to investigate 
whether the intuitions supporting the principle might have originated from unreliable sources.  
As we have seen, Parfit and Crisp attempt to motivate their claim that we have ultimate reasons 
to prioritize our own good by appealing to common sense intuitions about cases of conflict 
between self and others.  Presumably then, these are the sorts of intuitions that make it seem 
plausible that reason permits unequal weighing of equal portions of the good.  The important 
question is whether these intuitions are to be relied upon.  In the rest of this section I shall outline 
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four considerations which suggest that intuitions about cases of conflict do not justify 
abandoning Sidgwick’s axiom in favor of Equal Good Relational.   
 
5.1 Predominant Egoism 
Psychological egoism is a descriptive view which holds that people can only be motivated to 
perform actions they believe to be in their self-interest.  Although this view is implausible, there 
is a related view that is quite compelling.  According to predominant egoism, genuine instances 
of altruism are rare, and they typically occur only when the sacrifice is small and the benefit to 
others is large, or when those benefited are loved ones or favorite causes.
37
  Not only is 
predominant egoism supported by everyday experience and introspection, it is also well 
explained by evolutionary theory.  In modern societies where individuals are protected by laws 
and other institutions, highly altruistic individuals are not at a significant reproductive 
disadvantage.  But it is doubtful that the same was true in the early stages of human evolution.  
Given the ferocity of competition for resources and the lack of institutional safeguards, anyone 
who was not focused disproportionately on her own needs and those of her kin would be 
substantially less reproductively fit than individuals who had more self-centered attitudes and 
dispositions.  It is highly plausible that the disposition to give considerable priority to self-
interest was pervasive in the proto-human species we evolved from, and continued to be 
prevalent as our species evolved.
38
  
 The plausibility of predominant egoism as a descriptive view about human motivations is 
highly relevant to the Partiality Question.  This is because it is likely that the pervasive 
motivational tendency toward self-favoring has undue influence on our intuitions about reasons 
                                                 
37
 For discussion see Kavka (1986) and Shaver (1999).   
38
 In addition to prioritizing self-interest, evolutionary pressures likely promoted prioritization of the interests of 
one’s group over those of non-group members.  See Sober and Wilson (1998).   
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for action.  As beings that spend the majority of our time aiming to advance our own welfare it is 
unsurprising that we find it intuitive that self-interest carries at least some extra rational weight.
39
  
This is because intuitions about the rationality of conduct are often influenced by one’s own 
dispositions, feelings, and motives.
40
  Moreover, our judgments about what sort of conduct is 
reasonable are highly influenced by what is typical in the society we are part of.  In Reasons and 
Persons Parfit points out that egoism has historically been the dominant view because the 
world’s great religions teach that morality and self-interest ultimately coincide, and religious 
leaders have gladly appealed to self-interest to motivate people to obey the dictates of their 
religion.  Parfit then suggests that this historical influence makes some of our intuitions less 
reliable: “Since S [Parfit’s label for a theory which is essentially Rational Egoism] has been 
taught for more than two millennia we must expect to find some echo in our intuitions.  S cannot 
be justified simply by an appeal to intuitions that its teaching may have produced” (1984: 130).   
Although Parfit’s remarks are directed at intuitions supporting Rational Egoism, they apply 
equally well to self-favoring intuitions in general.     
 Here one might object that facts about our evolved motivational psychology can also cast 
doubt on intuitions supporting impartialist principles such as the axiom of Equal Good or 
Rational Impartialism.  However, Peter Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek explain why this 
is not the case.  Impartialist principles are immune from these worries because, as Folke Tresman 
(a noted proponent of evolutionary debunking arguments) acknowledged in correspondence with 
                                                 
39
 Of course, common sense intuitions also support our giving some ultimate consideration to complete strangers.  
The truth of predominant egoism is compatible with our assigning some ultimate weight to impartial interest 
because our normative intuitions are not determined exclusively by our inherited motivational tendencies.  As the 
animals that can understand and respond to reasons, we are able to overcome our partialist impulses and recognize 
that things like suffering and achievement could matter even if they are occurring on the other side of the globe.      
40
 Recall Sidgwick’s claim that “it cannot be denied that any strong sentiment, however purely subjective, is apt to 
transform itself into the semblance of an intuition; and it requires careful contemplation to detect the illusion” (ME 
339). 
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De Lazari-Radek and Singer, “we presently don’t have a fully satisfactory and well-established 
(evolutionary) debunking explanation of [these principles]” (2014: 194).  While evolutionary 
theorists can explain our tendency to make sacrifices for others by appealing to kin altruism and 
group selection, there is no equally plausible explanation on offer for the judgement that we 
ought to give equal consideration to equal interests regardless of whether the interests at stake 
are one’s own, those of a stranger in a distant land, or even a member of a different species.   
 Guy Kahane (2011: 119) objects that impartialist principles are not immune from 
evolutionary debunking because they are merely a reasoned extension of principles arising from 
kin altruism and reciprocal altruism.  The suggestion is that evolutionary pressures resulted in 
our aiming to help our kin and those who have helped us, and that in forming normative 
judgments we extended this altruism to include everyone so as to avoid incoherence.  Since the 
starting point of these judgements (i.e. kin altruism and reciprocal altruism) is purportedly 
contaminated by natural selection, then the judgments themselves are unreliable.  De Lazari-
Radek and Singer responded by pointing out that impartialism can be reached by means other 
than a reasoned extension of partial altruism.  As we have seen, for instance, Sidgwick’s 
principle of Rational Benevolence is deduced from the axiom of Equal Good (with a universal 
specification) and the axiom of Personal Irrelevance.  This axiomatic deduction is an 
instantiation of a type of reasoning that is not merely an attempt to extend partial altruism to 
make it coherent. 
 A second objection from Kahane (2014) is that the appeal to evolutionary debunking 
arguments backfires for any theorist who wishes to maintain that pleasure is good.  This is 
because if any normative belief is likely to be the direct result of selective pleasures, it is going 
to be the belief that pleasure is good.  One way of responding to this worry is to note an 
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important difference concerning our epistemic situations with respect to the Partiality Question 
and the question of the value of pleasure. In the case of the former, there are strong intuitions on 
both sides. There is something intuitive about prioritizing one’s own interests, and also 
something intuitive about giving equal weight to the equal interests of everyone.  One way of 
making progress here is to consider which intuition is more likely the product of our ability to 
reason.  The fact that partiality intuitions are explainable by evolution does not by itself debunk 
them.  Rather, the combination of the evolutionary explanation and the existence of a strong 
competing intuition which is not equally explainable in evolutionary terms tell in favor of the 
competing intuition.  Note that this is not the situation regarding the value of pleasure. We do not 
find ourselves with conflicting intuitions about the goodness of pleasure. Hence even if we 
should expect creatures with our evolutionary history to judge pleasure good, this does not give 
us sufficient reason to abandon this judgment because there is no competing intuition supporting 
the claim the pleasure is not good.  
         
5.2 Derivative Reasons in Practice 
A second source of skepticism about partiality intuitions comes from the fact that, regardless of 
which theory of rational weight is correct, in practice almost all of us have reasons to focus 
disproportionately on ourselves and our loved ones.  Given that each individual is in a unique 
epistemic and practical position with respect to her own needs, it would be highly inefficient for 
individuals not to pay special attention to their own basic needs before turning to the needs of 
others (in normal circumstances).  Although it is just as important for my colleague to eat a 
nutritious breakfast as it is for me, it would be a waste of resources to drive to his house in the 
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morning to cook for him.  For the sake of efficiency we should each focus on our own nutritional 
needs first.  The same is true for numerous other aspects of our lives.
41
 
 Similar remarks apply in the case of friends and family.  Even if the needs of a stranger 
on the other side of the globe carry no greater ultimate rational weight for me than the needs of 
my friend, I am obviously in a much better practical and epistemic position to meet the needs of 
my friend.  Moreover, there are certain needs my friend has that only someone who knows her 
well can provide (e.g. emotional support).  Furthermore, given the facts about human 
psychology, it is plausible that for most of us, failing to maintain intimate relationships in which 
we pay especially close attention to the needs of certain individuals would be detrimental to our 
mental health and well-being.  And it is plausible that jeopardizing our own health and happiness 
in this way would be suboptimal from a purely impartial perspective.  It is much easier to 
promote the greater good of others when we are healthy, happy, and productive.
42
  Thus, in 
practice, there is a significant disparity between the rational weight of the interests of my friend 
and the interests of a stranger in a faraway land.  But it does not follow from this fact that the 
interests of my friend are weightier for me at the fundamental level.       
 In light of the obvious fact that individuals should focus on their own basic needs first, 
and that we are often in a much better position to help those close to us, it is easy to see how we 
might find it intuitive that we are rationally justified in displaying fundamental partiality.  But to 
the extent that partiality intuitions are influenced by the fact that in practice we should focus 
disproportionately on ourselves, these intuitions are dubious.  This is because considerations of 
how we ought to focus our efforts in practice are not relevant to the theoretical question of 
ultimate (i.e. non-derivative) rational weight.  The fact that individuals should focus a 
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 Sidgwick notes this point in discussing utilitarianism and his principle of Rational Benevolence (ME 252, 382).   
42
 See Railton (1984). 
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disproportionate amount of attention on their own basic needs can be accommodated just as well 
by impartialist theories as it can by Partial Dualism.          
 
5.3 Different Senses of ‘Irrational’ 
Debates about the rational conflict between self-interest and the greater good often employ the 
term ‘irrational’.  We ask, for instance, whether it would be irrational for an agent to buy herself 
some luxury item rather than donating that money to famine relief.  I believe one of the reasons 
why some level of self-favoring strikes many as intuitive is the slipperiness of the term 
‘irrational’.  This word is widely used in several different senses, and it is crucial to recognize 
which sense is most important for the Partiality Question.   
 When people describe an agent or action as irrational, they often mean to say that the 
agent or action is ‘senseless’, ‘stupid’, ‘idiotic’, or ‘crazy’ (Parfit: 2011, 1: 33).  Following Parfit, 
we can call this the non-technical sense of ‘irrational’.  At other times, people use the term 
‘irrational’ to describe an agent who fails to take the necessary means to her own ends.  We can 
call this the instrumental sense of ‘irrational’.  A third sense of ‘irrational’ is the subjective sense.  
An agent is said to be irrational in this sense when she fails to do what she believes she has most 
reason to do.  This is related to the final sense of ‘irrational’ which is the objective sense.  An 
agent is irrational in the objective sense when she fails to do what she in fact has most reason to 
do. 
 For the purpose of investigating the Partiality Question, the most important sense of 
‘irrational’ is the objective sense.  The aim of our inquiry is to discover facts about our objective 
reasons.  We are not interested in facts about whether someone is crazy, or failing to take the 
means to her own ends, or failing to do what she believes she has most reason to do.  Yet when 
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we consider cases of conflict between self-interest and the greater good, it is easy to mistakenly 
focus on one of the other senses of ‘irrational’.  Of course we should find it obviously false that 
an agent who chooses to save her own life rather than the lives of two strangers is thereby 
irrational, if by this we mean that she is a fool, or that she has failed to take the means to her own 
ends.  But the relevant question is whether by saving herself she failed to do what she had most 
objective reason to do.  The fact that we often mistakenly use the term ‘irrational’ in one of these 
other senses should make us less confident about intuitions supporting the partialist answers to 
hypothetical conflict cases. One might object to this point on the grounds that nobody is as 
keenly aware of the significance of the different senses of ‘irrational’ as Parfit and Crisp.  
However, I believe the preceding discussion does go some way towards undermining self-
favoring intuitions for two reasons.  First, even those who are well aware of important 
conceptual distinctions are not immune from having their intuitive judgments unduly influenced 
by the wrong concepts.  Second, one of the theoretical advantages of Partial Dualism is the fact 
that the intuitions supporting self-favoring are widely held.  Even if the intuitions of chief 
proponents of the view are not unduly influenced by less important senses of ‘irrational’, the fact 
that the judgments of so many others probably are distorted by the wrong concepts is relevant.
43
 
 
5.4 Taking ‘Morality’ too Seriously 
Philosophers have long viewed adjudication of conflicts between partial and impartial interest as 
a matter of determining what morality requires of us.  As I explained in chapter 1, I believe this 
                                                 
43
 There is some reason for suspecting that even Sidgwick may have had his intuitions distorted by the fact that 
egoism is compatible with being fully ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ in several senses.  Hastings Rashdall suggests that 
something along these lines occurred in Sidgwick’s writing of the Methods.  When discussing Sidgwick’s claim that 
self-interest is a reasonable object of pursuit even when it conflicts with the general good, Rashdall writes, 
“[Sidgwick] seems to be relapsing into that meaning of the term ‘reasonable’ which has generally found favor with 
Hedonists who do not profess to be ‘rationalistic’ –that is to say, ‘internally self-consistent’ or ‘conducive as a 
means to the end which any one happens actually to desire’” (1907: 57).   
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tendency to focus on moral obligation when thinking about questions of rational weight has had 
a distorting influence on our intuitions.  To briefly recapitulate, the concept of moral obligation 
(which is central to moral discourse) is closely tied to the notion of blameworthiness.  To say that 
an action is morally wrong, on one common conception, is to say that an agent who performs it is 
blameworthy, which amounts to her meriting emotional sanctions in the form of resentment from 
others and feelings of guilt within herself.
44
 
 Insofar as we have a tendency to think about the conflicts between partial and impartial 
interests in terms of moral permissibility, it is unsurprising that intuitions often support partiality.  
In light of facts about human nature, such as our strong instinctual drive to preserve our own 
lives, it seems extreme to suggest that an individual who chooses to save her own life rather than 
the lives of two strangers has done something which merits resentment from others and feelings 
of guilt within herself.
45
  This is one of the major reasons why completely impartialist moral 
theories are often regarded as implausibly demanding.  Many people find it intuitive that a 
minimal degree of partiality could not be blameworthy.  If it is, then we get the implausible 
result that virtually all of us are, as Thomas Nagel puts it, “miserable sinners” (1986: 202). 
 I believe this fact about our moral intuitions partly explains the tendency for intuitions to 
tell in favor of partiality when considering cases of conflict.  While many would deny that moral 
requirements are rational requirements, it seems like a reasonable conjecture that most people 
assume that if an action or attitude is morally permissible, it is thereby rationally permissible.
46
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 See references in Ch. 1, note 13.      
45
 Of course, many moral theorists believe that there can be blameless wrongdoing.  Nonetheless, when we make 
intuitive judgments about whether an action would be wrong, it is likely that considerations of blameworthiness 
typically play a role, given the ubiquity of the blameworthy/‘reactive attitude’ conception of moral wrongness.   
46
 This idea plays a crucial role in Dale Dorsey’s recent work on the question of the rational authority of morality 
(2012, ms).  
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Since we judge that partiality is morally permissible, we are disposed to judge that it is rationally 
permissible as well.   
 The fact that intuitions about the greater rational weight of partial interests are likely 
influenced by our judgments about the moral permissibility of partiality should diminish our 
confidence in them.  The Partiality Question must be kept distinct from questions of moral 
obligation.  When we ask whether self-interest is a source of ultimate reasons with greater weight 
than that of reasons sourced in the welfare of others, our concern is not about the moral status of 
individuals or their actions.  The question is not whether an agent who gives fundamental priority 
to herself or her family is blameworthy—it is whether she failed to do what she had most reason 
to do.
47
     
 
5.5 Summary   
I have offered four distinct grounds for skepticism about the reliability of intuitions supporting 
fundamental reasons of partiality: (1) the plausibility of predominant egoism, (2) the undue 
influence of facts about derivative reasons, (3) conflation of different senses of ‘irrational’, and 
(4) a misguided emphasis on morality when considering cases of conflict.  I do not claim that 
these considerations alone undermine Equal Good Relational or Partial Dualism itself.  My aim 
has merely been to show that intuitions supporting the partialist option in cases of conflict 
provide unstable grounds for deviating from Sidgwick’s axiom.  Were it not for the existence of 
an apparently self-evident principle suggesting that the good is to be aimed at impartially, our 
self-favoring intuitions might be enough to justify Partial Dualism in spite of the doubts I have 
raised.  But the axiom of Equal Good, being immediately cognizable by abstract intuition and 
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While such failure can merit criticism, this criticism ultimately amounts to informing the agent that she has acted 
suboptimally.  This is different from moral criticism because there is no conceptual link between suboptimal 
performance and meriting feelings of guilt or shame. Cf. Brian McElwee (2007).    
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capable of withstanding careful reflection, raises the standards of justification for those who wish 
to vindicate ultimate reasons of partiality towards oneself.  Intuitive judgments about cases of 
conflict, which are problematic for the reasons I have outlined, are inadequate for this task.      
 
7  Conclusion 
Despite their belief in agent-neutral good, Partial Dualists resist impartialism because they deny 
that one ought to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.  I have tried to 
show that their rejection of Sidgwick’s axiom stands in tension with their own commitments, and 
that the intuitive judgments that constitute the primary support for Partial Dualism are dubious.  I 
conclude that if proponents of Partial Dualism wish to maintain their commitment to agent-
neutral good and an objective theory of practical reason, they should embrace the axiom of Equal 
Good and the impartialism to which it leads. 
 I have now defended each of the controversial premises of my Sidgwickian argument for 
Rational Impartialism.  However, the task of vindicating RI is not yet complete.  Despite the 
arguments presented in the preceding chapters, I suspect that many will insist that Rational 
Impartialism has implications that are too paradoxical to accept.  The aim of the next and final 
chapter is to remove the air of paradox surrounding RI.   
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5  Derivative Reasons and the Air of Paradox 
 
1  Introduction 
The conclusion of my Sidgwickian argument states that one ought to have equal fundamental 
concern for the equal good of all individuals.  Though I hope to have made a convincing case for 
the truth of the premises leading to this conclusion, there is more work to be done.  During the 
past three years I have discussed Rational Impartialism with numerous individuals—both 
philosophers and laypersons alike.  Nearly everyone who I have informed of my assent to RI has 
responded in an unsympathetic fashion.
1
  The responses have ranged from puzzlement and 
skepticism to incredulity and even mockery.  Philosophers typically respond by immediately 
proposing ostensible counterexamples to the view: “So you’re saying it’s irrational for me to be 
at this conference right now?”  Others have responded by questioning whether a life lived in 
accordance with RI could be a life worth living.  Still others have wondered how my belief in RI 
can be reconciled with my choosing to pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy rather than doing something 
that would presumably bring about much more total good, such as becoming an investment 
banker and donating my income to charity. 
 Given these reactions, I worry that the seemingly paradoxical implications of RI might be 
so troubling that even readers who find the considerations raised thus far persuasive will still be 
convinced that something must be amiss.  It is for this reason that I shall devote this final chapter 
to diminishing the air of paradox surrounding RI.   
 I begin in section 2 by considering the objection that Rational Impartialism is implausibly 
demanding.  I consider some of the most challenging cases for RI, and I explain how our 
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 One of the notable exceptions was Neil Sinhababu, who responded by giving me a hug.   
120 
 
tendency to ignore important facts about such cases can have a powerful distorting effect on our 
judgements.  In section 3 I consider the standard objection that impartialist views alienate us 
from the things we care about most and that adhering to such a view would prevent us from 
living meaningful lives.  I explain how such worries are mitigated by emphasizing the role of 
derivative reasons as well as the distinction between motivating reasons and normative reasons.  
I also stress the point that we should not have expected the true account of practical reasons to 
happily coincide with our individual desires, goals, and ambitions in the first place.  Finally, in 
section 4, I respond to the worry that RI cannot accommodate common judgements about cases 
of altruism in which an agent sacrifices her own greater good for the lesser good of another.  
 
2  Demandingness 
2.1 The Demandingness Objection 
Worries about demandingness are traditionally raised against versions of consequentialism such 
as utilitarianism.  Critics claim that by positing maximization of general happiness as the 
threshold for moral permissibility, utilitarianism is an implausibly demanding view.  Many 
theorists find it hard to accept that we could be acting impermissibly each and every time we fail 
to act in a hedonically and impartially optimific manner.  Since virtually no one comes close to 
living up to this standard, utilitarianism seems to imply that even the best among us are almost 
always acting immorally.  And since we typically think of immoral or impermissible conduct as 
blameworthy, this means that if utilitarianism is true, we are all deserving of substantial amounts 
of blame, and even ostensible moral exemplars ought to feel guilty for many of their choices 
insofar as they fall short of maximizing universal happiness.         
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 One might expect that the exact same objection can be leveled against proponents of 
Rational Impartialism.  Recall, however, that RI is not a theory of morality.  The view is not 
committed to the claim that whenever an agent shows greater fundamental regard for her own 
welfare or the welfare of her intimates she has therefore done something morally wrong, and 
hence that her conduct merits feelings of anger from others and guilt or shame within herself.  
All Rational Impartialism implies about such an agent is that she has failed to respond 
appropriately to her practical reasons.  Hence, insofar as the demandingness objection concerns 
the issue of implausibly high standards for avoiding blameworthiness, the objection has no force 
against RI.   
 That being said, there is a version of the demandingness objection that can be fairly 
raised against RI.  One might argue that theories of ultimate practical reasons can be implausibly 
demanding in a different way.  Even though RI does not imply that an agent is blameworthy for 
prioritizing her own good, the view does imply that such an agent exhibits a type of irrationality 
in the sense that she fails to respond appropriately to her reasons.  And given that most of us 
seem to give at least some fundamental priority to our own good, this would suggest that almost 
all of us are acting irrationally most of the time.  Critics might charge that an account requiring 
fundamental impartiality in order to avoid acting irrationally demands too much of agents for it 
to be taken seriously—it is just not plausible that irrationality is as pervasive as RI implies.  The 
demandingness objection can also be pressed against RI by highlighting specific examples of 
conflict between  personal interests and the interests of strangers for which we find it implausible 
that an agent would have decisive reason to choose the impartially optimific option due to the 
high level of sacrifice required.  In the rest of this section I shall address both of these 
manifestations of the demandingness objection.    
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2.2 Pervasive Irrationality 
Let us first consider the suggestion that RI is unlikely to be true because it is implausible that 
irrationality is as pervasive as the view implies.  As I noted in chapter four, the term ‘irrational’ 
is used in a variety of senses.  The sense that is relevant here is what I have called the ‘objective’ 
sense.  Given that most of us fail to give equal weight to the equal good of everyone, RI implies 
that we are quite often behaving irrationally in the objective sense.  In other words, most of us 
fail to do what we have most reason to do most of the time.  Some might take this implication of 
RI as grounds for skepticism about the view because we tend to think that, as the animals that are 
capable of understanding and responding to reasons, it is unlikely that we could be failing so 
miserably.   
 There are two lines of response that I believe undermine the force of this objection.  First, 
though I agree that very few of us are living an optimally rational life by the lights of RI, the 
extent to which we fall short of this is not as great as it might appear at first blush.  As I 
explained in the previous chapter, regardless of which theory of practical reason is true, in 
practice almost all of us have reasons to focus disproportionately on ourselves and our loved 
ones.  This is explained by epistemic and practical considerations, as well as facts about human 
psychological and emotional needs.  Not only am I uniquely situated to promote the needs of 
myself and those around me, by doing so I make it easier for my intimates and myself to 
effectively promote the greater needs of others.
2
  Of course, even taking these derivative reasons 
into account, most of us still fall well short of living in accordance with the reasons posited by 
RI.  Nonetheless, we are not as far off the mark as one might have thought initially.   
                                                 
2
 See Railton (1984). 
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 The second response to the worry about pervasive irrationality is to note that, setting the 
Partiality Question aside for the moment, most everyone accepts that they fail to respond 
appropriately to their practical reasons with high regularity.  This can be seen by considering 
some uncontroversial examples of the things that most people do not do despite having strong 
reasons to do them.  For instance, the vast majority of us have strong reasons to change at least 
some aspects of our diets, as well as reasons to exercise more.  Yet despite our annual New 
Year’s resolutions to exercise regularly and cut back on junk food, the majority of us fall back 
into our unhealthy habits by June if not sooner.
3
   
 To take another example, unless egoism is true, it is clear that we have strong reasons to 
donate a substantial amount of our disposable income to reputable and effective charities.  
Impartialists, Partial Dualists, and common-sense moralists can all agree that the great suffering 
occurring around the globe provides strong reasons to forego many of our luxuries in order to 
make a financial contribution.  And most of us would admit that we fail to donate as much as we 
should.
4
  Given this, on any of the widely accepted theories of practical reason, most of us act 
irrationally in the objective-reason sense with great regularity.
5
  Of course, if RI is true, we are 
falling shorter of the mark than we are if a view like Partial Dualism is true.  But since the 
rational failure is pervasive in either case, the rational failure implied by RI not a compelling 
reason for skepticism. 
                                                 
3
 Lenny Bernstein, “It’s a Week into January and a Quarter of Us Have Already Abandoned Our New Year’s 
Resolutions,” The Washington Post (January 2015): http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2015/01/07/its-january-7-and-a-quarter-of-us-have-already-abandoned-our-new-years-resolutions/ 
4
 Although Crisp believes everyone has ultimate reasons to prioritize their own welfare, he acknowledges that given 
the present state of the world (i.e. given the existence of extreme global poverty), “the lives of most of us are 
unjustifiable in the light of reason” (2006: 141).     
5
 Even if egoism is true, practical irrationality is pervasive insofar as we consistently engage in imprudent behavior 
due either to weakness of will or to a mistaken belief that we ought to sacrifice our welfare for the sake of others.   
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 A third example will further drive home the point.  One of the counterintuitive features of 
RI is the implication that personal relationships are only of derivative importance.  Common 
sense suggests that close personal bonds are highly valuable for their own sake.  Perhaps no 
relationship is held in higher regard than that between mothers and their children.  For most of 
us, once we reach adulthood and move out into the world on our own, we develop a strong sense 
of gratitude towards those who raised us—especially our mothers.  And most mothers of adult 
children derive great enjoyment from visiting with them or at least talking on the phone.  This 
explains the common belief that one ought to call or visit one’s mother with high regularity.  But 
despite these normative beliefs, most of us fail to call or visit as much as we judge that we 
should.  Given that common sense suggests that one ought to call one’s mother regularly, the fact 
that many of us do not further illustrates the point that even on a common-sense account of 
practical reasons, irrationality in the objective sense is pervasive.  Hence, the pervasive 
irrationality version of the demandingness objection is not a serious threat to RI.     
 
2.3 Hard Cases  
A second way of pressing the demandingness objection against RI is to point to specific cases in 
which the view requires an implausibly high level of self-sacrifice or impartiality in order to act 
in accordance with one’s reasons.  Consider, for instance, the following case from Doug 
Portmore.
6
  Suppose you have happily been working in the same corner office in the same 
building for the past several years.  And suppose that a new faculty member has been hired, and 
she informs you that it would make her very happy if you would give her your office and move 
into the smaller, windowless office that was initially offered to her.  If RI is true, then you ought 
                                                 
6
 Portmore presented a version of this case during personal communication at the 2014 Rocky Mountain Ethics 
Congress.  It is similar in structure to some cases he presents in Commonsense Consequentialism (2011: 4, 26, 30-
31).   
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to give equal weight to the equal good of everyone.  Hence, if it is the case that giving up your 
office would lead to even the slightest net increase in total good, an increase of say, one utile, 
then RI implies that this is what you have most reason to do.
7
  Portmore finds this implication of 
RI absurd.  The thought is that the mere fact that giving up your office would result in a 
minuscule increase in impartial good cannot be enough to give you decisive reason to do so. 
 Though I understand why the above implication of RI might initially appear absurd, I 
believe this appearance diminishes when we consider what would need to be true in order for it 
to be the case that swapping offices would lead to an increase in overall good.  It is tempting to 
think of the example as being based on the premise that the new faculty member would get 
slightly more enjoyment from your office than you do.  But this would not be sufficient for it to 
be true that trading offices would lead to a net increase in total good.  This is because packing up 
all of your belongings and moving them into a different office requires a great deal of time and 
energy.  Moving offices is a substantial inconvenience, and it is typically an unpleasant 
experience.  Moreover, your future working hours will presumably be less enjoyable for you in 
the windowless office, given that you had grown used to the much nicer corner office.  Thus, 
given the amount of self-sacrifice involved in making the exchange, it would have to be the case 
that your new colleague would experience a very substantial increase in welfare from moving 
into the corner office in order for the trade to be overall good.  This might be possible if, for 
instance, moving into your office would somehow help to alleviate an episode of depression that 
would otherwise prevent your colleague from experiencing happiness for the next several weeks.  
But if it is circumstances such as these that would allow for the exchange to be overall good, it 
                                                 
7
 This is not to say that RI implies that one ought always to maximize total happiness by any available means.  RI is 
officially compatible with non-welfare based reasons including deontological constraints.  To simplify things we can 
suppose that in the above example, the only normatively relevant factors in play are the welfare of you and your 
colleague.   
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no longer seems absurd to suggest that you would have decisive reason to move offices.  On the 
contrary, given that your colleague’s happiness matters every bit as much as your own, and that 
the cost to you (taking everything into account) is less substantial than the benefit to her, it seems 
clear that you would have decisive reason to make the trade.             
 A second difficult case for Rational Impartialism comes from Crisp in Reasons & the 
Good (2006).  In order to show that there is a limit to the amount of self-sacrifice one could have 
reason to make for the sake of others, Crisp provides the following example: 
 
  Two Doors 7.  You are currently living a reasonably good life.  You are now  
  confronted by two doors.  If you pass through door A, your global well-being will 
  drop dramatically, so that the rest of your life will be worth living but of a very  
  low quality.  If you pass through door B, nothing will happen to you, but the  
  future well-being of some other person, a stranger and out of sight, also living a  
  reasonably good life, will drop even further, so that her life is barely worth living.  
  (2006: 140-41)  
 
If RI is true, then you have decisive reason to pass through door A.  Of course, if you found 
yourself in such a situation you would likely believe that you have a reason to pass through door 
B.  In discussing a case involving a similar conflict between self-interest and the good of others, 
Crisp (2015: 198) acknowledges that it is available for proponents of RI to appeal to 
evolutionary psychology to explain why we tend to judge that we would have a reason to pursue 
the self-interest option in cases such as this.  Recall that I employed this strategy in discussing 
Partial Dualism in the previous chapter.
8
  However, Crisp suggest that a plausible explanation for 
why you would think you have such a reason is available without appealing to evolution—the 
explanation is that you would in fact have such a reason (ibid. 199).  This is taken to be strong 
grounds for skepticism about RI.   
                                                 
8
 See pp.109-112.  For a comprehensive attempt to utilize evolutionary considerations to support impartialism and 
utilitarianism see Singer and de Lazari-Radek (2014: ch. 7).  For a critique of their strategy see Crisp (2012).    
127 
 
 Rather than rehearse the reasons for skepticism about self-favoring intuitions, I think it 
would help to consider a variation of Two Doors 7 that eliminates some of the distorting 
influences of our motivational psychology.  In chapter 3 we considered an example from Simon 
Keller involving a unique civilization that functions quite well despite the absence of close 
personal relationships.  This was instructive for diminishing intuitive support for the claim that 
close relationships are valuable for their own sake.  I believe that a similar idea can be useful for 
undermining the force of Crisp’s thought experiment.   
 Imagine that there exists, on a faraway planet called Rashdall, a species of intelligent 
beings who are similar to human beings in most significant respects.  The only major difference 
is that, as a result of a different evolutionary history, the Rashdallians do not have the innate 
drive towards self-favoring and kin partiality that are characteristic of human beings.  When 
individual Rashdallians face conflicts between self-interest and the greater good, they typically 
do not experience an inclination to choose the former.  While Rashdallians have the same sense 
of self that human beings typically possess, and while it matters to them that their own lives go 
well, their innate motivations are not biased toward themselves and their loved ones.  But neither 
are Rashdallians strongly inclined to choose the sacrificial option.  Rashdallians have the 
peculiar feature of possessing no innate motivational tendencies when they encounter such 
conflicts.  At every such conflict they simply reflect on the balance of reasons in favor of each 
option.  To avoid begging any questions, we will not assume which option is favored by the 
balance of reasons.   
 Now imagine that there is a Rashdallian who encounters a situation similar to Two Doors 
7.  Everything is the same as in the original version of the case except that it is now Rashdallians 
rather than human beings who are involved.  The crucial question remains the same: Does the 
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Rashdallian have most reason to pass through door A, thus causing her own well-being to drop to 
a very low quality, in order to prevent an even worse outcome for a stranger?  Or does she have 
most reason to pass through door B?   
 Before answering this question it is worth explaining why we should bother considering 
an imagined case involving alien beings.  The reason the Rashdallian version of the example is 
significant is that it allows us to overcome some of the distorting influences that arise when we 
consider thought experiments involving human beings.  These distorting effects take two forms.  
First, because we are human beings, it is difficult to prevent our own motivational and emotive 
responses from influencing our judgments about thought experiments involving drastic outcomes 
for other humans.  When we are asked to judge what the agent facing the imagined set of 
circumstances has most reason to do, the impulses that might unreflectively pull us in one 
direction or another were we in those circumstances can also influence our second-person 
assessments.  This effect is made even worse when we are asked what we ourselves would do if 
faced with such a decision, as in Crisp’s Two Doors 7.  When I imagine that I am the one who 
faces the choice between giving up my current happy life to drop to a level of well-being that 
makes my life barely worth living, I experience slight feelings of anxiety and dread (even as I sit 
comfortably in the air-conditioned library).  It is only to be expected that my powerful instinctual 
aversion to such outcomes will have at least some influence on my intuitions about which option 
is supported by weightier reasons.   
 A second distorting effect that arises when we focus on examples involving human 
beings is the influence of one of the less important senses of ‘rational’ which I have discussed in 
previous chapters.  We know that human beings are highly self-interested.  Though many of us 
are inclined to take an interest in the well-being of others, few of us make the promotion of the 
129 
 
general welfare our guiding principle.  Given that most of us are primarily focused on ourselves 
and our intimates, we assume that an act of great sacrifice would frustrate an individual’s chosen 
ends.  This makes such sacrifice an instance of instrumental irrationality.  The fact that we tend 
to assume that an individual who chooses door B would instrumentally irrational insofar as she 
would be frustrating her primary end of promoting her own welfare can plausible bias our 
intuitions in the direction of door A.   
 By focusing on Rashdallians we can avoid both of these distorting effects.  Since it is 
made salient that Rashdallians are different from us in that they do not have an innate disposition 
to prioritize their own interests, it is easier to focus solely on the issue of which option the agent 
has more reason to choose.  It should be uncontroversial that the Rashdallian has reason to care 
about her own well-being.  And only proponents of egoism would deny that she had reasons to 
care about the well-being of the other Rashdallian whose welfare hangs in the balance.  The 
question then is what the relative weight of these reasons are (i.e. the Partiality Question).   
 When I reflect on this alternative version of the thought experiment it is evident to me 
that the Rashdallian has decisive reason to pass through door B.  Although this choice will make 
her own situation extremely bleak, if she does otherwise another Rashdallian will suffer an even 
worse fate.  And the suffering of this other individual will not be any less bad simply because it 
is happening to someone else.  The fact that the Rashdallian does not have any innate tendency to 
prioritize her own welfare makes it easier to focus on what really matters in the case which is the 
welfare at stake.  By thinking about what a Rashdallian would have reason to do rather than what 
a human being would have reason to do, or worse yet what “I” would have reason to do, we can 
eliminate the distorting influence of our desires and inclinations.  And given the assumption that 
subjectivism is false, the judgements we endorse about the reasons had by alien beings with 
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different motivational psychologies should not differ from the judgements we endorse 
concerning the reasons possessed by human beings facing similar circumstances.  If we agree 
that the Rashdallian would have most reason to pass through door A, then we should say the 
same thing about a human being who faces such a choice.  
 
3  Alienation 
The demandingness objection is not the only traditional critique of utilitarianism that can also be 
raised against Rational Impartialism.  Critics of RI might also appeal to worries about alienation, 
which is a second standard line of objection against utilitarianism.  The basic idea is that 
adhering to an impartialist ethical theory would alienate us from our true selves and the things 
that are most important to us, such as our loved ones and our personal projects.  Hence, unlike 
the demandingness objection, the alienation worry takes a similar form against both 
utilitarianism and RI.  This is because concerns about alienation directly address the impartialism 
that is inherent in both theories.   
 Worries about alienation can be expressed in various ways, but for present purposes it 
will suffice to focus on two particular versions of the objection.  The first holds that impartialist 
views preclude individuals from having integrity and living a worthwhile life.  The second is that 
impartialist views are incompatible with appropriately responding to the value of the individuals 
around us.  I shall respond to each of these worries in turn.        
3.1 Integrity  
The integrity objection is most often associated with Bernard Williams.  Though Williams 
presses the objection against utilitarianism, many of his claims could be applied just as well to 
Rational Impartialism.  Williams’ primary complaint is that any view requiring impartiality at the 
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fundamental level implies that a person’s life is not really his or her own.  He focuses 
specifically on the importance of choosing one’s own projects and commitments, and the fact 
that impartial ethical views require that agents be willing to set aside their personal projects and 
convictions whenever doing so would be impartially best.  Williams finds this aspect of 
impartialism absurd.  In an oft-quoted passage, he puts the point thus: 
 
  The point is that [the agent] is identified with his actions as flowing from projects  
  or attitudes which…he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is  
  about…It is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come in from the  
  utility network which the projects of others have in part determined, that he  
  should just step aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the  
  decision which utilitarian calculation requires.  It is to alienate him in a real sense  
  from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions.  It is to make  
  him into a channel between the input of everyone’s projects, including his own,  
  and an output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which his  
  projects and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow  
  from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified.  It is thus, 
  in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity.  (1973: 116-17)     
         
These remarks can be interpreted in at least two different ways.  On one reading, Williams’ 
objection is that it is absurd to suggest that an agent could have reason to sacrifice the very things 
that he most strongly identifies with because it would be impossible to be motivated to make 
such a sacrifice.   Understood this way, the objection is easily met by appealing to the distinction 
between motivating reasons and normative reasons.
9
  It might be true that some agents could 
never be motivated to sacrifice their most sacred life projects for the sake of distant strangers.  
But that is consistent with the agent’s having decisive normative reason to make the sacrifice 
nonetheless.  Normative reasons are considerations that count, for the agent, in favor, of 
performing an action.
10
  And if we continue to work under the assumption that subjectivism is 
                                                 
9
 Singer and de Lazari-Radek (2014: 135).   
10
 Crisp (2006: 38).  The normative reasons we are here concerned with are, of course, practical reasons rather than 
epistemic reasons.     
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false, and that normative reasons are object-given, then we can accept that an agent can have a 
reason to Ф even if Ф-ing is not in any way connected to her subjective concerns.   
 On a second interpretation, Williams’ objection is a first-order claim about the reasons an 
agent might have, rather than a meta-ethical claim about the nature and sources of one’s reasons.  
On this alternative reading, Williams’ claim is that a willingness to sacrifice one’s personal 
projects whenever doing so is impartially optimal is incompatible with maintaining one’s 
integrity.  If we are required to set aside the things we care most about whenever their 
maintenance requires a certain sacrifice of the greater good of others, then we cannot live 
authentic and meaningful lives.   
 The problem with this objection is that Williams seems to be championing a subjective 
notion of integrity according to which one ought to be committed to carrying out one’s projects, 
whatever they happen to be.  But it is highly implausible that one has reasons to carry out 
whatever personal projects one happens to have adopted.  If having integrity simply means 
staying committed to one’s principles and projects regardless of their effects on others, than it is 
far from clear why we should think there is anything counting in favor of integrity.  As Elizabeth 
Ashford (2000: 423-4) argues, if we appeal to this subjective notion of integrity we quickly run 
into absurd implications.  If I happen to have structured my life and my identity around wanton 
cruelty, then maintaining my integrity would necessitate my continuing to cause suffering to 
innocent individuals.  But this would be no reason to do so.         
  One might try reviving Williams’ objection by arguing that there is special value 
inhering in staying committed to one’s projects whenever these projects are objectively 
worthwhile.  There is certainly something plausible about this suggestion.  It does seem 
important for a person’s wellbeing that she can immerse herself in the things that matter to her, 
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and develop a sense of identity from the worthwhile projects she commits herself to.  But if this 
is right, the value inhering in integrity is sourced in considerations of welfare.  And nobody’s 
welfare is any more valuable than anyone else’s.  So even if staying committed to my projects is 
good for me, that does not imply that I have reason to maintain this commitment if doing so 
leads to a sacrifice of the greater good of someone else who is no less deserving of happiness 
than I am. 
 Here one might object that maintaining commitment to one’s projects is not just one 
factor among many that constitute a person’s welfare.  Perhaps it is the case that such 
commitment is a necessary condition for a person’s life to be worth living at all.  There are two 
replies to this worry.  First, it is highly implausible that a precondition for a person’s life being 
worth living is that she view her projects as something she would not give up for the sake of the 
greater good of others.  The sense of meaning I derive from my personal projects does not 
depend on my viewing them as non-negotiable.  The projects and commitments that shape my 
identity and structure my day-to-day life provide meaning for me in virtue of their intrinsic 
features and the enjoyment and sense of accomplishment they give rise to.  If it were the case 
that I was constantly changing my commitments and projects, or if I was under constant threat of 
losing the mental and physical capacities that allow me to engage in them, that would certainly 
detract from my sense of contentment and meaningfulness.  But awareness of the fact that I 
might have decisive reason to abandon these projects or commitments for the greater good of 
others who are no less important than I am does not detract from the sense of meaning provided 
by my projects.   
 Second, we must bear in mind that Rational Impartialism is in principle compatible with 
agents pursuing their own personal projects.  Pursuit of one’s projects is among the chief means 
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of pleasure and achievement, which are two of the most plausible constituents of a person’s 
good.  But we must be careful not to confuse the question of what an agent has most reason to 
do, with the question of what would be the best possible life for a human being.  It is certainly 
plausible that the best possible human life would include plenty of time and resources allocated 
to personal projects and relationships.  In an ideal world, everyone would have the resources 
necessary to immerse themselves in meaningful projects, whether in the arts, science, athletics, 
or any of the other endeavors that would bring enjoyment and enrichment.  Unfortunately, we do 
not live in an ideal world.  Given the level of suffering that is taking place around the globe, 
reason requires most of us to make substantial sacrifices of our own good.  This is because no 
individual’s good is any more valuable than anyone else’s, and as rational beings we are bound 
to have equal fundamental concern for equal portions of the good.       
 
3.2 The Value of Individuals 
A second version of the alienation worry holds that impartialist views alienate us from those 
around us insofar as adhering to such views precludes us from responding properly to the value 
of individuals.  A clear articulation of this view is found in the work of David Velleman.  On 
Velleman’s view, although every rational agent is of equal intrinsic value, if you respond to 
everyone’s value in a like manner, you fail to respond appropriately to anyone’s value.  The 
value that inheres in individuals is said to be a value that demands respect, and respect for this 
value is incompatible with making comparisons and trade-offs concerning the good of 
individuals (Velleman 1999: 370).  Because Rational Impartialism holds that one ought to have 
equal fundamental concern for the equal good of all individuals, this implies that agents have 
ultimate reasons to prioritize the greater good of some individuals over the lesser good of others.  
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And this seems to run afoul of the idea that every person has a value that precludes comparisons 
and trade-offs.  Hence, one might worry that an agent who attempts to live up to the standards of 
RI would alienate herself from her fellow human beings insofar as she would not be directly 
responsive to the true value of their personhood.  This would not only constitute a rational failing 
on the part of the agent, it could also constitute a significant harm to those near and dear to her.   
 In order to address this worry we must first note that RI does not require of agents that 
they respond to everyone’s value similarly in practice.  As mentioned above, the impartiality 
required by RI concerns ultimate reasons.  This is compatible with our having derivative reasons 
to focus our attention on certain individuals including ourselves and our intimates.  In most 
cases, for instance, parents should show special concern for the welfare of their own children.  
The same is true of friends, siblings, spouses, etc.   
 That being said, RI does imply that at the fundamental level, I ought to give equal weight 
to the equal good of everyone.  Displays of partiality are justified if they are impartially optimal.  
Hence, we must still answer the question of whether all persons possess a type of value that 
precludes reasons to make comparisons with respect to the good of others.   
 The suggestion that comparing the good of some against the good of others can be 
inappropriate in certain contexts is plausible enough.  But the thought that persons possess an 
intrinsic value that precludes making comparisons altogether, if understood literally, is obviously 
false.  Even the strictest Kantian would have to accept the rationality of comparing the good of 
some against the good of others when deciding what one has most reason to do (Keller 2013: 
131).  When deciding how to allocate the money I have set aside for charity, it would be absurd 
not to consider and compare the needs of those individuals who receive help from the respective 
charities I might donate to.  Giving priority to whoever has the greatest need does not betray a 
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lack of respect for the value of individuals.  And even when there is a choice to be made between 
benefitting someone with whom you have a special relationship and benefitting a complete 
stranger, it is easy to see that a comparison of the value of the interests is possible and sensible.  
Keller provides a helpful example in which you must choose between treating your child’s 
asthma and saving several other children from blindness.  Even if you believe in ultimate reasons 
of partiality, and thus believe that you have ultimate reasons to treat your child’s asthma rather 
than saving the other children from blindness, you can at least see that a neutral observer would 
have reason to choose the latter.  And that is all that is necessary to see that comparisons and 
trade-offs can be legitimate (ibid.).   
 To the question of whether general acceptance of and adherence to RI would alienate us 
from one another, it is helpful to imagine a world in which, at the fundamental level, everyone 
did in fact have equal fundamental concern for the equal good of all.  In responding to a version 
of Williams’ integrity objection I noted that because we do not live in an ideal world, most of us 
living in affluent nations have decisive reasons to change many things about our lives, including 
the amount of resources we devote to making progress on issues like global poverty.  But think 
for a moment about what things would be like should everyone come to recognize that there are 
no ultimate reasons of partiality, and that the good of distant strangers provides ultimate reasons 
of the same strength as the reasons provided by one’s own good.  Were all citizens of wealthy 
nations to become convinced of this and attempt to live their lives accordingly, it is doubtful that 
problems like severe global poverty would persist for much longer.  And though we would likely 
need to maintain certain special relations with certain individuals, if everyone were to share the 
same basic commitment to treating the good of everyone as an equal source of ultimate reasons 
we should not expect that this would result in a loss of meaning or connection with those around 
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us.  If anything, universal recognition of the equal normative significance of all should lead to a 
greater sense of unity and connectedness for everyone.    
 
4  Negative-Sum Altruism  
In chapter 1, I framed the Partiality Question as concerning the extent to which self-interest and 
the interests of one’s intimates carry greater rational weight for one than the interests of 
strangers.  If Rational Impartialism is true, the answer to this question is No.  Though I claimed 
that the Partiality Question is the most fundamental and important question of philosophical 
ethics, RI has significant implications for other important questions.  One particularly important 
question is whether an agent can ever have ultimate reason to perform an act of what I shall call 
‘negative-sum altruism’.  Acts of negative-sum altruism involve sacrificing one’s own greater 
good for the sake of the lesser good of someone else.  Imagine, for instance, that an agent is 
trapped in some wreckage following an earthquake, and that she could save a stranger from 
losing her leg by sacrificing her own life.
11
  According to common consciousness, this act would 
be morally and rationally permissible (assuming that making the sacrifice would not prevent you 
from meeting important obligations to others).  Indeed, many people would likely deem such an 
act of selflessness praiseworthy.  At the same time, however, few would say that this act is 
morally or rationally required.  Hence, the most generally shared judgement would likely be that 
the act was supererogatory.  You had sufficient reason to make the sacrifice, but you also had 
sufficient reason not to. 
 Rational Impartialism implies a different verdict about such cases.  According to RI, one 
ought to have equal fundamental concern for the equal good of everyone.  Hence, one could not 
                                                 
11
 This example is based on examples from Parfit (2011, 1: ch. 8).    
138 
 
have sufficient reason to sacrifice one’s lesser good for the greater good of someone else.  
Insofar as many people share the intuition that negative-sum altruism can rationally justified, this 
is a further respect in which RI deviates from common sense.   
 In responding to this worry, we can begin by noting that it is unsurprising that we find it 
intuitive that a person might have sufficient ultimate reason to sacrifice a greater good of hers for 
the sake of a lesser good of someone else.  Given the human tendency to prioritize self-interest, 
an agent who is willing to prioritize the lesser needs of others ahead of her own greater needs 
reveals a unique disposition to extend her concern to others to a degree that would typically 
result in a net increase in impartial good.  Such an agent likely possesses the traits of generosity 
and compassion, which are regarded as among the chief moral virtues.   
 But although the traits that can manifest themselves in negative-sum altruism are 
generally beneficial for everyone, the important question is whether an agent could ever have 
sufficient ultimate reason to perform such an act.  In order to get the question clear, we must 
make sure that we consider only cases that are genuine instances of negative-sum altruism.  
Some scenarios which might seem to be properly classified as such are actually not because of 
the further consequences of the act.  For instance, if the sacrifice were to become widely known, 
this might inspire people to show more kindness and generosity to others, which could make it 
the case that the act lead to a net increase in total good, and hence optimal from an impartial 
perspective.  We must also set aside the point that the traits that manifest themselves in acts of 
negative sum altruism—generosity, kindness, etc. are typically beneficial from an impartial 
perspective.   
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 Given these criteria, we can use the earthquake example mentioned above, so long as we 
stipulate that the agent in position to make the sacrifice knows that nobody will ever know about 
her decision.  So imagine the following scenario: 
 
  Earthquake: Two strangers, Mollee and Carmen, are trapped in slowly collapsing  
  wreckage.  Though Carmen is unaware of Mollee’s presence, Mollee can see that  
  Carmen’s leg will be crushed if Mollee does not move some of the debris.  But  
  Mollee also knows that the cost of saving Carmen’s leg will be certain death from 
  an onslaught of rubble that would be jarred loose.  Mollee makes the sacrifice and 
  is subsequently killed.  Carmen’s leg is saved, and a few hours later she is pulled  
  from the debris by rescue workers.  Nobody ever learns of Mollee’s sacrifice.    
 
Mollee’s decision to sacrifice her life for a stranger’s leg is undeniably generous.  But the 
important question is whether it was justified by the light of reason.  Rational Impartialism 
implies that it was not.  The reason why it was not justified is that Carmen’s good is no more 
valuable than Mollee’s, and as a rational being Mollee ought to give equal weight to equal 
portions of the good.  Mollee’s life is a source of more value than Carmen’s leg.  Hence, there is 
more counting in favor of Mollee’s letting Carmen’s leg be destroyed than there is for sacrificing 
her life.  The fact that Mollee’s act of negative-sum altruism was generous and driven by a deep 
concern for the welfare of others is not sufficient to justify making such a choice.         
 I suspect that some will want to defend acts of negative-sum altruism because such acts 
are widely held to be morally permissible.  And it certainly seems implausible that an agent who 
sacrifices her own greater good for the lesser good of someone else has done something morally 
wrong, and hence is deserving of blame.  Considerations such as these further support my 
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preference for avoiding moral concepts such as ‘permissible’ when engaging in theoretical 
ethics.  It is indeed highly plausible that acts such as the one chosen by Mollee in the above 
example do not merit blame.  But that is not to say that they are justified by the light of reason.   
 After his axiomatic deduction of the maxim of Benevolence in Methods III:XIII, 
Sidgwick claims that, once we set aside the distorting influence of derivative reasons of 
partiality, his impartialist principle is supported by common-sense.  He provides the following 
remarks:  
 
  I think that a ‘plain man,’ in a modern civilized society, if his conscience were  
  fairly brought to consider the hypothetical question, whether it would be morally  
  right for him to seek his own happiness on any occasion if it involved a certain  
  sacrifice of the greater happiness of some other human being,--without any  
  counterbalancing gain to any one [sic] else,--would answer unhesitatingly in the  
  negative. (ME 382) 
 
If we replace ‘morally right’ with the ‘ought’ of practical reason, I believe similar remarks would 
apply in the case of negative-sum altruism.  I suspect that a ‘plain man’ would deny that one 
ought to seek the happiness of others when this involves a sacrifice of one’s own greater 
happiness, and there is no counterbalancing gain to anyone else.  And if so, this suggests an 
independent challenge for proponents of partialism.  If we hold that it would generally be a 
mistake to count one’s own good less than the good of others, should we not also hold that it 
would be a mistake to count one’s own good more?  The best explanation for our judgement that 
one ought not count one’s own good less is that one’s own good is no less valuable than anyone 
else’s.  But nor is one’s own good any more valuable than anyone else’s.  So by parity of 
reasoning, we should conclude that one ought to give equal weight to the equal good of all.  At 
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the very least, the counterintuitiveness of counting one’s good less throws an onus probandi on 
those who argue that self-interest carries extra rational weight.
12
   
 
5  Conclusion 
My aim in this chapter has been to diminish the air of paradox surrounding Rational 
Impartialism.  I have addressed three general worries that might make it difficult for some to 
accept the truth of RI: that the view is implausibly demanding; that adhering to it would lead to 
alienation; and that it runs afoul of common judgements about altruism and supererogation.  
With respect to demandingness, I argued that pervasive irrationality in the objective-reason sense 
follows from any plausible theory of practical reason.  I argued further that our intuitions about 
cases involving extreme sacrifice or extreme impartiality do not tell strongly against RI once we 
bring all the relevant considerations into focus and eliminate possible distorting influences.   
 In response to alienation worries, I argued that appeals to the importance of an agent 
pursuing her own personal projects and commitments cannot be sufficient for undermining 
impartialist views because the mere fact that an agent cares deeply about a cause or project does 
not imply that its pursuit is justified by the light of reason.  I noted further that RI is in principle 
compatible with agents pursuing the projects and activities that most plausibly contribute to their 
welfare.  I also considered the worry that RI is incompatible with responding appropriately to the 
value of individuals.  In response, I explained why making comparisons and trade-offs 
concerning the good of persons is both necessary and innocuous, and that giving equal weight to 
the good of everyone when deciding how to act does not preclude having respect for each 
individual.   
                                                 
12
 Thanks to Julia Driver for alerting me to this particular challenge for proponents of partiality.   
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 Finally, I argued that intuitions supporting the reasonableness of negative-sum altruism 
can be explained away by the fact that such acts typically result from traits and motives that a 
generally beneficial for the greater good.  Additionally, we tend to think that such acts must be 
rationally permissible because they are clearly morally permissible.  When we jettison these 
moral terms and reflect on the simple question of what an agent has most reason to do, it 
becomes clear that one should not count one’s own good less than the equal good of someone 
else.   
 This concludes the presentation and defense of my Sidgwickian argument for Rational 
Impartialism.  In describing his masterpiece, Sidgwick writes: “The book solves nothing, but 
may clear up the ideas of one or two people, a little.”13 My central aim in writing this dissertation 
has been to show that Sidgwick provides most of the resources needed for solving what I take to 
be the most fundamental and important question of philosophical ethics.  If we accept that 
practical reasons are object-given and value-based, then we should also accept that the good of 
all is a source of reasons for all.  And when we compare Sidgwick’s axiom of Equal Good with 
the alternative maxim championed by proponents of partiality, we find that the former is on more 
stable ground.  Hence, we can conclude that there is not, as Sidgwick feared, a fundamental 
contradiction in one of the chief departments of human thought.  Though Sidgwick was right in 
his observation that each individual has special concern for her own existence, this fact about our 
inclinations does not track deep ethical truths.  When we encounter basic conflicts between 
personal or partial interests and the greater good of all, our ultimate reasons tell decisively in 
favor of the latter.   
 
                                                 
13
 Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir by A.S. and E.M.S. (Macmillan 1906).  Reference from Parfit (2011, 1: xxxiv).   
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